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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting 
Abstract 
Mandatory Disclosure of Interim Reporting by   
Malaysian Companies 
 
by 
Norhayati bte Alias 
 
Interim reporting has become an important medium that allows listed companies to 
communicate with their stakeholders. In Malaysia, accounting standards and listing 
requirements regulate disclosures for interim reports. This study analysed the quarterly reports 
issued by 60 listed companies in Malaysia during 2005-2007. It established the timeliness of 
these reports and the level of disclosure compared with those mandated by Financial 
Reporting Standard 134 Interim Reporting and Paragraph 2.22 of the listing requirement 
specified by the Malaysian Stock Exchange. An unweighted disclosure index model was 
developed to determine the level of disclosure.  Independent variables of company size, 
leverage, profitability, liquidity and industry are considered to be associated with the level of 
disclosure and timeliness. Both univariate and multivariate analyses were conducted to 
explore the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Findings for timeliness in this study reveal that: (a) some companies filed reports after the due 
date or allowable period had passed; (b) the length of time taken to file the report for the 
fourth quarter was longer than for other quarters; (c) the mean times for the filing of quarterly 
reports were 51 days for Q1 in all three years, 50 days for Q2 and Q3 in all three years, and 50 
days for Q4 in 2005 and 2006, and 56 days for 2007; and (d) the average mean time taken to 
file reports for each quarter was between 50 to 56 days. The result of the Friedman test 
implies that there are statistically significant differences in the mean rank for timeliness across 
years. However, a mixed result was found regarding the mean of timeliness between quarters. 
No industry effect was observed for the mean of timeliness. 
With regard to disclosure, this study found that the compliance level was between 87 and 97 
percent for all three years. In other words, none of the companies fully complied with all the 
disclosure requirements!  Results of one-way repeated analysis of variance revealed that there 
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was a significant difference in the means of the level of disclosure within the 2006 year. 
However, no significant differences could be observed for these means between quarters and 
across industries. Furthermore, there was a significant difference in the means of the level of 
disclosure for two groups of companies, those that “comply with the Reporting but not with 
the Listing” and those with “non-compliance with both requirements”. 
The regression analysis revealed that there was a mixed association between the levels of 
disclosure. For example, an association could be found for level of disclosure and company 
size for Q1 and Q3, profitability for Q3, and liquidity for Q2 and Q4. Similar results were 
observed for the determinants of timeliness, such as the company size for Q1, Q2 and Q3, 
profitability for Q1, Q3 and Q4, and liquidity for Q1 and Q2 had a relationship with the 
timeliness. In addition, no association was found between leverage and level of disclosure and 
leverage and timeliness for all quarters. 
A further investigation was conducted against the notes of quarterly reports to determine the 
extent of disclosure, namely comments on seasonality and cyclicality, review of the 
performance (quarterly and yearly), material changes in the profit before tax, company 
prospects (future and current), Board of Directors‟ opinion, and profit forecast. The findings 
reveal that most of the companies chose to satisfy only the minimum requirement. In addition, 
the Board of Directors‟ opinion and profit forecasts were frequently not made available. This 
study also revealed that no enforcement actions or penalties were imposed on the non-
compliant companies. 
 
Keywords: Interim reporting, level of disclosure, compliance, timeliness, characteristics, 
disclosure index 
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     Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 34 Interim Financial Reporting defines an interim 
financial report as a financial report containing either a complete set of financial statements 
(as described in IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements) or a set of condensed financial 
statements, as described in this Standard for an interim period.  It further defines an interim 
period as a financial reporting period shorter than a full financial year.  However, this 
standard does not specify which companies must publish such reports or how frequently they 
should be published.  The interim report could be issued quarterly, half-yearly or for any other 
period, depending on the regulations of the country concerned.  Examples of countries that 
provide quarterly reporting are the USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, China, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Saudi Arabia, while countries such as Japan, Australia, Singapore, New Zealand and the 
UK require companies to produce half-yearly reports.  IAS 34 allows companies to produce 
either a full set of financial statements that comply with the requirements of IAS 1 
Presentation of Financial Statements, or condensed financial statements consisting of a 
condensed balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and a statement of changes 
in equity, together with selected explanatory notes. In Malaysia, publicly listed companies are 
also subject to the requirement of Financial Reporting Standard
1
 (FRS) 134 Interim Financial 
Reporting and The Listing Requirements
2
, Para 9.22.  
Today, quarterly reporting has become one of the important mechanisms for management to 
communicate with investors. This importance is reflected in the actions taken by numerous 
national stock exchanges and securities regulators who have introduced interim financial 
reporting as a requirement for listing. The reason for such changes is because the interval 
between the annual financial statements is too long for investors to be without financial 
information from companies in which they have invested.  In fact, data in annual reports have 
become historical or outdated on the day they are released to the public, and will lead to an 
 
                                                 
1
   The Financial Reporting Standard is a renamed version of  the MASB standard beginning from 1 January 
2005. It is equivalent to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). 
2
   The Listing Requirement is a regulation for listed companies issued by Bursa Malaysia. Para 9.22 refers to 
disclosure made for periodic disclosures. 
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inaccurate prediction of a company‟s performance. Therefore, interim reports can help resolve 
this matter since they show the progress of a company within their yearly reporting cycle. 
Financial analysts worldwide claim that interim financial reporting is an important source of 
information in making decisions (Deppe, 1994).  At the same time, the importance of interim 
reports to stock market investors‟ decision-making is well documented in the  literature 
(Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). It is believed that these reports provide investors with 
material information on the financial condition of publicly listed companies in a timely, 
relevant and reliable manner to assist investors in making informed investment decisions, 
particularly, in accurately forecasting earnings and share prices (Abdel-Khalik & Espejo, 
1978; Allen et al., 1999; Foster, 1977).  
Furthermore, some countries (such as the USA and India) require companies to audit their 
interim financial reporting. Liming et al. (2006) reported that audited interim reporting helps 
to prevent managers from manipulating the earnings in the fourth quarter, thus increasing the 
credibility of the annual report. The benefits derived from quarterly reporting can be 
summarised as per Yee (2004):  
a) Improved timeliness of disclosure and more frequent reporting would help 
investors to monitor the performance of management and reduce agency frictions. 
b) By making stock prices impound interim reporting news more frequently, more 
frequent interim reporting would help improve the efficiency of capital allocation. 
c) By spreading news across more frequent interim earnings announcements, more 
frequent reporting may reduce information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
less sophisticated traders. Hence, this will improve market liquidity on earnings 
announcement dates. 
d) By reducing interim information asymmetry between insiders and the public, more 
frequent interim reporting may reduce wasteful redundant rent-seeking efforts by 
analysts trying to acquire undisclosed information.  
However, there are several drawbacks, or criticisms, regarding the interim report. The interim 
report was once regarded as the “forgotten report” (Taylor, 1965), which has never been 
subjected to auditing, unlike the annual reports. This reduces its usefulness in the eyes of the 
investors.  Furthermore, it can be costly to audit an interim report, since it needs to be 
produced either quarterly or half-yearly. The increased frequency of reporting will definitely 
increase the administration costs such as compiling and distributing (Yee, 2004). Yee further 
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explains that companies need more time and human resources to produce quarterly reports, 
since they have to be produced every three or six months.  This will impose a burden on 
companies, especially on management, since they are responsible for both the annual report 
and the interim report.  As such, this will lead to greater estimation problems (Reilly et al., 
1972) and exacerbates the short-term focus of the typical investor (Rahman et al., 2007). The 
integrity of the interim report is also questionable when a country does not require interim 
reports to be audited, as in Malaysia.  Moreover, the result of the fourth quarter will not be 
integrated into the annual report.  
Manegold and McNicholas (1983), Butler et al. (2007) and Gigler and Hemmer (1998) 
believe that mandating interim reporting will not improve timeliness.  In fact, Butler et al. and 
Gigler and Hemmer reveal that managers actually stop voluntarily disclosing information 
when interim reporting is mandatory. In other words, mandating frequent reporting can 
influence a company‟s propensity to issue voluntary disclosures that are potentially more 
precise indicators of a firm‟s value.    
1.2 Why interim reporting disclosure? 
Relating the above discussion to the Asian financial crisis that happened in 1997/1998, 
literature has suggested that a major contributing factor to this economic crisis was the lack of 
transparency, or inadequate disclosure, by corporate entities (Ho & Shun Wong, 2001; 
Rahman et al., 2007). Thus, it prevents investors and creditors from receiving necessary and 
timely information that would be useful for their investment decisions. In addition, disclosure 
and transparency affect both a company‟s operations and its performance as an investment. 
Operationally, rigorous disclosure and transparency systems enable management and the 
board of directors to allocate resources rationally and to run the business in accordance with 
strategic plans. In this respect, disclosure and transparency are important to managers and 
directors, and have the capacity to influence the company‟s ability to generate the intrinsic 
value of cash flows. 
Generally, corporate disclosure can be defined as a formal communication to inform the 
public about the performance of the company for a specific period. Specifically, disclosure is 
the communication of economic information, financial or non-financial, concerning a 
company‟s financial position and performance (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) . It can be presented in 
many forms, such as interim reports, prospectuses, and employee reports, announcements to 
the stock exchange, other printed material, and electronic media. However, the most 
prominent  disclosure to the shareholders is the annual report (Sighvi & Desai, 1971).  
 4 
Corporate disclosures can be divided into two broad categories: required disclosures and 
voluntary disclosures (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Required disclosures, also known as 
mandatory disclosures, are governed by the authorities who regulate the accountancy „laws‟ 
and the financial market(s) for that particular country. On the other hand, voluntary 
disclosures are when management decide to disclose information that exceeds the mandatory 
requirements (Ahmet & Serife, 2007).   
Research into corporate disclosures since the work of Cerf (1961) primarily focuses on the 
quality of the mandatory and voluntary disclosures. In general, disclosure studies can be 
divided into two schools of thought. One school of thought investigates the determinants of 
disclosure decisions (e.g. Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). Results of these and similar studies 
have been mixed, which leads to the second school of thought, the inspection of the capital 
market implications of disclosure (e.g. Christine, 1997). Research in both schools of thought 
essentially analyses the mandatory and voluntary disclosures that appear in  annual reports.  
Previous literature indicates that users need information that will help them make better 
investment decisions, and this has been widely discussed following the many high-profile 
corporate failures that have occurred.  Consequently, many countries have actively reviewed 
their capital market regulations and financial reporting systems.  Malaysia is an example of an 
Asian country that has reviewed its capital market, resulting in the Securities Commission 
establishing a blueprint known as the Capital Market Master Plan (CMP). The CMP is a 
strategic blueprint charting the 10-year development of Malaysia‟s capital market. The CMP 
has six objectives
3
, one of which is to strengthen the regulatory regime. The Plan provided 
recommendations to achieve this objective by further enhancing disclosures in the annual 
reports that are prepared by listed companies in Malaysia.  In line with this, Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad (BMSB)
4
 now requires quarterly reporting of financial statements, 
commencing March 1999.  
The introduction of quarterly reporting is seen as one of the reform measures aimed at 
promoting greater transparency in the corporate sector (Capulong et al., 2000) and helps 
increase investor confidence in the capital market. Thus, the objective of having transparent 
and quality financial information would be achieved. Such timely information will reduce the 
 
                                                 
3
  The six objectives of the CMP are to be the preferred fund-raising centre for Malaysian companies, to 
promote an effective investment management industry and a more conducive environment for investors, to 
enhance the competitive position and efficiency of market institutions, to develop a strong and competitive 
environment for intermediation services, to ensure a stronger and more facilitative regulatory regime and to 
establish Malaysia as an international Islamic capital market centre.  
4
  Formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
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uncertainties and accordingly improve the quality of decisions made by the users of the 
financial statements. Clearly, companies could just simply comply with the regulations, but it 
is also possible that companies that produce interim reports do so because they provide better 
quality information to the users. Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) showed that full compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements is not attainable in practice, especially in emerging 
economies.  They cited, among others, less stringent regulatory and enforcement systems, and 
the high cost of employing professionally qualified accountants as contributing factors. 
Malaysia is an emerging economy, and it would be appropriate to examine the level of 
compliance achieved by Malaysian companies. In addition, the Financial Reporting Act 1997 
(FRA 1997) was enacted and enforced in July 1997 to give legal backing to accounting 
standards. Malaysia-listed companies are obliged to comply with the approved accounting 
standards issued by the Malaysia Accounting Standard Board
5
 (MASB). To ensure companies 
comply with the regulations, the FRA 1997 Act also grants enforcement powers to the 
Securities Commission, the Central Bank and the Registrar of Companies. This study reports 
on how well Malaysian companies comply with mandatory disclosure requirements for 
interim reports and, in addition, examines the determinants of interim reporting disclosures. 
1.3 Problem statement 
Research on interim reporting was introduced in the U.S. with the earliest survey conducted 
by Taylor (1965), followed by Lipay (1972), Edwards et al. (1972), Beresford and Rutzler 
(1976), and Mc Ewen and Schwartz (1992), to name a few.  One stream of research in this 
area discusses the effect of quarterly reporting on the accuracy of forecasted earnings and 
share prices, while another stream of research investigates the aspects of usefulness, reliability 
and timeliness of quarterly reporting from a user‟s perception.  However, little research has 
been carried out to investigate the total compliance of mandatory disclosure for interim 
reporting. Further, these two streams of research were conducted when interim reporting was 
voluntary (see Marty et al., 2007) and it is not conclusive (see Ku Ismail & Chandler, 2004, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2007). Therefore, this study will provide a new dimension for a wider 
research area for interim reporting, because it is conducted under mandatory practices. 
This study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the following ways. Firstly, 
the study is unique in that it will provide findings on the quality of interim reporting from the 
 
                                                 
5
  The Malaysia Accounting Standard Board (MASB) is the sole body that formulates accounting standards in 
Malaysia. It was formed under FRA 1997, with the Financial Reporting Foundation as a body to oversee MASB 
activities. 
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„adequacy‟ perspective6.  Adequacy refers to total compliance for mandatory disclosure of 
interim reporting among Malaysian companies from two aspects: the disclosure requirement 
for interim reporting, namely the FRS 134 Interim Reporting (hereafter Reporting), and the 
Listing Requirement Para 2.22 (hereafter Listing). Further, this study will look at the 
relationship between company attributes that influence compliance for mandatory disclosure 
of interim reporting across all quarters. This is done because many studies have been 
conducted to test company characteristics with the level of disclosure in annual reports, or the 
effect on interim reports for the third or fourth quarter.  With all this in mind, the following 
research objectives were formulated. 
1.4 Research objectives 
This study is undertaken: 
 To examine whether a company complies with the interim reporting requirement of 
Malaysian companies for the period 2005 to 2007;  
 To investigate whether there is a significance difference between years and quarters 
on the level of disclosure and timeliness; and 
 To explore the relationship between company attributes and the level of disclosure 
and timeliness.  
To achieve these objectives, a number of specific hypotheses were developed and will be 
tested. Various statistical analyses were used to test the hypotheses with the aim of answering 
the following research questions: 
a) How well do Malaysian companies comply with mandatory disclosure requirements 
for interim reports as a consequence of implementing FRS 134? 
b) Are there any significant differences between year and quarter regarding the level of 
disclosure and timeliness? 
c) What company characteristics are associated with the level of disclosure and 
timeliness?  
1.5 Scope of the study 
Primarily, this study empirically investigates the „adequacy‟ of mandatory information 
disclosure practices of the Malaysian companies. FRS 134 Interim Reporting permits a 
 
                                                 
6
  The adequacy perspectives in this study adopt the meaning given by Owusu-Ansah (1998) with 
modification. This study investigates „adequacy‟ with reference to the reporting requirement for interim 
reporting as compared to Owusu-Ansah‟s study that investigated „adequacy‟ with reference to the reporting 
requirements for annual reports. 
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complete set of financial statements or a set of condensed financial statements. However, this 
study only considers a set of condensed financial statements because the minimum disclosure 
requirement is subject to the requirements of FRS 134 and Para 9.22 Bursa Malaysia. This 
means if company chooses to present a set of condensed financial statements, it is not 
required to comply with all the Financial Reporting Standard‟s disclosures. In addition, the 
study does not consider the disclosure practices of regulated companies, such as banks and 
MESDAQ Market, since these companies are subject to different regulation requirements. 
This study adopts the adequacy measurements outlined by Qwusu-Ansah (1998) , and  
therefore does not investigate the accounting recording systems or the other measurement 
aspects of financial accounting standards. It does not focus on the adequacy of other areas of 
accounting, such as cost and managerial accounting, or accounting information systems. No 
attempt was made to assess the accounting principles employed and/or the estimates made by 
management when preparing the financial statements of the sample companies. Further, this 
study does not investigate press releases or any other form of communication that is or could 
be associated with interim reporting.  
1.6 Contribution of the study 
This study will contribute to the body of literature mainly concerning Malaysia and its policy 
makers. The contribution can be seen from three aspects. Firstly, this study will look in detail 
at the regulations, namely the disclosure requirement, that govern interim reporting in 
Malaysia. Therefore the results of this study are sufficiently interesting to warrant an 
extension to the research area on mandatory disclosure, particularly in the area of interim 
reporting either in Malaysia or other countries and conducted for larger sample sizes. This is 
because the disclosure requirement used in this study refers to FRS 134 Interim Reporting and 
Listing requirement. As for the FRS 134 Interim Reporting, this standard is equivalent to IAS 
34 Interim Reporting and this means this study can be adopted by other countries. However, 
the Listing Requirement needs to be modified to suit the Securities Commission regulation 
under which the study is to be conducted. 
Secondly, the findings of this study are unique and differ from those in other literature on 
interim reporting for disclosure because all aspects of mandatory disclosure, namely 
timeliness, level of disclosure, extent of disclosure and company characteristics were tested 
under one study. Further, the test of mandatory disclosure was carried out for all four quarters, 
unlike other studies of interim reporting that usually focused on either quarter 3 or quarter 4 
and ignored what had happened in quarter 1 and quarter 2.   
 8 
Thirdly, this study provides a new dimension of compliance by introducing the classification 
of the nature of compliance based on the disclosure requirement. This study discovered that 
the nature of compliance can be classified into the following four groups, namely: 
Group 1- Comply with the Reporting and the Listing 
Group 2- Comply with Reporting, but not with Listing 
Group 3- Comply with Listing, but not Reporting 
Group 4- Do not comply with Reporting and Listing. 
Another significant contribution of this study as far as interim reporting is concerned, is the 
development of a checklist using thematic content to measure the extent of disclosure.  
Fourthly, the prominent disclosure model, namely disclosure indices, has been used in this 
study as a basis for establishing the extent of disclosure and identifying the company‟s 
characteristics that influence the disclosure pattern that is widely used in annual reports.  A 
self-constructed checklist was established as part of the research process. It is the first 
comprehensive checklist for an interim reporting study based on Malaysia disclosure 
requirements and issues of validity and reliability have been addressed (it can be used) . The 
checklist will provide guidance to future researchers concerning the collection of data relevant 
to disclosures related to interim reporting.  
Findings of this study are also important for policy makers. The recommendation made in the 
blue print of the Capital Market Master Plan by the Securities Commission is to enhance 
disclosure of Listed Companies. The measure is carried out with the objective of 
strengthening the capital market regulation in order to prevent the effect of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Further, users will always be the centre of attention in protecting their 
investment interest. Therefore, it is important for users to have timely and quality information 
for decision making. However, the findings reveal that there are still issues concerning 
compliance. Thus, the Securities Commission should identify the reasons companies do not 
comply with the reporting regulations and then take appropriate action to address this issue.  
1.7 Outline of the subsequent chapters 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 explains the legislation of interim 
reporting in Malaysia. Chapter 3 provides a review of literature relating to interim reporting.  
Chapter 4 elaborates on the conceptual framework, identifies the variables, and develops the 
hypotheses in this study. Chapter 5 describes the research methodology, sample selection 
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procedure, and data analysis technique.  The results are reported and discussed in Chapter 6. 
The final chapter will summarise and conclude the analysis, and offer recommendations. 
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     Chapter 2 
Legislation of Interim Reporting in Malaysia 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to provide a context for this study, Chapter 2 will review the legislation relating to 
interim reporting in Malaysia. The discussion will focus on two reports: the half-yearly report 
and the quarterly report, which coincide with the periods pre- and post-1999. The post-1999 
period is a formally regulated environment. 
2.2 Half-yearly reporting (before 1999) 
Interim reporting was first introduced in Malaysia in 1966. During the period 1966 to 1999, 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (now known as Bursa 
Malaysia) were subject to the requirements under the Listing Undertaking
7
. Directors of listed 
companies were encouraged to issue half-yearly reports as soon as possible after the end of 
the period, stating the profitability of and revenue from the company‟s activities, plus any 
material factors that may change the earning capacity of the firm (Lim, 1996).  The Exchange 
also had the right to publish the half-yearly reports after they had been filed. The Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore Gazette dated 7 February 1967 contained the first 
publication of the half-year reports from several companies. However, those reports were very 
brief and qualitative in nature – no figures on profitability and revenue were reported. 
In 1987, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) introduced its new Listing Manual. 
Under this regulation, company directors were required to submit a half-yearly report to the 
Exchange within three months after the end of the half-year period. The report should disclose 
company activities, profits and any material factors and/or exceptional circumstances 
affecting the earning capacity and profits of the company. In addition, companies were 
required to state whether or not the figures had been audited. Six years later, the Listing 
Manual was replaced with the KLSE Listing Requirement (Amendment 1993). Listed 
companies were then required to submit half-yearly reports on a consolidated basis to the 
KLSE, although the submission period and the audit requirement remained the same. 
However, fixed formats as set out in notes attached to the Listing Requirement for the half-
 
                                                 
7
  The Listing Undertaking supplements the Listing Manual in the Articles of Association. In 1966, the three 
important charters governing a company during its active life were the Companies Act, the Memorandum & 
Articles of Association, and the Stock Exchange Listings Undertaking.  
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year reports were made available. The companies were required to present the items similar to 
the income statement. Further, companies were required to disclose factors affecting their 
earning/revenues, earnings per share, deferred tax, pre-acquisition profit, profits on sale of 
investments and properties, details of shares issued, current year prospects, and details of 
dividends. In 1997, this Listing Requirement was replaced by the KLSE Listing Requirement 
(Amendment 1997), which did not change the periodic reporting requirement. 
These regulations became more significant after the Malaysian Securities Commission issued 
the Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities in 1995. Under the Post-Listing 
Obligation of these Guidelines, listed companies were required to submit to the Securities 
Commission interim and annual financial reports immediately after the figures became 
available. These results were to be announced within the period stated in the listing 
requirements or the rules of the Stock Exchange on which the company was listed. 
2.3 Quarterly reporting (during and after 1999) 
In 1999, the KLSE announced that from 31 July 1999, all listed companies would be required 
to issue quarterly reports instead of half-yearly reports. It was intended that these quarterly 
reports would provide: 
 Greater and more timely disclosure of information regarding company results; 
 Improved enforcement of existing rules and regulations as part of the move towards 
making audit committees effective and promoting good corporate governance; 
 An awareness of increased sanctions that could be imposed on company directors 
and listed companies for wrongdoing and poor internal control systems due to the 
lack of corporate governance; and 
 Greater emphasis on the transparency and accountability of company directors, as 
the KLSE moves towards a full-disclosure regime.  
This quarterly reporting can be found through the KLSE LINK
8
. Further, the KLSE Listing 
Requirement (Amendment 1999) (KLSE, 1999) required companies to file with the KLSE a 
quarterly report on a consolidated basis as soon as the figures are available, but not later than 
two months after the end of each quarter. The quarterly report comprises the balance sheet, 
 
                                                 
8
  KLSE LINK is an internet-based electronic document management system that can be found on Bursa‟s 
websites. 
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income statement and explanatory notes. The year-to-date figures and comparative data from 
the immediately preceding year must also be disclosed.  
The Listing Requirements were further strengthened when the revamped Listing Requirement 
took place in 1999 and was submitted to the Malaysian Securities Commission for approval. 
Issued in January 2001, it was the first revamp undertaken by the KLSE since the Listing 
Requirements were introduced in 1987. One objective of the revamp was to strengthen the 
provisions regarding disclosure, financial reporting, continuing listing obligations and 
corporate governance. The additional requirements were as follows: 
 Quarterly reports must be prepared based on the accounting policies and 
measurement, which are consistent with those in the most recent audited annual 
accounts. Where an accounting policy in the quarterly report differs from that in the 
most recent audited annual accounts, the differences must be explained in the 
quarterly report (Section 9.22(2)(c)). 
 The listed issuer must comply with the approved accounting standards of the 
Malaysia Accounting Standard Board (MASB) to the extent that the approved 
accounting standards are applicable to a quarterly report (Section 9.22(2)(d)). 
 In circumstances where a change in an applicable accounting standard of MASB (or 
other legislation) becomes effective during a financial year and will be applicable to 
the preparation of the listed issuer‟s forthcoming annual audited accounts, the basis 
of preparation of the quarterly reports during the financial year must be consistent 
with that of the audited annual accounts (Section 9.22(2)(e)). 
The revised Listing Requirement also strengthened the fixed format for quarterly reporting. 
Under this revised requirement, companies are required to disclose the consolidated income 
statement and the balance sheet, together with 21 explanatory notes covering inter alia 
accounting policies, the nature of exceptional items (if any), the status of corporate proposals 
and the nature of borrowing. In addition, the new requirements detail the contents of the 
quarterly report for closed-end funds. 
In the same year, MASB issued its Draft Statement of Principles #4 (DSOP 4), Interim 
Financial Reporting. The DSOP provides guidance on the application of accounting 
principles and financial reporting practices of listed companies in the preparation of quarterly 
reports. In addition, application of the principles presented in DSOP 4 facilitates compliance 
with the KLSE Listing Requirement regarding quarterly reports. This Statement provides 
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guidance on best practice regarding the preparation of quarterly reporting. Among others, the 
statement suggests the use of the discrete method
9
 rather than the integral method
10
 for the 
preparation of quarterly reports. The Statement also encourages companies to publish either a 
complete set of financial statements or a set of condensed financial statements to meet users‟ 
needs.  All this guidance cannot be found in the KLSE Listing Requirement. Therefore, the 
issuance of DSOP 4 to a Statement of Principles 2 (SOP 2) in July 2000 provided another 
milestone in the development of quarterly reporting in Malaysia. However, this Statement 
provides guidance only – in other words, the Statement does not have legal backing. 
Therefore, MASB took a further step in March 2001 by issuing Exposure Draft 30 Interim 
Financial Reporting (ED30), which, after going through the due diligence process of standard 
setting, ultimately became MASB 26 Interim Financial Reporting in 2002. The Standard is 
essentially an adoption of IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1998. This Standard is an approved accounting 
standard (AAS). Approved accounting standards were granted legal backing under S.27 of the 
Financial Reporting Act 1997 (FRA 2007), which has now been replaced with S.26D of the 
Financial Reporting (Amendment) Act 2004 (FRA 2004), as follows: 
“Where financial statements are required to be prepared under any 
law administrated by the SC, Central Bank or the Registrar of 
Companies, such financial statements shall be deemed not to have 
complied with the requirements of such law unless they have been 
prepared and are kept in accordance with the approved accounting 
standard.” 
MASB 26 prescribes two additional statements as well as the existing Listing Requirement – 
a condensed statement showing either all changes in equity or changes in equity other than 
those arising from capital transactions with owners and distributions to owners, and a 
condensed cash flow statement. Thus, listed companies need to prepare five statements. In 
addition, MASB 26 does not specifically recommend the recognition principles for interim 
financial reporting. The Standard only provides examples of how to use the discrete and the 
integral approach, and in favour of the former. 
 
                                                 
9
  The discrete method treats each interim period as an accounting period distinct from the annual cycle.  The 
transactions reported in the interim period should reflect the economic activity of that particular quarter 
independent of the other quarters, rather than outcomes based on a forecast of the operations of the forthcoming 
year. Under this method, deferrals, accruals and estimates at the end of each interim period should be determined 
by the principles that apply to the annual periods. 
10
  The integral method regards an interim period as part of the larger annual reporting cycle. It considers that 
each interim period is affected by judgments made in the interim period as to results of operations in the annual 
period. Under this perspective, deferrals, accruals and estimates reported in each interim period reflect the 
accountant‟s belief as to what is likely to transpire relative to the results of operations for the entire year. 
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The enforcement body, namely the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission,  in 
Malaysia has also made amendments to the Companies Act 1965 and Securities Industries Act 
1983 (SIA 1983), respectively in conjunction with the announcement of FRA 1997.  For 
example, the Companies Act 1965 inserted subsection 1 to S.166A to refer to the approved 
accounting standard used in the Companies Act 1965. This change carried a similar meaning 
assigned thereto in section 2 of FRA 1997. Further, the Securities Commission came out with 
a new regulation for the Securities Industries Act 1983 that applies to the financial statements 
and accounts of listed companies, effective from 18 June 1999. This regulation may also be 
cited as the Security Industry (Compliance with Approved Accounting Standards) Regulation 
1999. This regulation highlighted that “approved accounting standard” shall have the meaning 
assigned to the expression in Section 2 of FRA 1997 (S3 SIA 1983). In addition, the Act also 
laid out that failure to comply with approved accounting standard is an offence. Specifically, 
S.4 of this Act requires that: 
 Every listed corporation, its directors and chief executive shall prepare and present 
or cause to be prepared and presented the financial statements, and if the listed 
corporation is a holding corporation for which consolidated financial statements are 
required, the consolidated financial statements, of the listed corporation in 
accordance with approved accounting standards (S4(1) SIA 1983); 
 Every director of a listed corporation shall ensure that the accounts, and if the listed 
corporation is a holding corporation for which consolidated accounts are required, 
the consolidated accounts, of the listed corporation, when laid before the annual 
general meeting are made out in accordance with approved accounting standards 
(S4(2) SIA 1983); and 
 Any person who contravenes sub-regulation (1) or (2) commits an offence (S4(3) 
SIA 1983). 
Following the introduction of MASB 26, KLSE once again amended their Listing 
Requirements in July 2002 so that reports for quarters ending on or after 30 September 2002 
must be prepared in accordance with MASB 26.  The amendment also eliminated the fixed 
format that has been described in the previous listing requirement. 
Beginning on 1 January 2005, the approved accounting standards were renamed Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRSs), in line with similar moves by other countries in the region. 
MASB also changed the numbering of the standards to correspond with the International 
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Accounting Standards.  Hence, MASB 26 is now known as FRS 134 Interim Financial 
Reporting.  
Today, companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are subject to the requirements of FRS 1342002 
which become operative for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 
2002. FRS 1342002 applies if an entity is required or elects to publish interim financial reports 
in accordance with FRSs. MASB encourages all entities, which elect to provide interim 
financial reports, to conform to the recognition, measurement and disclosure principles set out 
in FRS 1342002. The Standard permits entities to publish either: 
 A complete set of financial statements11 (as described in FRS 101 “Presentation of 
Financial Statements”); or  
 A set of condensed financial statements12 (as described in FRS 1342002). 
The objective of this Standard is to prescribe the minimum content of an interim financial 
report.   FRS 1342002 does not mandate which entities should be required to publish interim 
financial reports, or how soon after the end of an interim period. However, the Standard 
encourages listed companies to make their interim financial reports available no later than 60 
days after the end of the interim period, which is consistent with the Bursa requirement of two 
months. Currently, the disclosure requirements for quarterly reporting are subject to FRS 134 
Interim Financial Reporting and Part A of Appendix 9B of the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirement.   
 
                                                 
11
  Complete financial statements refer to an interim financial report that contains a complete set of financial 
statements; the form and the content of the interim report should conform to the requirement of FRS 101. It 
should not be described as complying with FRS, unless it complies with all the requirements of each applicable 
standard or each applicable interpretation issued by MASB. 
12
  Condensed financial statements should include, at a minimum, each of the headings and subtotals that were 
included in the entity‟s most recent annual financial statements and the selected explanatory notes required by 
FRS 134. Additional line items or notes shall be included if their significance in the overall context of the entity 
has changed since the most recent annual financial report and their omission would make the condensed interim 
financial statements misleading. 
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The development of interim reporting in Malaysia is summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Interim reporting in Malaysia before 1999 and during and after 1999 
 Before 1999 During and after 1999 
Frequency Half-yearly report Quarterly report 
Submission period 
As soon as possible, and later 
changed to three months. 
60 days or two months 
Standard No standard, only guidance. Effective from 2002 
Legal No Governed by FRA (Amendment) 2004 
Purpose Internal use External user 
 
In order to ensure that listed companies comply with the current regulations, the Securities 
Commission monitors listed companies through a financial reporting surveillance and 
compliance programme. The objectives of this programme are to ensure that listed companies 
comply with approved accounting standards in the preparation and presentation of their 
financial statements. When a listed company fails to comply with approved accounting 
standards, the Securities Commission has broad powers to direct the company and its 
directors, or chief executive, to take the necessary rectifying actions, or make the necessary 
announcements with respect to the non-compliance or rectification required. Such offences 
also carry a general penalty of a fine not exceeding RM1 million, or imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding five years, or both (Darus, 2005). This action shows the seriousness on the 
Securities Commission‟s part to carry out its duty as an enforcement body. 
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     Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with a broad definition of the quality of disclosure that has been used in the 
literature, and then discusses previous literature from the perspectives of compliance with 
disclosure regulations, the timeliness and extent of disclosure of interim reporting.  
3.2 Quality of disclosure 
The quality of disclosure in corporate annual reports and accounts has been represented in the 
literature by several constructs: adequacy (Buzby, 1974), comprehensiveness (Barett, 1976), 
informativeness (Alford et al., 1993), and timeliness (Courtis, 1976; Whittred, 1980) (as cited 
in Wallace et al., 1994, p43). Nonetheless, the ambiguity of the meaning of quality of 
disclosure is still a relevant question emphasised in the literature. For example, Imhoff (1992) 
showed that it is difficult to come to an agreement as to the criteria of quality financial 
reporting. He suggests that “high accounting quality is closely associated with conservative 
accounting methods and full financial disclosures”. McEwen and Schwartz (1992) agreed that 
it is difficult to measure the quality of interim reports, and argued that the compliance with the 
minimum disclosure requirement, the presence of „settling up‟13 in the fourth quarter, and 
accuracy of the reports, were to be associated with the quality of interim reports.  
Research on the quality of corporate disclosure was conducted in several ways. Research 
studies have used earning variability or persistence, forecast accuracy and bias, predictability 
of future performance and content quality as proxies for disclosure.  The quality measurement 
tool used for each of these research studies also varies from best annual report content, 
Association of Investment Management Research (AIMR) rating, auditor type checklist, 
Standard and Poor measurement, market reaction, and disclosure index approach. Content 
analysis with index of disclosure methodology is widely used in most of the disclosure 
studies.  
Measuring the quality of interim reporting has been approached in a number of different ways 
in the literature. The quality of interim financial disclosures is either measured in terms of the 
 
                                                 
13
  „Settling up‟ in the fourth quarter refers to the practice whereby managers use the fourth quarter to perform 
the adjustments related to the first three quarters. 
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extent of disclosure (Robb, 1980; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998; West, 1998), compliance with 
the disclosure regulations (McEwen & Schwartz, 1992; Samantha & Greg, 1997; Short & 
Palmer, 2003), or timeliness (Leftwich et al., 1981; Robb, 1980). However, Robb integrated 
content of disclosure and timeliness in his measure of disclosure quality. 
3.3 Compliance with the disclosure regulation 
In 1910, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) advocated the preparation of interim 
statements (Taylor, 1965). In 1946, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required 
public listed companies to issue quarterly reports in response to the demand for more timely 
reports by external investors. Nine years later, companies were required to prepare unaudited 
income statements  on a semi-annual basis to be filed on form 9K under the SEC‟s 
jurisdiction (Taylor, 1965). In 1962, the American Stock Exchange changed its listing 
requirements to require listed companies to publish quarterly income statements. Ultimately, 
in 1973, the Accounting Principles Board got into the act by issuing Opinion No 28, also 
known as APB No 28.  Since the 1960s, interim reports have received considerable attention 
from researchers. A survey conduct by Waldron (1961) provided evidence that a number of 
British companies prepared half-yearly reports, while four large firms published simple 
quarterly profit statements. Three of these four companies had majority shareholders from 
America. This shows that interim reporting has been recognised as an important means of 
communicating information about company performance. The Waldron study argued the 
advantages and disadvantages of interim reporting and is descriptive in nature.  
Taylor‟s (1965) research was one of the earliest studies in the USA to investigate interim 
reports. Six hundred companies were studied to determine the trend in and techniques used in 
publishing interim reports.  His work is basically descriptive with no hypotheses tested. 
Taylor categorised the content of the interim report into income statement, balance sheet, 
textual material, and others.  First, he found that the most common statement prepared by 
these companies was the income statement, and that 97% of them published comparative 
figures. In addition, 40% of the companies studied published both cumulative and quarterly 
figures.  Second, Taylor reported that only 20% of the reports contained balance sheets with 
78% publishing comparative figures. He explained that the low level of disclosures was due to 
the fact that the balance sheet was not required by all stock exchanges, or the SEC at that 
time. Third, textual materials were reported to contain the greatest level of variation, with 
more than 60% of the companies forecasting future income, and using textual material to 
explain the interim results. Taylor also discovered that management had a desire to change 
and improve their interim reports by suggesting that they change from semi-annual to 
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quarterly reporting, and from reporting to only the financial press to reporting to both the 
financial press and the stockholders. It can therefore be seen that the early studies of interim 
reporting were basically descriptive with no hypotheses testing. 
Holmes (1971) carried out a survey on interim reports issued by the top 100 UK companies, 
where quarterly reporting is voluntary, to determine trends in published interim reports. His 
study can be considered as the most comprehensive empirical study on interim reporting 
during that time. Several findings are of particular interest. He provided evidence that a 
number of companies do not prepare either half-yearly or quarterly statements, with few 
companies publishing quarterly reports. Distribution methods also differed among companies, 
with newspaper or direct mail to individual shareholders being the most widely-used method. 
He also found that a large number of companies emphasised problems associated with the 
interpretation of half-yearly results, and that a large number of disclosures in the interim 
reports were very brief. In fact, none of the companies suggested that quarterly or half-yearly 
report figures could be used to provide moving annual totals. A closer inspection of 29 
income statements revealed that the information disclosed was not consistent among 
companies. The most common items disclosed were total sales, total operating profit before 
tax, total tax, profit after tax, minority interests, and profit applicable to the holding company. 
Holmes also conducted interviews with officials of some of the companies to gain insight  
into why companies were not prepared to issue quarterly reports. The officials expressed 
concerns over the usefulness of quarterly reports, saying that issuing a quarterly statement 
would be misleading when their business was seasonal in nature. 
Lipay (1972) conducted a study to determine interim reporting practices. Lipay sent 4000 
questionnaires to the active members of the Financial Executives Institutes (FEI) in the US, 
and obtained 1214 (30.4%) responses. Looking at frequency, 91.3% of the respondent 
companies published their interim reports on a quarterly basis, followed by semi-annually 
(5.3%) and monthly (3.45%). With respect to reporting lag, the majority of the quarterly 
reporting companies took between eight and 28 days to publish their reports. The study also 
indicated that most respondents put greater emphasis on the presentation of the income 
statement as compared to presentation of balance sheet. However, the study noted that only 
35% of the respondent companies published complete income statements. The 
comprehensiveness of the items published in the income statements varied, with the most 
prevalent income item reported being the amount of sales (or revenues), “net income before 
extraordinary items and taxes”, “extraordinary items”, “earnings per share”, or combinations 
of these. As for the balance sheet, only 19% of the companies provided a complete balance 
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sheet, with the majority disclosing only some specific balance sheet items, such as total 
current assets, property, plant and equipment, total current liabilities, long-term debt, 
stockholders‟ equity, and common shares outstanding. Other than these two statements, 6% of 
the companies published the statement of financial position and 4% disclosed forecast 
information. In addition, some companies provided segment information either using segment 
sales figures or segment net income figures. Other information such as an order backlog 
report, capital expenditure, new business, capital reconciliation, and production output were 
also presented by some of the companies.  
Edwards et al. (1972) undertook a research study sponsored by the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA) with the objective of contributing towards the improvement of interim 
reporting.  They interviewed users, specifically professional investors and creditors, as well as 
preparers, to determine the uses of interim reports. The interim reports of UK companies 
covering the 1968 and 1969 fiscal years for 250 companies were analysed. It was observed 
that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (ASE) had 
made significant contributions to the increase in interim reporting. In other words, the changes 
made in the listing requirement witnessed a significant growth in the volume of such 
reporting.  Nevertheless, this study suggests improvements for interim reporting, such as 
reducing the delay in publishing interim reports and greater disclosure including the provision 
of comparative data in the financial statements, forecast income statement data, a financial 
narrative section, and a statement by management in order to enhance the usefulness of such 
reports. Their major findings from the interviews include the following points: 
 Interim reports were found useful since the interim reports are used in their analysis, 
although such reports did not usually represent the most important source of 
information. 
 The study did not support the single purpose theory that interim reports are used to 
predict current year results. Instead, the respondents indicated that interim reports 
are used to forecast results for quarters in current and future years, as well as to 
forecast current and future annual results. 
 The analysts complained that interim reports lack detail because of over-
condensation. In order to better forecast annual results, they require not only sales 
and net earnings figures, but also the cost components such as cost of sales, and 
depreciation, research, advertising and interest charges. In addition, earnings before 
tax, extraordinary items, prior period adjustments, accounting policy changes, 
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product-line breakdowns, and forecasts by management would also be desirable. 
Other necessary information includes disclosure of balance sheet and funds flow 
information.   
 The findings revealed that the analysts ranked textual materials second in 
importance to income statement data. However, many providers of interim reports 
interviewed did not favour the reporting of information about the prospects of the 
company. They contended that it was the responsibility of investors to develop their 
own expectations.  
 The interviewees agreed with the position that the same accounting principles that 
govern annual reporting should be applied to interim reporting. 
Beresford and Rutzler (1976) investigated the impact of the new SEC rules, the Accounting 
Series Release, ASR No 177, on quarterly reporting. ASR No 177 expands the requirement of 
Form 10Q quarterly reports to include the disclosure of current and comparative balance 
sheets, an income statement, the statement of changes in financial position, and the 
management‟s narrative. They examined the interim reports sent to shareholders for the first 
quarter of 1976, as well as Form 10Q quarterly reports that had been submitted to SEC. Their 
findings revealed that Form 10Q was found to substantially comply with the new 
requirements of SEC, though the incidence of explanatory disclosures was limited. The 
variation in the content and number of footnote disclosures suggested that more definitive 
guidelines might be necessary. 
Maingnot (1982) observed and compared the disclosure pattern for interim reports with the 
minimum information prescribed by the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  This study was 
carried out on 37 and 43 interim reports of UK companies for the years 1975 and 1979, 
respectively. The findings are divided into three sections: financial information, notes to the 
financial information, and ancillary information. For the first section, Maingnot concluded 
that there was no significant difference in disclosure, and companies tended to comply with 
the minimum disclosure requirements of LSE for both years. The pattern of disclosure implies 
that more disclosures were made in the latter year. For the notes to the financial information, 
the author highlighted that seven companies in 1975 and nine companies in 1979 did not state 
that the interim reports were unaudited. The majority of reports gave dividend information 
that shows an increase in the dividend paid. This section also reported no discussion centred 
on the sources and applications of funds, and no comments were made regarding the balance 
sheet. As for ancillary information, the study found that no company released its information 
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before week six in 1975. However, the ancillary information became available by week four 
in 1979.  
McEwen and Schwartz (1992) conducted a study in the U.S. to investigate whether firms 
comply with the disclosure requirements specified in APB Opinion No 28 Interim Financial 
Reporting. A total of 76 firms for the year 1989 were the subject of this study. Specifically, 
the interim reports were examined for compliance with the minimum disclosure requirements 
for the following items: (i) sales or gross revenue, (ii) provision for income taxes, (iii) net 
income, and (iv) other required disclosures. They found that firms do not disclose all the 
information required by APB Opinion No 28. The higher compliance among these items can 
be found in “seasonal revenues, costs or expenses” and “primary and fully diluted EPS” under 
categories (i) and (iii), respectively, and the researchers concluded such non-compliance 
diminishes the usefulness of interim reports. They further suggested that auditor involvement 
and stricter enforcement are important for greater compliance, thereby enhancing the 
usefulness of the interim report. The study also reported that the extent of compliance with 
some of the disclosure requirements was difficult to determine from the reports. They noted 
that because of difficulties in distinguishing between possible non-compliance and 
unavailability of information, they were unable to conclude that firms do not disclose all of 
the information required. For example, the researchers had difficulty determining whether 
firms that failed to indicate seasonal operations did not have seasonal activities or were not 
complying with the disclosure guidelines. McEwen and Schwartz also performed the 
Friedman test to determine and compare the pattern of revenues for each firm.  They 
discovered that the revenues were not constant from one quarter to another, and that the mean 
rank of revenue in the fourth quarter was significantly greater than the revenues in the other 
three quarters. Although the difference might be attributed to industry or economic factors, it 
was suspected that at least some of the firms might not be complying with APB Opinion No 
28. 
On behalf of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Lunt 
(1982) undertook a comprehensive study of interim financial reporting in the UK. One part of 
his study was to examine interim reporting practices of a stratified random sample of 100 UK 
companies, selected from the Times Top 1000. A total of 50 companies were taken from the 
top half of the Times 1000 and the rest from the bottom half. They were classified as „large‟ 
and „small‟ groups, respectively.  Lunt also took a further random sample of 17 non-industrial 
companies that covered banks, insurance and property companies, giving a total of 117 
sample companies. The companies were asked to supply their most recent interim reports, 
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subsequent annual reports, and preliminary profit announcements. Lunt did not make any 
attempt to measure the overall disclosure for each company or apply any statistical test to 
measure whether there were any significant differences between companies, as had been 
performed in other disclosure studies. He believed that  it is very subjective to determine the 
relative importance of each item, and smaller companies might have less relevant information 
to disclose. He found that most of the companies complied with the minimum requirement of 
the Stock Exchange in disclosing the income statement, though not all companies disclosed 
information that was required in the half-yearly reports. He also made a comparison between 
small and large companies, and revealed that disclosures were greater for larger companies 
for most of the items. Lunt  also reported that there were a number of problems in establishing 
non-compliance. For some items, such as extraordinary items, non-disclosure may not 
represent non-compliance, but merely that the company did not have such an item at the half-
year stage. For example, the greater amount of disclosure found for overseas taxation in the 
annual reports suggests that the information that ought to be disclosed in the interim report 
was not disclosed.  
In Canada, Lambert et al. (1991) formed a study group sponsored by the Canadian Institute of 
Accountants (CICA) to review Section 1750 of the CICA Handbook, Interim Financial 
Reporting to Shareholders, to determine if changes in the Handbook were needed. They 
summarised their findings “Spotlight on Interim Reporting”. A survey of interim financial 
reports of 150 Canadian companies for the years 1989/1990 were used in this study. More 
than 100 types of interim data were analysed, including management reports to shareholders, 
operating summaries, and individual statement items. The research report addresses four 
major issues of interim reporting, namely, applicability, presentation and disclosure, 
measurement and recognition, and other matters. The study group concluded that the 
companies present much more information than that required by the Handbook, so they 
recommended that regulations be raised or amended to the level of current reporting practices. 
Following the recommendations made by the Cadbury Report (1992) concerning interim 
information on balance sheets and cash flow statements, a working party was formed by 
Coopers and Lybrand to survey and examine the interim reports of the UK companies 
(Coopers & Lybrand, 1992). A total of 168 of the top UK companies were selected for the 
survey. The working party reported that the level of disclosure was still low for non-
mandatory items, and that larger companies provided more disclosure than their smaller 
counterparts, particularly where the balance sheet, cash flow statement, segmental reporting 
and the notes were concerned. In this study, compared with the one undertaken by Lunt 
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(1982), there was an increase in the disclosures of balance sheet and cash flow information. 
These findings led to a proposal for the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to include the 
balance sheet and the cash flow statement  as a requirement in its standard on interim 
reporting.  
Frost and Pownall (1994) have examined differences in interim disclosure practices between 
the UK and the USA by comparing the frequency and timing of accounting disclosures made 
by foreign and domestic firms listed in the USA and in the UK. They also investigated the 
influence of selected firm characteristics on disclosure practices between these two countries. 
Their samples were based on the periodic disclosures of 107 firms from 13 domiciles with 
equity securities traded on the USA and/or the UK exchanges during 1989. This research 
expands the international accounting literature on voluntary disclosures by extending the 
definition of accounting disclosures to include annual financial statements, interim reports, 
and media disclosures. The findings revealed inadequate compliance for both mandatory and 
voluntary accounting requirements and cross-jurisdictional disclosure for annual and interim 
reports for both countries. It was found that compliance disclosures in the USA were more 
frequent, and there was a shorter reporting lag as compared to the UK; but these differences 
can be explained by the different disclosure rules that apply to each country. Finally, the study 
also found that disclosure frequency is positively correlated with firm size, exchange listing, 
and domicile.   
Hussey and Woolfe (1994) examined the disclosure and timeliness of interim reports of 61 
UK companies that were reported in the Financial Times, and 223 interim reports that were 
sent to shareholders, in order to determine whether they complied with London Stock 
Exchange requirements. Generally, disclosures made are related to the profit, and the amount 
of information provided was extremely modest. Of the reports issued to the shareholders, 21% 
contained a balance sheet, and only 3.6% contained a cash flow statement. Overall, only a 
small percentage fully complied with the requirements.  
The earlier study of interim reporting discussed above is only descriptive, and no hypothesis 
was tested. Therefore, during that time, no conclusion can be made to determine to what 
extent an individual company disclosed, or tried to associate it with some company attributes, 
although the information had been gathered.  However, later research has conducted some 
hypotheses testing, and provides more insight into the nature of interim reporting. 
In another study, Hussey and Woolfe (1998) compared the timing and reporting practices of 
interim reports for the UK companies prepared in 1992 and 1997. Analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) and chi-squared test were employed in this study.  The authors reported that there 
was a substantial growth in the publication of an auditor‟s review report in the interim report, 
although the review was not mandated in the UK. They also found that there was a substantial 
increase in voluntary information disclosed in the interim reports, particularly with regard to 
the balance sheet, cash flow statement, and total recognised gains and losses. Hussey and 
Woolfe also investigated the relationship of the presence of an auditor‟s review report in the 
interim report with four company attributes, namely, size, industry, reporting lag, and the 
publication of voluntary information. The results indicate that the presence of an auditor‟s 
review report is likely to be directly associated with the size of the company and the amount 
of voluntary information it disclosed. However, the type of industry has no influence over the 
publication of an auditor‟s review reports, and there is no evidence that the work involved in 
preparing the audit review would delay the release of the interim reports. 
Tan and Tower (1997) examined the half-yearly reports issued by 89 Australian and 97 
Singaporean companies to evaluate and determine the factors that explained the compliance 
for interim reporting practices. The statistical tools of ANOVA and t-test were employed, and 
a disclosure index based on financial statement and other information was established.  The 
findings revealed that Singaporean companies had a higher level of compliance as compared 
to their Australian counterparts, although the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) had a higher 
standard of disclosure. A closer examination of specific accounting requirements for both 
countries was also carried out. It was found that none of the items investigated had a similar 
level of compliance between Australian and Singaporean companies. For instance, in 
Australia, 33.7% of companies did not comply with the requirement to have a commentary by 
directors, whereas all Singaporean companies complied with this requirement.   
West (1998) carried out a disclosure study of 40 interim reports for five leading sectors of the 
industry (excluding mining and insurance) for listed South African companies. The interim 
reports of the four largest and the four smallest companies from each of the sectors for 1995 
to 1997 were studied. The overall disclosure levels for each company were measured using a 
disclosure index model with respect to the Companies Act and the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirements. They were also scored for their disclosure with respect 
to IAS 34, Interim Financial Reporting. This study hypothesised that the level of disclosure 
varies with the type of industry and size of the company. The ANOVA test performed on the 
type of industry and company size revealed that there was some variation in the level of 
disclosure. It is obvious that the disclosure level of commercial banks was significantly 
different from that of companies in other sectors. The study also concluded that the disclosure 
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levels for the four largest and the four smallest firms were significantly different within each 
industry. This study however, does not reveal the mean disclosure for each group under study, 
and therefore was not able to indicate the direction of these differences. It does not reveal 
whether banks have better disclosure as compared to other companies, or large firms have 
better disclosure as compared to small firms. In other words, it is not known where the 
differences lie. 
Bagshaw (1999) performed a survey of 30 of the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
100 UK companies to investigate interim statement disclosure practices. The interim 
statements inspected were dated between 30 June 1998 and 30 November 1998. With regard 
to the interim statement inspected, at least one primary statement was produced, in addition to 
the income statement required by the UK Listing Rules.  It was noted that there were also 
wide variations in the volume and nature of narrative disclosures. The content of the interim 
reports have become lengthy and more detailed than before. It was also noted that 70% of the 
FTSE 100 involved their auditors in the publication of their interim reports.  
More recently, Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) examined the extent of disclosure in the 
quarterly reports issued by Malaysian listed companies. The quarterly reports (to 30 
September 2001) of 117 companies were the subject of this study. The study firstly observed 
the level of compliance of overall disclosure with respect to the Listing Requirements of 
KLSE. It then observed the extent of narrative disclosures with respect to comments on 
material changes, review of performance, and current year prospects. Next, the extent of 
disclosure was tested for association with profitability, growth and leverage of the company. 
Generally, the companies disclosed all the mandatory financial statements and relevant notes 
to the accounts, but the extent of mandatory narrative disclosures varied. Overall, the 
companies appeared to provide a minimum level of required disclosures. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examined the efficacy of agency-related mechanisms on the 
degree of disclosure compliance with the ASB Statement on interim reports under a voluntary 
environment. The conclusion was drawn using 259 interim reports issued by companies that 
were listed on the London Stock Exchange for the years 2001 and 2002. Three disclosure 
indices were produced, namely, an overall disclosure compliance index, a narrative disclosure 
compliance index, and a financial statement disclosure compliance index. The findings of the 
study show that although overall disclosure compliance is high with 74.5% of the items of 
information being disclosed, there are companies that do not fully comply with the ASB 
Statement on interim reports. This shows that “full compliance may not be attainable without 
appropriate regulations” (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007, p419).  
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From the above discussion, it is important to note that an effective enforcement mechanism is 
needed to improve company compliance with the relevant regulations. In addition, reporting 
regulations that have clear guidelines about interim reporting do enhance the quality of 
disclosure. Therefore, enforcement bodies should ensure that all companies understand the 
regulations concerning interim reporting. However, it should also be noted that some 
companies choose to report the minimum amount of information that is required. Such 
companies comply with the reporting regulations, but it poses the question as to why they 
would do this if the objective of having interim reports is to provide more information to 
investors and to help resolve transparency issues. 
3.4 Timeliness 
Timeliness can be defined as having information available to decision makers before it loses 
its capacity to influence decisions (Ku Ismail, 2002). This is important for users who need 
timely information to ensure they do not make decisions based on out-of-date information.  
For users, the failure to disclose information in a timely fashion would result in the inefficient 
allocation of resources. In 1954, the American Accounting Association observed that 
“timeliness of reporting is an essential element of adequate disclosure” (Dyer & McHugh, 
1975, p204). Timeliness can be measured using frequency of reporting or the reporting lag. 
Frequency of reporting refers to how frequently interim reports are required to be issued, such 
as monthly, quarterly or  half-yearly. Most of these studies were carried out under a voluntary 
disclosure environment and were market-based research studies. Reporting lag refers to the 
time taken before the interim report is published, measured as the number of days after the 
end of the (interim) reporting period. Most of the disclosure studies on the timeliness of 
interim reporting focused on the reporting lag, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
3.4.1 Reporting lag 
Robb (1980) incorporated two factors that measure the quality of information in a report: the 
timeliness of the report, and  the financial data disclosed.  In his study of 40 New Zealand 
companies, Robb associated the quality of interim reporting with different sectors within 
which the companies operated.  He found that companies in the finance sector issued the 
highest quality of half-yearly reports, while those in the manufacturing and service sectors 
seemed to have the lowest quality of reports. Robb posited that quality (Q) is a direct function 
of the extent of content of the reports (C) and an inverse function of the reporting lag (T), 
where Q=(1/T)+ C. In determining the level of content, only five items were considered: 
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sales, cost of sales, profits, certain balance sheet items, and directors‟ comments. A weighted 
disclosure method was used to determine the level of content with scores divided into four 
levels between 1 and 4, ranging from complete and comparative, ratio change, non-quantified, 
and no disclosure. He used the mean and standard deviation as statistical tools to measure the 
quality of information. 
Lunt (1982) carried out a survey on the reporting lag of half-yearly interim reports issued by  
UK companies. He found that the interval between the end of the reporting period and the 
reporting date was between 61 and 90 days, with an average of 72 days. As for reporting lag, 
he found no statistically significant difference between the small and the large companies, 
even though the latter have to gather more information in order to prepare their reports. 
However, large companies tend to have more sophisticated information systems, which would 
reduce the amount of time needed to prepare the financial reports. Moreover, non-industrial 
companies produce their interim reports more quickly than industrial companies.  
A similar survey on the reporting lag of the UK companies was conducted by Coopers and 
Lybrand (1992) ten years later, and they found that the average time lag had improved to 53 
days. This is 67 days earlier than the allowable time of 120 days. In another study of the UK 
environment by Hussey and Woolfe (1998), it was found that more companies in the UK were 
issuing interim reports within 90 days in 1997 than in 1992. The average reporting lag 
improved from 68.7 days in 1992 to 62.4 days in 1997. The difference in results between the 
Coopers and Lybrand (1992) study and the Hussey and Woolfe (1998) study could be due to 
different samples being used. However, it is noted that the reporting lag reported by Hussey 
and Woolfe is close enough to the 60 days recommended by the ASB Statement, Interim 
Reports, that was issued in 1997 (Ku Ismail, 2003, p127). 
Al-Bogami (1996), in his thesis entitled “An examination of the usefulness of interim 
financial statements to investors in the Saudi Stock Market”, examined the timeliness of 
quarterly reporting by Saudi Arabian companies for the years 1987 to 1991. His study 
revealed that companies, on average, published their fourth quarter report and their first three-
quarterly report within 108 days and 50 days after the quarter ended, respectively. He reported 
that the variation in reporting times was related to the industry sector within which the 
company operates. Agricultural companies had an average lag of 66 days, which was the 
maximum time lag during the five-year period. On the other hand, for all years, the banking 
sector was faster in issuing interim reports, compared to firms in other sectors. The banking 
sector took an average of 16 days to publish the reports for quarters one to three, while it took 
64 days for the fourth quarter. 
 29 
Ettredge et al. (2000) examined the earning release lag, namely the quarterly and annual 
reporting lags of companies with “timely reviews” or “retrospective reviews”. Under timely 
reviews, the quarterly reports have to be reviewed by the auditor at the end of each quarter. A 
retrospective review is where the review of the quarterly reports is deferred until the year-end 
audit. Ettredge et al. hypothesised that a change in earning release lags would occur when 
companies switched from retrospective reviews to timely reviews. A total of 331 companies 
were used in this study, and 114 companies were subjected to retrospective reviews covering 
a period from 1987 to 1989. The remaining companies had timely reviews. Their findings 
support the allegation made by opponents of the SEC regulation on timely reporting, who 
argued that timely reviews would increase the release of quarterly information. The study also 
indicated that the quarterly lag will increase about three days on average for companies 
switching from a retrospective review to a timely review. 
Bagshaw (1999) studied timeliness issues among Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
companies, and found that 67% of companies issued interim reports within 60 days of the end 
of the reporting period, as recommended by the ASB. The remaining 33% prepared their 
reports within the four-month period permitted by the Stock Exchange. This significant 
improvement from the previous surveys indicates that companies would have no difficulty in 
issuing their reports within 60 days if the Stock Exchange requirements were to be tightened.  
Another timeliness study was undertaken by Annaert et al. (2002) of 64 Belgian companies 
from 1991 to 1998. The objective was to examine the relationship between the content of 
reports and the timeliness of earnings announcement. The content of the news was classified 
as good or bad and a chi-squared test was employed to analyse the data. They found no 
evidence to confirm that bad news is reported faster than good news. The authors also found 
no significant market reaction between good (bad) news that is reported earlier or later than 
expected. They also found that the reporting lag for Belgian companies was on average 57 
days although the maximum allowable period was four months.  
The timeliness study by Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) examined the timeliness of quarterly 
financial reports published by Malaysian listed companies. An analysis of 117 quarterly 
reports ended on 30 September 2001 revealed that all companies except one, reported within 
the allowable reporting period of two months. On average, companies took 56 days to release 
their reports.  
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3.4.2 Reporting frequency 
Leftwich et al. (1981) examined the frequency of interim reporting, and analysed reasons why 
companies chose a particular reporting frequency. They also investigated the economic 
incentives for managers to voluntarily provide interim reports. Data from 1948 were used to 
investigate the cross-sectional variations, while data from 1937 and 1948 were selected to 
observe the time series variation. Such data were used because interim reporting was provided 
voluntarily during the period. The study explored the incentives for voluntary disclosure as 
suggested by agency theory. Differences in capital structures, assets structures, and choices of 
other monitoring devices were predicted to influence the frequency of reporting. Specifically, 
this study proposed that reporting frequency is associated with ratio of assets in place, size of 
the firm, and leverage ratio of debt, leverage ratio of preferred stock, use of outside directors, 
reporting frequency ten years beforehand, and stock exchange listing. The same variables 
were also used by the researchers to analyse the time-series variations, and they proposed that 
the change in the frequency of external reporting is a function of the changes in those 
variables. A probit probability model and an ordinary least squares regression model were 
used to test their hypotheses. Although their results were not strong, they found that: 
a) Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1948 reported more 
frequently than firms listed on the American Stock Exchange (ASE);  
b) Firms that changed listing from other exchanges to NYSE or from other exchanges 
other than NYSE to ASE in the period 1937 to 1948 were more likely to increase 
their frequency of reporting in that period; and  
c) The reporting frequency of firms listed on the NYSE in 1948 was significantly 
associated with their reporting frequency in 1937.   
Hemmer and Gigler (1998) investigated the relationship between three attributes of the 
financial reporting regime: the frequency of mandatory financial disclosures, the amount of 
information voluntarily disclosed by privately informed managers, and the resulting 
informational efficiency of stock prices. They hypothesised that the level of voluntary 
disclosures will decrease if more firms are required to report more frequent interim reporting. 
This eventually will lead to an increase in disclosure cost. They concluded that increased 
earnings timeliness is not associated with increases in reporting frequency, especially when 
such changes are non-discretionary. In another study that reported similar findings, Butler et 
al. (2007) examined the way  interim reporting frequency affects the timeliness of earnings. A 
sample of 28,824 reporting frequency observations from 1950 to 1973 were used in this study. 
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They concluded that there is little evidence to support the claim that “firms forced to adopt 
more frequent financial reporting policies are likely to improve their earnings timeliness as 
much as firms freely choosing to report more frequently” (Marty et al., 2007, p214). Butler et 
al. (2007) reported that firms that voluntarily increased their reporting frequency from half-
yearly to quarterly experienced an increase in timeliness. However, firms whose increased 
reporting frequency was mandated by the SEC did not experience an increase in timeliness. 
Even though the study is controlled by self-selection, there is little evidence of differences in 
either intra-period or long-horizon timeliness between firms that report quarterly and those 
that report half-yearly. The study also found that bad news is recognised more quickly under 
increased reporting frequency for the voluntary environment from half-yearly to quarterly, but 
experienced no change in the timeliness of good news recognition.  
The study conducted by Werner and Mensah (2008) empirically investigated the association 
of  the frequency of interim financial reporting with stock price volatility. This study was 
carried out in the US and Canada (where quarterly reporting is required), and Great Britain 
and Australia (where half-yearly reporting is required). As expected, the trade-off between 
timeliness and the predictive value of the interim reporting will lead to lesser price volatility 
for half- yearly interim reporting after accounting for other potential influences.  
From the above timeliness literature, it appears that most countries are able to produce their 
interim reports within the allowable timeframe. It also appears that the regulatory body in 
each country is efficiently monitoring compliance with submission deadlines. However, there 
are companies which tend to delay producing their reports until the end of the allowable 
submission period. Is it because the time given is not sufficient for companies to produce 
interim reports, or is it just a matter of delaying since companies have other things to do? The 
answers to these questions should be relevant to regulators, since interim reports provide 
important information to investors.  
3.5 The determinants of interim reporting disclosure 
In the US, Chambers and Pennman (1984) conducted an analysis of interim and annual 
earnings for 100 randomly selected NYSE firms over the seven years between 1970 and 1976. 
They provided descriptive evidence of the relationship between the timeliness of reported 
earnings and stock price behaviour surrounding the interim and annual earning release using 
an analysis of the pooled cross-sectional and time series data. Their study also attempted to 
determine the association between the reporting lag and firm size. They concluded that there 
is no significant relationship between reporting lag and the variability of stock returns 
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associated with interim and annual earnings release. Some of the findings of this study are as 
follows: 
a) There is an inverse relationship between firm size and reporting lag. 
b) There are smaller price reactions to the earnings reports for large firms as opposed 
to small firms. 
c) Timely interim reports of small firms which bring good news are associated with 
higher price reactions than are those with longer lag times. This is not observed for 
reports revealing bad news or reports for relatively large firms. 
d) Reports that are published before the dateline tend to have larger price effects than 
when they are published on time or later than expected. Therefore, the authors 
characterised unexpectedly early reports as showing good news, whereas 
unexpectedly late reports tended to bear bad news. 
Bradbury (1991) examined the association between corporate characteristics and the 
disclosure of semi-annual earnings in an unregulated environment. His sample of 158 New 
Zealand firms was chosen from the period 1973 to 1976. This study incorporated 
methodological refinements suggested by Leftwich et al. (1981). Bradbury focused on an 
index of the level of interim disclosure rather than reporting frequency, as used in the Letwich 
et al. study. He established that there is a significant association between the level of interim 
earnings disclosure and the payment of an interim dividend. In other words, firms that pay 
interim dividends also have higher levels of interim disclosure, but this association is not 
significant in the Letwich et al. study. Bradbury also found that firms with high half-yearly 
earnings disclosures have more shares issued, have paid an interim dividend, carry less 
inventory, are in a more seasonal industry, and have greater earnings forecast errors.  
In another study, Bradbury (1992) examined the interim earning disclosures of 172 New 
Zealand companies that voluntarily reported semi-annual earnings during 1973 to 1976. The 
study also investigated the relationship between interim earnings disclosures and earnings 
volatility, unexpected earnings and firm size. As predicted, there is no association between the 
levels of voluntary semi-annual earnings disclosures and earnings volatility. The study also 
reported that non-quantified interim disclosures are more prevalent for firms with larger 
annual forecast accuracy. For the wholesale sector, a greater incidence of „quantified‟ interim 
disclosures (announcements which contained point estimates of earnings) can be found and 
was significant at the 0.01 level. However, companies in the financial, construction and other 
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manufacturing industries had a greater incidence of quantified interim disclosures at the 0.05 
significance level, which reveals that there may be industry differences in the amount of 
information disclosed by these companies. Finally, the study concluded that firm size does not 
appear to affect the level of disclosure.   
Ettredge et al. (1994) investigated  the reasons that motivate companies to voluntarily 
purchase timely reviews for their quarterly data. Purchases of timely reviews mean the 
company hires an auditor to review the quarterly reports at the end of each quarter. The 
researchers also assessed the role of internal and external agency costs in motivating 
companies to purchase timely reviews. A sample of 371 timely reviews was used for the 
period 1987 to 1989. This study hypothesised that companies contracting for timely reviews 
are seeking a higher level of monitoring because of higher internal and external agency costs. 
Ettredge et al. concluded that companies with higher external and internal agency costs are 
more likely to purchase timely reviews. The result also indicated that timely reviews 
contribute to a higher level of monitoring by external accountants as opposed to retroactive 
reviews. Purchase of timely reviews is also positively associated with company size, issuance 
of securities, and financial leverage, but is negatively associated with the percentage of 
common stock owned by managers and directors.  
Another study was carried out by Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) in Finland, where interim 
reporting is mandatory. They investigated the disclosure level of interim reports of the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) companies during the period 1985 to 1993. The study also 
determined company attributes that are associated with the level of disclosure. A sample of 
256 interim reports covering industries (except finance and insurance companies) was used to 
develop a disclosure index from items found in the interim reports submitted to HSE. This 
study developed a new measurement system for dichotomous procedure as 0.0/0.5/1.0, where 
a score of zero was given for non-disclosure, a score of one was given for full disclosure, and 
a score of 0.5 was given for anything in between. The disclosure index was regressed against 
29 independent variables (classified under the eight company variables and maturity of the 
stock exchange) to determine the association. This study provides evidence that Finnish 
interim disclosures are positively associated with business risk, capital structure, company 
size, and market maturity. The study also supported the hypothesis that disclosure is inversely 
related to governance structure; specifically, the greater the institutional concentration of 
ownership of Finnish firms by other firms, the lower the degree of interim disclosure. Market 
risk, stock price adjustment, growth and growth potential variables appeared not to have any 
significant influence on interim disclosure.   
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Tan and Tower (1999) have used a compliance index to examine compliance practices of 
Australian and Singaporean listed companies. They found a significant country-effect on the 
half-yearly reporting compliance practices of these two countries. They further tested the 
association of three other variables (namely, industry type, company size and debt leverage) 
on compliance practice. A total of 186 half-yearly reports were examined for the two-year 
period from 1995 to 1996. The result of independent sample t-tests revealed that the 
compliance level of Singaporean companies was significantly higher than their Australian 
counterparts. Debt leverage and total assets were also shown to be significant in influencing 
compliance practices for both countries. However, company size and industry type did not 
show any significant difference in compliance practices between the two countries. 
Yee (2004) examined the potential effects of increased interim reporting frequency on several 
aspects of the capital market using the Kyle model (1985). His findings support the 
conventional wisdom that more frequent interim reporting improves the information content 
of securities prices, reduces reporting day price volatility and trading volume, and enhances 
market liquidity. His primary findings include: 
 Increased interim reporting frequency is likely to lead to a reduction in the total 
spending by analysts (on average); 
 Aggregate spending by analysts, however, is likely to increase with an increase in 
interim earnings reporting frequency;  
 An increase in reporting frequency is likely to lead to increased liquidity at the 
earnings announcement dates; and 
 An increase in reporting frequency is likely to lower the price volatility on the 
earnings reporting dates.  
Chen et al. (2002) conducted a study to explain why managers voluntarily disclose balance 
sheet information in quarterly earnings announcements. The analyses were performed on all 
earning announcements in the Wall Street Journal Proquest database from the fourth quarter 
of 1992 through to the third quarter of 1995. The study predicted that managers are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose balance sheet information when current earnings are relatively 
less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Generally, 52% of the 
firms included balance sheet earnings announcements. The relative frequency of this 
disclosure grew from 31% to 46% over the period being analysed. The study also found that 
balance sheet disclosures were more common among firms in high technology industries, 
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those engaging in mergers or acquisitions, and those that are younger and with more volatile 
stock return.  
The Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) study also tested the association of the extent of 
disclosure with  profitability, growth and leverage for quarterly reports (to 30 September 
2001) of 117 companies. This study revealed that only leverage has an influence on the extent 
of disclosures. No significant association was found between the extent of disclosure and 
profitability and growth of a company. 
Boritz and Liu (2006) employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to 
investigate the determinants of the timeliness of quarterly reporting in a Canadian 
environment. A sample of 266 financial statements in quarter one were used in this study. The 
study hypothesised that interim financial statements are released more promptly by companies 
that are in an environment of high transparency, as compared to firms that are in an 
environment of low transparency. In addition, they predicted that firms with more agency 
problems were more likely to delay the disclosure of their interim financial statements than 
firms with fewer agency problems. They also provided evidence that firms that have their 
financial statements reviewed by an auditor release their interim financial statements in a 
more timely fashion, as compared to firms that do not have their interim financial statements 
reviewed by an auditor.  
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) empirically investigated the degree of disclosure of 
compliance with selected company-specific and corporate governance characteristics. They 
employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to establish the association, and 
found a positive association with all the variables tested. Specifically, there is a significant 
positive relationship between the degree of compliance and multiple listings, company size, 
interim dividend, and new shares issuance for company characteristics. For the corporate 
governance variable, their study found that the degree of disclosure compliance is positively 
associated with auditor involvement, audit committee independence, and audit committee 
financial expertise.  
A more recent study of the determinants of disclosure was conducted by Rahman et al. (2007) 
in Singapore. They examined three issues pertaining to quarterly reporting (namely, benefits, 
drawbacks and determinants), conducted under a voluntary-disclosure environment with 
respect to reporting quarterly earnings. Results of their multivariate tests revealed that firms 
with high growth prospects, large size and having a technology orientation are likely to 
disclose earnings on a quarterly basis if left to their own discretion. In addition, quarterly 
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reporting is also found to be associated with higher analyst following on the benefits side. On 
the drawbacks side the level of disclosure is associated with high price volatility.  
Overall, there is inconclusive evidence regarding the association of disclosure indices or 
timeliness with corporate attributes. The previous studies were conducted against the level of 
disclosure or reporting lag as dependent variables. However, many studies were conducted on 
the level of disclosure. They reveal either positive, negative or no relationships at all between 
disclosure compliance with independent variables such as audit committee, company size, and 
industry type. As for timeliness, the most common independent variables used were company 
size and profitability, and the results are mixed. The main reason for such differences could be 
due to having either a mandatory or voluntary reporting environment. Lastly, the period when 
the abovementioned studies were conducted also differed. However, this scenario gives more 
opportunity for researchers to explore this area.  
3.6 Summary 
A review of past literature indicates that there have been many research studies on quarterly 
reporting. The main purpose of this chapter is to review disclosure studies of interim reporting 
that are relevant to this research. Previous studies show that there has been a huge effort to 
measure the quality of disclosure for interim reporting, but researchers have not provided 
conclusive evidence as to why their study is superior to others. However, these studies do 
provide guidance for the way disclosure quality can be measured by looking at the level of 
compliance with regulation, timeliness, or corporate characteristics that influence the extent of 
disclosure. Based on this measurement of the quality of disclosure in interim reporting, the 
literature on interim reporting in this chapter was constructed.  
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     Chapter 4 
Conceptual Framework, Variable Identification and 
Hypotheses Development 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework for corporate disclosure that led to the 
development of the conceptual model that will be employed in this study.  It also identifies 
variables that will contribute to mandatory disclosure practices of interim reporting. Further, it 
elaborates the literature on the nature and direction of the relationships, followed by the 
formulation of formal hypotheses for each variable that has been identified.  
4.2 Theoretical framework for corporate disclosure 
There are several theories for corporate disclosure, as illustrated by Owusu-Ansah (1998, p91) 
in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
Diagram Removed 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Theories of corporate disclosure 
 
 
As Figure 4.1 shows, corporate disclosure theories can be divided into two broad spectrums, 
namely, regulation theory and free market theory. Since the focus of this study is on 
mandatory disclosure, regulation theory is more appropriate for this study. Regulation theory 
can be classified into public interest theory and interest group or capture theory, with the latter 
further subdivided into political scientists‟ and economists‟ versions.  
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Pergum (1965) outlines the regulation term in three ways.  First, it is used in a generic sense 
to mean any form of behavioural control. The second meaning, social regulation, arises from 
legislative actions designed to limit the freedom of activity of business enterprise. These 
actions are meant to control the imperfection of the free market system and the failure of 
economic forces in achieving social objectives. The third, and the narrowest, meaning of 
regulation arises from controls imposed on monopolistic industries such as transport, 
communication and public utilities. Usually, they take the form of fixing minimum prices, 
limiting profits, and restraining discrimination. Generally, its purpose is to correct the 
perceived deficiencies of the free market system in fulfilling public interest. This is consistent 
with Wolk et al. (as cited in Darus, 2005, p88), suggesting it is necessary to regulate 
accounting information due to market failure. In other words, regulation is important to 
correct deficiencies that occur in the capital market. This is consistent with public interest 
theory views that regulating the disclosure of corporate information would enhance social 
welfare. 
The aspect of the regulatory environment which is a concern of this study, is whether the 
introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements would enhance the adequacy of interim 
reporting. Existing literature indicates that companies do not comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements unless stringent mechanisms are in place (see Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007; Marty et al., 2007; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005). Thus, regulation is 
needed to ensure the adequacy of financial reporting. For this study, „regulation‟ refers to 
disclosure requirements, namely FRS 134 Interim Financial Reporting and the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement Para 2.22. 
Prior literature demonstrates that disclosure practices are motivated by agency-related costs 
(see Botosan & Harris, 2000; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Agency theory states that these 
agency costs arise from the separation of ownership and control in companies (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In public companies, shareholders appoint the board of directors with the 
objective of maximising shareholder wealth. Since the shareholders are not participating in 
the daily operations of the company, management are able to pursue their own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the shareholders 
anticipate that managers would attempt to expropriate wealth; as such, they would prefer to 
enter into a contract in order to protect themselves (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) These 
contracts are costly, and corporate managers have incentives to reduce the costs. Disclosure is 
one way of reducing the agency problem by bridging the information gap between managers 
and shareholders (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Thus, from an agency perspective, greater 
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disclosure can be achieved through best practices reporting statements. This will reduce the 
agency problem. 
4.3 Variable identification and development of hypotheses 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual model 
As laid out in the conceptual model (Figure 4.2), this section explains the explanatory 
variables to be used in this study as determinants of mandatory disclosure. The explanatory 
variables, also known as independent variables, are formulated into regression equations and 
an empirical schema for this study. The independent variables will be tested against the 
dependent variables, namely, the disclosure index and timeliness. The relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables and a set of hypotheses to be 
empirically tested is generated in this chapter, while the dependent variables used in this study 
will be explained in the following chapter. 
4.3.1 Hypotheses for testing the mandatory disclosure for interim reporting 
among Malaysian companies 
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables for this study are the disclosure index and 
timeliness. The following null hypotheses are formulated and tested against each of the 
dependent variables in order to answer research question one: How well do Malaysian 
companies comply with mandatory disclosure requirements for interim reports as a 
consequence of implementing FRS 134? This study hypothesized there is no difference in the 
mean of timeliness because the disclosure requirement applies to all years and quarters 
included in the study and to firms in all industries examined in the study, which is why one 
could expect there to be no difference. In addition, there is a possibility that timeliness may be 
adversely affected in instances where firms/auditors require more time to prepare/audit 
financial statements. 
a)  Timeliness (no of days) 
a
H1 :  There is no difference in the means of timeliness across the years for Malaysian listed 
companies 
FRS 134 Interim Financial Reporting 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement 
Para 2.22 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
practices 
Adequacy 
Timeliness 
Disclosure index 
Corporate attributes 
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b
H1 :  There is no difference in the means of timeliness between quarters for Malaysian listed 
companies 
c
H1 :  There is no difference in the means of timeliness between industries for Malaysian 
listed companies 
b)  Disclosure index 
a
H 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index across the years for 
Malaysian listed companies 
b
H 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index between quarters for 
Malaysian listed companies 
cH 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index between industries for 
Malaysian listed companies 
In addition to the compliance aspect, the nature of compliance among the companies is also 
investigated. A pilot test involving the quarterly reports of 10 Malaysian companies for three 
years (four reports per year), totalling 120 reports, was conducted to determine the nature of 
compliance based on the disclosure requirements related to Reporting and Listing 
requirement. As discussed in Section  1.3, the disclosure requirements for interim reporting 
are, namely the FRS 134 Interim Reporting governed by the MASB and Listing Requirement 
Para 2.22 governed by the Bursa Malaysia. Based on the pilot test, this study concludes that 
total compliance refers to companies that have full compliance with the disclosure 
requirements. This group will be referred to as Group 1. It is also expected that there will be 
companies that will not comply with either Reporting or Listing, or both. These companies 
will be classified as non-compliant companies and are distinguished as follows: 
Group 2 – Companies that comply with Reporting but not Listing 
Group 3 – Companies that comply with Listing but not Reporting 
Group 4 – Companies that do not comply with Reporting or Listing  
 
Therefore, the following summarises the hypotheses in order to determine if there are any 
significant differences for timeliness and disclosure index for each group, between groups, 
across years and quarters.  
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c)  Timeliness (no of days) 
d
H1 :  There is no difference in the mean of timeliness between groups for Malaysian listed 
companies 
d)  Disclosure index 
dH 2 :  There is no difference in the mean of disclosure index for each group for Malaysian 
listed companies 
eH 2 :  There is no difference in the mean of disclosure index between groups for Malaysian 
listed companies 
4.3.2 Hypotheses for testing the association between mandatory disclosures 
and company attributes 
The majority of previous studies that investigated the statistical relationship between 
disclosure and company attributes concentrated on annual report disclosure, and only a 
handful of them analysed the interim reports (Darus, 2005). Specifically, the research findings  
suggested that corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure is influenced by certain 
company-specific characteristics (Owusu-Ansah, 2005). The most common variables 
associated with disclosure studies are structure (size and capital structure), performance 
(profitability and growth), corporate governance, and the culture of the company. The most 
frequently examined attributes have been corporate size, profitability, capital structure, 
auditor and listing status (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). However, this study does not examine the 
auditor-type because this study is restricted to the largest firms and most of these firms are 
expected to have Big-4 auditors. In addition, this study also does not include corporate 
governance characteristics because corporate governance data is normally not readily 
available and involves a significant investment in time to hand-collect this data. Further, the 
notion of good corporate governance is subject to varying definitions. Therefore, this research 
attempts to identify the determinants of interim disclosure study, and only considers five 
variables (company size, industry, liquidity, profitability and leverage) to be relevant. The 
following sections discuss each of the independent variables that are hypothesised to be 
associated with the level of disclosure and timeliness. 
4.3.2.1 Hypotheses for testing the association between the level of disclosure 
and company attributes 
Previous studies of the relationship between the level of disclosure and company attributes for 
annual reports and interim reports were carried out under both the mandatory and voluntary 
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environments. The following sub-section will discuss the studies that are based on the 
relationship of the level of disclosure with company attributes, starting with company size and 
followed by leverage, liquidity, profitability and industry. 
4.3.2.1.1 Company size 
In previous disclosure studies, company size has consistently been found to be significantly 
positively related to mandatory and voluntary disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Ahmed, 
2001; Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993; Street & Gray, 2002; Wallace et al., 1994) 
and interim reporting disclosures (e.g. Lunt, 1982; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007; Rahman et 
al., 2007; Samantha & Gregy, 1997; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998; Tan & Tower, 1999). 
However, Bradbury (1992) and Leftwitch et al. (1981) (for interim reports) and Ahmet and 
Serife (2007) (for annual reports) found an inverse relationship between company size and the 
level of disclosure. 
Large firms are known to disclose more for several reasons (Botosan, 1997). Firstly, it has 
been suggested that large companies tend to engage in more disclosure activities due to 
economies of scale (Alchian, 1969; Stigler, 1961) and because they depend heavily on the 
securities market to finance their operations, as compared to small companies (Salamon & 
Dhaliwal, 1980).  In addition, disclosing more information is not so costly for large 
companies compared to small companies, since they generally have an established database of 
information. This will enable them to provide any type of disclosure required.  In contrast, 
small companies will most likely incur significant cost in providing the required information.  
Even though the literature is in favour of a positive relationship between level of disclosure 
and company size, the focus of this study is to examine the compliance for mandatory 
disclosures for interim reporting by Malaysian listed companies. All listed companies, 
regardless of size, are subject to these requirements. Therefore, this study hypothesises that 
there is no relationship between the size of a company and the level of disclosure. Consistent 
with many prior studies, total assets will be used as a proxy for size (e.g. Buzby, 1975; 
McNally et al., 1982; Samantha & Greg, 1997; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998). The following 
null hypothesis tests this relationship in the Malaysian context. 
3H  : There is no relationship between company size and the level of disclosure for 
Malaysian listed companies 
4.3.2.1.2 Leverage 
As financial disclosure is used for monitoring purposes, it is expected that highly leveraged 
firms would disclose more information in the quarterly reports (Ku Ismail and Chandler, 
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2005a). This expectation is consistent with agency theory perspectives that argued that as 
higher monitoring costs would be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged they would 
disclose more information in their financial reports (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 
previous evidence shows that the relationship between level of disclosure and leverage is 
inconclusive. This mean finding of the previous study is not in line with the prediction of 
agency theory. For example some studies showed a significant positive relationship, such as 
those of Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Hossain and Adam (1995) for annual reports, and 
Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), Tan and Tower (1999), and Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) 
for interim reports. Other annual report studies, such as those of Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), and Wallace (1994) found no relationship. In addition, 
Meek et al. (1995) found a negative relationship between leverage and the level of disclosure. 
Because of these mixed results, this study does not predict any relationship between leverage 
and the level of disclosures. Consistent with measurements used by Naser (1998) and 
Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), the gearing ratio (long-term debt/total equity) is used to 
measure leverage 
4H  : There is no relationship between leverage and the level of disclosure for Malaysian 
listed companies 
4.3.2.1.3 Liquidity 
Liquidity is related to the going concern status of the company. From the audit point of view, 
going concern period refers to the period from the date of the financial period being audited to 
the next financial accounting period. If the going concern issues are related to signalling 
theory, a company that has suffered losses will tend to delay the submission of the interim 
report, or perhaps not produce the interim report at all, in order to protect its reputation. 
Companies will be more willing to make disclosures in their annual reports if they are able to 
meet their short-term obligations without having to liquidate their assets (Belkaoui & Kahl, 
1978; Wallace & Naser, 1995). The studies of Owusu-Ansah (2005) and Belkaoui and Kahl 
(1978) are among those that support the hypothesised relationship between disclosure and 
liquidity. However, Wallace and Naser found no relationship. Given these mixed results, this 
study hypothesises that there is no association between liquidity and the level of disclosure. 
Liquidity is measured using the quick ratio. 
5H : There is no relationship between liquidity and the level of disclosure for Malaysian 
listed companies 
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4.3.2.1.4 Profitability 
It can be assumed that companies with a good reputation in terms of their bottom- line will 
willingly disclose mandatory information items in their annual reports. As argued by Cerf 
(1961), this is a benchmark for management in terms of their performance, and as such, the 
management of  profitable companies are more likely to disclose information to support their 
positions and the performance-related compensation schemes that may be due to them. 
Further, Sighvi and Desai (1971) argued that higher profitability motivates management to 
provide greater information because it increases investor confidence, which in turn increases 
management compensation. The main reason companies are motivated to provide disclosures 
is because of the regulation requirement. This is consistent with the discussion in the liquidity 
section. Indeed, Lang and Lundholm (1993) noted that the association of profitability level 
and disclosure can be increasing or decreasing, depending on their performance.  
Previous studies show mixed results on the association between disclosures and profitability. 
While a significant positive relationship was observed (for instance, by Singhvi (1968), 
Wallace et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah (2005) and Ahmet and Serife (2007) in annual reports 
studies, and Tan and Tower (1999) in interim reports studies), no such relationship was 
reported by McNally et al. (1982), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Wallace and Naser (1995) and 
Ahmed  and  Courtis  (1999) in annual reports studies, and Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) in 
interim report studies. Therefore, this study hypothesises that there is no association between 
company profitability and the level of disclosure. The profitability measurement used in this 
study is the ratio of net income to turnover (i.e. sales) as employed in the Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999) study. 
6H : There is no relationship between profitability and the level of disclosure for Malaysian 
listed companies 
4.3.2.1.5 Industries 
To date, Bursa Malaysia has about 1200 companies classified into 13 industries listed on the 
stock exchange. These industries are spread over the Main Board, the Second Board, and the 
Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ)
14
 as 
follows: 
 
 
                                                 
14
  MESDAQ was launched on 6 October 1997 as a separate market, mostly for technology-based companies. 
It is part of Bursa Malaysia. 
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Table 4.1 Industries for Main Board, Second Board and MESDAQ 
Main Board Second Board MESDAQ/Derivatives 
Consumer product Consumer Rights 
Industrial Industrial “A” Shares 
Construction Construction Loan/debenture 
Trading/services Plantation Preference share 
Infrastructure project companies Properties TBR/Warrant 
Hotels Technologies  
Properties Trading/Services  
Plantations   
Mining   
Technologies   
Real Estate Investment Trusts   
Close end funds   
Exchange Trade Fund   
 
According to Owusu-Ansah (1998), the level of mandatory disclosure varies across industries 
for several reasons. His first argument is that certain industries are subject to strict control or 
regulation because they are the main contributors to the country‟s export earnings or national 
income. Secondly, certain industries such as oil companies may have difficulties in 
adequately reporting due to the nature of their business. Lastly, the type of product line, or the 
diversity of products, may contribute to differences in disclosure. Results from the literature 
show mixed evidence between industries and the extent of disclosure. For example, Stanga 
(1976) and Fekrat et al. (1996) found that industry-type is one of the most significant factors 
for the differences in the level of disclosure among companies. Specifically for interim 
disclosure, Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) found that there is a relationship between 
industries and the extent of disclosure.  
Moreover, Botosan (1997) argued that different industries will have different disclosure 
practices, which would be consistent over the years. A possible explanation for this is that the 
differences are caused by the nature of the business and its operating cycle. Conversely, 
Cooke (1992) found no association between industry type and mandatory disclosure for 
Japan. Likewise the study by Tai et al. (1990) for Hong Kong. Similarly, Patton and Zalenka 
(1997) found that the extent of disclosure of companies in the financial or manufacturing 
industries in the Czech Republic was no different from other companies.  However, the 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are subject to the same disclosure requirements, and 
companies that have other compliance requirements (such as foreign companies) have been 
excluded from this study to control for this effect. Since the empirical evidence is 
 46 
inconclusive, the industry-type null hypothesis of this study posits that there is no association 
between industry and the level of disclosure.  
7H : There is no relationship between industry type and the level of disclosure for 
Malaysian listed companies 
4.3.2.2 Hypotheses for testing the association between timeliness and 
company attributes 
Examples of previous studies that determine the association between timeliness and company 
attributes in interim reporting are Robb (1980), Lunt (1982), Chambers and Penman (1984), 
and Al-Bogami (1996). As mentioned earlier, timeliness is defined as the number of days 
taken to produce the (quarterly) report. This relationship is discussed in the following section. 
4.3.2.2.1  Company size 
One of the attributes that is often found to be associated with the timeliness of an annual or 
interim financial report is company size. For example, Chambers and Penman (1984) found 
an inverse relationship between reporting lag and size of the company. Similar findings were 
also found by Boonlert-U- Thai et al. (2002) for annual report studies. In contrast, Ettredge et 
al. (1994) found that purchase of timely reviews are positively associated with  company size. 
Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) reported the same findings that the timeliness of quarterly 
reporting is influenced by company size. Further, Lunt (1982), Al-Bogami (1996) and Courtis 
(1976) found no significant association between reporting lag and size of the company.  
Therefore, this thesis tests the null hypothesis as follows: 
8H :  There is no relationship between company size and timeliness for Malaysian listed 
companies  
4.3.2.2.2 Profitability 
Profitability is one measure used by investors to evaluate the performance of a company. 
Companies with good profits will want to disclose their results faster than companies that 
suffer losses. This is consistent with the findings reported by Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004), 
namely, that companies with good news report faster than companies with bad news. In 
addition, Chambers and Penman (1984) showed that timely interim reports from small 
companies that report good news are associated with higher price reactions than are those 
with longer lag times. However, Courtis (1976) found that there was an inverse relationship 
between profitability and reporting lag. Based on the above discussion, this study tests the 
following hypothesis: 
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9H : There is no relationship between profitability and timeliness for Malaysian listed 
companies 
4.3.2.2.3 Leverage 
A review of literature reveals mixed findings between timeliness and leverage. According to 
Ku Ismail (2003), there are two schools of thought. The first suggests that firms with high 
leverage will report faster than their counterparts. The second suggests the exact opposite, 
namely, that firms with high leverage report more slowly than firms with low leverage. 
Examples of studies that support the latter view are  Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) for 
interim reporting and Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2002) for annual reporting. Therefore, this study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
10H : There is no relationship between leverage and timeliness for Malaysian listed 
companies 
4.3.2.2.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity is always related to going concern issues, and many studies have been conducted on 
the relationship between the level of disclosure and liquidity. These variables are also tested 
in the research area that used distressed companies as their sample. However, the association 
between timeliness and liquidity can be seen from the study by Boritz and Liu (2006). They 
found that quarterly reports are released in a less timely manner for firms without going 
concern disclosure. This thesis posits that there is no association between liquidity and timely 
reporting, as per the following hypothesis: 
11H : There is no relationship between company liquidity and timeliness for Malaysian 
listed companies 
4.3.2.2.5 Industries 
A number of studies found an association between industry and timeliness, with the earliest 
reported by Robb (1980). He found that companies in the finance sector issued the highest 
quality half-yearly reports, while those in the manufacturing and service sectors seemed to 
have the lowest quality half-yearly reports.  In another study, Lunt (1982) found that non-
industrial companies produced interim reports more quickly than industrial companies. Al-
Bogami (1996)  found that the banking sector published more quickly than other industries. 
However, to date, no studies can be used to conclude that there is either no relationship or an 
inverse relationship between industries and timeliness. Therefore, this study makes no 
assertion with respect to possible direction by formulating the following hypothesis: 
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12H : There is no difference between industries and timeliness for Malaysian listed 
companies 
4.4 Summary 
From the above discussion, it is noted that the results from previous studies for each variable 
proposed are inconclusive. The dependent variables used to determine the association with 
company attributes are either level of disclosure or timeliness. For level of disclosure, the 
common independent variables used to determine the relationship are company size, 
profitability and industry type. For timeliness, the common measurement used is reporting 
lag, and the independent variables are company size and profitability. For this study, the 
proposed hypotheses not only look at the association of corporate attributes against the level 
of disclosure and timeliness, but also examine their relationship with the group established in 
Section 4.3. In addition, Table 4.2 summarizes the measurement of dependent and 
independent variables used in this study. 
Table 4.2 Summary of the measurement of dependent and independent variables 
Variables Measurement Formula 
Dependent Variables 
Levels of disclosure Disclosure indices Disclosure Index Model 
Independent Variables 
Company size Total assets Current assets + Long term assets 
Industry types Industry groups  
Liquidity Quick ratio (Current asset – Inventories) / Current 
Liabilities 
Profitability Sales Net profit after tax and interest / Sales 
Leverage Debt to equity ratio Long-term debt / Total s/holder equity 
Total shareholders equity = Share capital + 
Retained earnings – Treasury shares 
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     Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion on the sample is selected, followed by a discussion on 
the collection of data from the sample companies. The study involves three stages of data 
collection: measurement of timeliness, compliance with reporting requirements, and extent of 
disclosure. The disclosure index model that this study uses is developed and described, as are 
validity and reliability issues concerning the data collection methods used in this study.  
5.2 Sample selection 
To date, there are 1200 companies listed at Bursa Malaysia. It will be costly (time wise and 
financially) to collect data for the entire population of firms. With that in mind, a decision has 
been made to focus on a preliminary sample of the 100 largest, as these firms collectively 
constitute a large proportion of the total market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia and would be 
of more interest to regulators. This method is commonly used for voluntary disclosure studies 
because the selected companies are the most active stock traded on Bursa Malaysia; therefore, 
these are the companies that will more readily attract investors (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006). In addition, it is expected that these companies will be more willing to make greater 
disclosure in order to give a „true‟ picture of their performance. It is further expected that they 
would more willingly disclose information in order to retain the attention of analysts or to 
attract more analysts (Eng & Teo, 1999). To relate this discussion with the method of 
determining sample size, this study is carried out under a regulated environment. First, if the 
company is willing to make greater disclosure and readily attract investors under a voluntary 
environment, then it may be assumed that the company would also endeavour to comply with 
the mandatory disclosure requirement. They would not take the disclosure requirement lightly 
since this regulation is made to help companies to be more transparent in the eyes of the 
stakeholders. Secondly, there is a legal backing for such action. Thirdly, sample selection bias 
does not exist because this study is carried out under a regulated environment. This means 
that each company should have the same compliance level. In addition, a rule of thumb 
suggests that sample sizes larger than 30 and smaller than 500 are appropriate for most 
research (Roscoe, 1975), as noted by Sekaran (2003, p295). Therefore, a minimum of 100 
companies should be selected to ensure compliance with this rule of thumb, after considering 
incomplete data, if applicable.  
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For this study, due to the limited study period and the discussion on how sample size should 
be determined and selected, the top 100 companies were chosen from the list of market 
capitalisation as at 31 December 2004.  Out of the 100, 18 companies were excluded because 
finance companies, trusts and close-end funds have different requirements with respect to 
quarterly financial reporting (that is, these companies do not fall within the scope of this 
study). Another 22 were excluded because they did not publish four quarterly reports in a 
year; in other words, their data was incomplete.  The final sample, therefore, consists of 60 
companies. The timeframe is three years, specifically, 2005, 2006 and 2007. These years were 
chosen because FRS 134 Interim Reporting applies to accounting periods beginning on or 
after 1 July 2002, and the financial year ending in 2004 is the transitional year (that is, the 
period when companies will adjust to the new requirements). Hence, 2005 is the first full year 
when all companies should be reporting under the new requirements.  
5.3 Data collection 
The data collection stage is divided into three phases: (1) measuring timeliness, (2) measuring 
compliance, and (3) the extent of disclosure. As reported in Chapter 3, the quality of interim 
financial reporting is measured either in terms of timeliness, compliance with the disclosure 
regulations, or the extent of disclosure. In the following sections, each phase is discussed in 
detail in order to determine the quality of interim financial reporting. 
5.3.1 Phase 1 – Measuring timeliness     
The objective of this phase is to determine whether Malaysian listed companies comply with 
the due date for interim reporting. There are two aspects of timeliness that have been 
discussed in the literature concerning interim financial reporting. One aspect refers to the 
frequency of interim reporting such as half-yearly, quarterly, or some other periodic basis. 
The second aspect refers to the reporting lag (that is, the period between the date of the 
accounting report and the date of its release). This study, however, considers timeliness from 
the perspective of that specified in the listing requirement, namely, (a) whether the quarterly 
reports are produced within the maximum allowable period (two months or 60 days), and 
then, (b) determining how many days were actually taken to submit the interim reports, what 
has been termed as the reporting lag, and whether there are any issues regarding late 
reporting. The findings of this study will establish whether or not timely information can be 
achieved.  
In doing so, the end of each quarter was identified for each company. The Bursa Malaysia 
website was then searched for the date when the results were announced, allowing a simple 
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comparison with the latest date that would comply with the relevant regulation. The study also 
distinguishes between the initial report date15 and the amendment announcement date16, if 
applicable. Where a company has issued an amended report, the initial report date is taken as 
the actual reporting date. This conclusion is made after confirming with the Bursa Malaysia 
about the nature of the amendment made in the amended report by the company after the 
initial report. According to Bursa, the amendment usually involved reproducing a new interim 
report due to a wrong calculation or human error. This amendment, in Bursa Malaysia‟s 
opinion, is immaterial and insignificant and therefore does not affect the whole presentation 
of interim reporting. As noted previously, this study does not include press releases or any 
other form of media announcement made by the company. 
5.3.2 Phase 2 – Measuring compliance  
This study also aims to determine the adequacy of mandatory disclosures in quarterly 
reporting among Malaysian listed companies. A self-constructed checklist was used to 
determine the level of compliance with mandatory disclosures specified for quarterly 
reporting. This is consistent with prior compliance studies such as Tower et al. (1997), Street 
and Bryant (2000), and Street and Gray (2002). It is noted that a properly constructed index is 
seen as a reliable measurement device for corporate compliance (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
The disclosure checklist was developed by considering the disclosure requirements specified 
in FRS134 Interim Reporting and Para 9, Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia. A total of 
45 items are required from both sources, as listed in Appendix 2 (items 1 to 24 specified by 
FRS134, and items 25-45 specified in the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement). Both 
regulations complement each other, and there are no redundant items that appear in both lists. 
The scoring procedure assigns one point for each item disclosed in the quarterly report, as 
specified by the disclosure requirement. No point is assigned if companies do not disclose as 
required by the disclosure requirement. By applying the measuring instrument against the 
interim reporting of the sampled companies, their mandatory disclosure scores were obtained, 
and were used with other data specific to each sample company, to test the relational 
hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
15
  Initial report date refers to the date that the company issues the quarterly report. It is the same as the 
announcement date. 
16
  Amendment announcement date refers to the date when the company issues an amendment to an earlier 
version of their quarterly report. An example of an amendment would include a new operating profit or changes 
in expenses amount. 
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5.3.2.1 Disclosure index model 
The items disclosed in each quarterly report for each company were then used to calculate a 
disclosure index for that company for that quarter. The value derived from the disclosure 
index model was used to test the hypotheses summarised in Chapter 4. The disclosure index 
can be weighted or unweighted.  An unweighted disclosure index assumes that each item of 
disclosure is equally important (Cooke, 1991), while a weighted disclosure index assumes that 
some items of disclosure are rated as more important relative to other items (Chau & Gray, 
2002; Cooke, 1991). Since the disclosure regulations for interim reporting in Malaysia do not 
attach greater importance to some items, as compared to others, it was considered that an 
unweighted index would be more appropriate for this study. In addition, it is noted that recent 
studies tend to use unweighted indices as the measure of level of disclosure (see Haniffa & 
Cooke (2002), Botosan (1997), Hossain et al. (1995)). In contrast, weighted indices have 
limitations in that the assignment of weights is subjective and that similar items may be 
assigned different weights in different countries (see Cooke, 1989; Hossain & Adam, 1995). 
Unweighted indices avoid the subjectivity associated with the determination of the relative 
weights for each item (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). 
A major problem with this type of scoring is that some companies might be penalised by 
assigning a score of zero for an undisclosed item when it is not required to disclose that item. 
It is therefore necessary to use a relative scoring approach whereby the disclosure index for 
the company is assessed as being the ratio of the computed total disclosure score to the total 
number of items required to be disclosed by the company. The disclosure index (DI) for each 
company is then expressed as a percentage according to the following formula: 

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Where 
dijt  =  The disclosure value of mandated information item i relevant to sample company j in 
period t. It is 1 if disclosed, or 0 if not disclosed. 
mjt  =  The total number of mandated information items relevant to company j actually 
disclosed in its interim report in period t. 
njt  =  The total number of mandated information items that are required to be disclosed by 
company j in its interim report in period t. 
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In order to minimise subjectivity in scoring, suggestions made by Cooke (1989), Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1999), and Mangena and Taurina (2007) were also employed in this study. Firstly, 
interim reports for 10 companies were read thoroughly in order for the researcher to have a 
better understanding and to become familiar with the quarterly reporting disclosure. Each 
company has 12 quarterly reports (four reports per year, for three years). A total of 120 
scorings for levels of disclosure were carried out. This procedure was performed by the 
researcher and a single coder and their scorings were then compared to ensure consistency, 
thereby minimising subjectivity. Further, in utilising the disclosure index, it is necessary to 
consider reliability and validity. The following sections address these issues. 
5.3.2.2 Validity   
Berelson (1952) and Kripendorff (1980) highlighted that the success of content analysis as a 
research technique depends on the reliability and validity of the procedures employed. 
According to Sekaran (2003), validity refers to whether the measuring instruments used 
measure the right object or capture the measures that they were intended to measure, and the 
measurement becomes invalid if they do not.  He divided validity tests into three groups, 
namely, logical or content validity, criterion-related validity, and congruent or construct 
validity. These are briefly explained as follows: 
a)  Logical or content validity 
This type of validity test captures to what extent the measuring instrument provides an 
adequate coverage of the subject matter. The validation is carried out by a group of experts. 
b)  Criterion-related validity 
This validity is established when the measure differentiates among individuals on the criterion 
it is expected to predict (Sekaran, 2003, p206). It is divided into two types: concurrent validity 
and predictive validity. Concurrent validity is a measure of how well a particular test 
correlates with a previously validated measure. Predictive ability involves testing a group of 
subjects for a certain construct, and then comparing the results with those obtained at some 
point in the future. 
c)  Congruent or construct validity 
This validity refers to how well the results obtained from the use of the measure fit the 
theories around which the test is designed. This is assessed through convergent validity and 
discriminant validity. Convergent validity is established when the scores obtained with two 
different instruments measuring the same concept are highly correlated. Discriminant validity 
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is established when, based on theory, two variables are predicted to be uncorrelated, and the 
scores by measuring them are indeed empirically found to be so. 
5.3.2.3 Reliability 
Reliability refers to a measurement as an indication of the stability and consistency with 
which the instrument measures the concept and helps to assess the goodness of the measure 
(Sekaran, 2003, p203). It is assessed from two points: stability and consistency of the 
measurement.  
a)  Stability 
This refers to the ability of a measure to remain the same over time, despite uncontrollable 
testing conditions or the state of the respondents themselves, and is indicative of stability and 
low vulnerability to changes in the situation (Sekaran, 2003). There are two types of stability 
tests: retest reliability and parallel-form reliability. Retest reliability testifies to the reliability 
coefficient obtained with a repetition of the same measure on a second occasion. Parallel-form 
reliability is conducted when responses on two comparable sets of measures tapping the same 
construct are highly correlated.  
b)  Internal consistency 
The internal consistency is typically a measure based on the correlations between different 
items on the same test. Consistency can be examined through the inter-item consistency 
reliability and split-half reliability tests. The most popular inter-item consistency reliability 
test is Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) for multipoint-scaled items, and the 
Kuder-Richardson formula (Kuder & Richardson, 1937) for dichotomous items. Sekaran 
(2003, p204) illustrates the goodness of measure in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
Diagram Removed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Testing Goodness of Measures (forms of Reliability and Validity) 
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Based on the foregoing discussion for validity and reliability, this research employed the 
content validity approach for the validity test. As for the reliability test, a parallel-form 
reliability test for stability and Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha for internal consistency are 
considered appropriate to measure reliability. The chosen test was performed, and the result is 
discussed in the following sections to show that the research instruments passed the two 
important tests. 
5.3.2.4 Validity test 
To validate the disclosure measuring instrument for this study, the scoring checklist was sent 
out to two financial reporting experts, Mr Danny Tan, Project Manager for the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and Associate Professor Arun Mohamed, lecturer in 
Financial Reporting at Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). They were requested to review 
the disclosure item in the measuring instrument in the light of the disclosure requirement for 
quarterly reporting in Malaysia. Their comments were taken into account in revising the 
instrument. Amendments were made basically on the terms used and the sequence of the item 
in the scoring sheet so that it will be easily read with the quarterly reports. A pilot study was 
then carried out to ensure validity of the research instrument and the scoring process. Data 
was encoded by a single coder person, and then compared with the coding performed by the 
researcher. The detail of this process is also explained in Section 5.3.2.1. Discrepancies, if 
any, were resolved so that the researcher was better able to interpret and code the raw data, 
thereby ensuring consistent high quality data. The actual scoring was carried out by the 
researcher. A single coder was appointed and had undergone a sufficient period of training. 
From a pilot sample, she has shown an acceptable level of reliability to carry out the rest of 
the scoring.  The same single coder was used throughout the whole study. This procedure 
performed falls under content validity, as illustrated by Sekaran (2003). 
In addition to this, the data collection was also carried out by a research assistant. The 
research assistant was assigned to extract items 46 to 58 (as in Appendix 3) from the interim 
report since these items are factual rather than interpretative). This data will be used to test the 
effect of company attributes on mandatory disclosure. The research assistant was employed 
because it involved a high volume of data. Also, due to the large number of observations for 
each company reviewed in this study, the effect of any potential measurement error or bias 
would have been minimised with the help of the research assistant (Darus, 2005). However, as 
a precaution in case the research assistant was unfamiliar with financial statements, the 
reports were downloaded and sorted by the researcher. The job involved extracting the figures 
from the balance sheet to the checklist. The research assistant then transferred the data to the 
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Excel sheet prepared by the researcher. Next, the researcher compared the Excel sheet and the 
manual worksheet to ensure that no discrepancies were found. Therefore, there can be 
reasonable justification of the validity of the measuring instrument developed for this study. 
5.3.2.5 Reliability test 
In the context of this study, the reliability test refers to the way the constructed disclosure 
checklist consistently measures the mandatory disclosure practices of quarterly reporting.  As 
such, two tests were conducted, namely, correlation analysis and the Cronbach‟s alpha. The 
correlation analysis has been widely used in disclosure studies (see Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Wallace & Naser, 1995), while the Cronbach‟s alpha has been used by Botosan (1997). 
5.3.2.5.1 Cronbach alpha 
Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is a measure of internal consistency that uses 
repeated measurements to assess the degree to which correlation among the measurement is 
attenuated due to random error. As a general rule, an alpha of 0.8 indicates that the correlation 
is attenuated very little by random measurement error (Carmines & Zellner, 1979). Table 5.1 
shows the result for Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha for the scoring sheet. 
Table 5.1 Reliability statistics 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Cronbach's alpha based 
on standardised items No of items 
.968 .968 12 
 
Even though the above result indicates that the internal consistency of measurement is more 
than 0.8, it could not be used to determine the reliability test, because the calculation posed a 
serious warning that stated that “it cannot calculate the inverse matrix”, indicating that there 
was a serious statistics calculation problem. It could not be calculated because the disclosure 
indices values used to calculate the inverse matrix were so close to each other and some of the 
values were overlapping so that the inverse matrix calculation could not be performed. Thus, 
this study cannot rely on the Cronbach‟s alpha value to measure the internal consistency, as 
used by Botosan (1997) in her study. Therefore, this study will use the correlation analysis to 
measure the reliability test.  
5.3.2.5.2 Correlation analysis 
As mentioned in the validity test section (Section 5.3.2.4), a pilot test was carried out and a 
second coder appointed. Thus, a correlation test was performed on the researcher‟s scores and 
the second coder‟s scores for the 10 companies between quarters and across years. Table 5.2 
presents the result of the correlation analysis. The coefficient of Pearson should be above 0.8, 
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indicating significant correlations between the scores of the two scorers. These results reveal 
that the scores obtained independently by both scorers were in substantial agreement, 
indicating minimal subjectivity in interpreting and scoring the mandatory disclosures in 
quarterly reporting. These values are comparable to studies by Owusu-Ansah (1998) and 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987). Therefore, the reliability of the scoring sheet used in this 
study is justified.  
Table 5.2 Bi variate correlations for the reliability test 
  r1_05 r2_05 r3_05 r4_05 r1_06 r2_06 r3_06 r4_06 r1_07 r2_07 r3_07 r4_07 
y1_05 .722*            
y2_05 .018 .723*           
y3_05 -.401 .639* .693*          
y4_05 -.285 .696* .719* .906**         
y1_06 .722* -.309 -.172 -.130 .722*        
y2_06 -.081 .723* .679* .913** -.081 .723*       
y3_06 -.401 .639* .693* .794** -.401 .639* .693*      
y4_06 -.285 .696* .719* .906** -.285 .696* .719* .906**     
y1_07 .099 -.421 -.347 -.334 .099 -.421 -.347 -.334 .819**    
y2_07 -.150 -.324 -.427 -.238 -.150 -.324 -.427 -.238 .760* .704*   
y3_07 -.194 -.256 -.356 -.213 -.194 -.256 -.356 -.213 .745* .701* .788** . 
y4_07 -.352 -.406 -.552 -.190 -.352 -.406 -.552 -.190 .641* .692* .648* .699* 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
5.3.3  Phase 3 – Measuring the extent of disclosure 
After completing the compliance aspect, the analysis was further extended to determine the 
quality of disclosure. The scoring sheet was scrutinised to determine the item that will be used 
to measure the extent of disclosure. The following explanatory notes were selected as the 
subjects of investigation: 
 Comment on the seasonality and cyclicality 
 Review the performance (current and year-to-date) 
 Material changes in the profit before taxation 
 Company‟s prospects (future and current) 
 Board of Directors‟ opinion 
 Profit forecast 
The above explanatory notes were chosen for several reasons, as determined in the study by 
Ku Ismail (2003), and involved interpretation and comments from the management. 
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Specifically, this selected item has a different style of reporting that leads to different 
interpretation from the users‟ perspectives. Secondly, although the explanatory notes are 
compulsory, the amount of disclosure provided is at the discretion of the preparer. It is 
considered subjective and, hence, the amount of disclosure is subject to the interpretation of 
the preparer. Therefore, it is expected that the amount of disclosure is likely to vary between 
companies. Ku Ismail limits her analysis to three items to measure the quality of disclosure 
for interim reporting: (a) material changes in the quarterly results compared to those of the 
previous year; (b) review of company performance; and (c) comment on current year 
prospects. Her argument is that only the explanatory notes are common and could be 
disclosed by all companies. However, other explanatory notes that involved interpretations are 
not included in Ku Ismail‟s study since she argued that it is difficult to determine by mere 
observations of the reports. She further argued that non-disclosure may be due to the items 
being irrelevant or immaterial, and thus not subject to disclosure, or alternatively the company 
was not willing to disclose the item in question although it was relevant (Ku Ismail, 2003, 
p186). However, this study considers all explanatory notes as subject items, because this will  
give a better measurement for quality, by defining clearly non-disclosure and not applicable 
items. Further, this study considers every aspect of the disclosure requirement; leaving out 
one disclosure item will diminish the uniqueness of this study. 
To measure the extent of disclosure in a report, prior literature was reviewed: studies show 
that content analysis approach is one of the techniques that may be used in analysing text. It is 
also one of the techniques that is most widely used in accounting research to reveal useful 
insights into accounting practices (see Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; 
Ktrippendorff, 2004; Milne & Adler, 1999; Smith & Taffler, 2000).  It is a systematic method 
of categorising and analysing the content of text, such as the number of occurrences of words, 
or the number of words relating to a particular theme (Smith, 2003). Also, content analysis is 
a research technique for making inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the 
context of their use (Krippendorff, 2004, p18). The potential contribution of content analysis 
is that it can enable researchers to go behind the text as presented to make valid inferences 
about hidden or underlying (or possibly unintended) meaning and messages of interest 
(Weber, 1990; Denscombe, 1998, as cited in Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007). 
Content analysis involves codifying qualitative and quantitative information into pre-defined 
categories in order to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of information (Guthrie 
& Petty, 2000). It involves the identification of  coding categories, the unit analysis, and  
relevant data (Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007). In the context of this study, coding categories 
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refer to the themes and concepts identified as being related to the interim reporting. 
Accordingly, the category for this study is identified as extent of disclosure. Next, the 
appropriate unit analysis used in this study is determined. It can be words, phrases, sentences 
or themes that would be treated as data „units‟.  This choice of appropriate units to be used 
with content analysis has been the subject of considerable debate in the literature (Tilt, 2000). 
A review of the literature shows that studies of corporate disclosure used either the number of 
words (Clatworthy & Jones, 2001), the number of sentences  (Buhr, 1998; Guthrie et al., 
2006; Kohut & Segars, 1992), or the number of pages (Bartlett & Jones, 1997; Cowen et al., 
1987)  and  thematic content analysis within sentences (Short & Palmer, 2003) as their units 
of analysis. Nevertheless, no one method can be argued to be superior to the others, since the 
results of previous studies found a mixed result of correlation between disclosure index and  
appropriate unit (Ku Ismail, 2003). However, the relevant data for this study are the 
explanatory notes in interim reporting. As for this study, thematic content analysis within 
sentences is chosen since there is repetition of words involved in the disclosure. Furthermore, 
a review of the report shows that most of the wording used is verbatim from one quarter to 
another.  
As such, a scoring sheet is established to capture the extent of disclosure in interim reporting 
in Malaysia. Ten reports for each quarter were randomly selected to establish the scoring 
sheet. At the same time, Ku Ismail‟s (2003) findings in the form of frequency items for the 
extent of disclosure were used as a guide to establish the scoring sheet. A proper scale was 
assigned for each of the disclosure items investigated for the extent of disclosure. The scale 
was developed after randomly reviewing the reports for 10 companies, for each quarter and 
year as shown in Appendix 4. The meaning of some of the scales will be explained here, and 
can be applied to all the disclosures being investigated. For example, “no information”, “no 
projection”, and “no comment” refer to no disclosure made by the company. As for “general 
explanation”, “general projection”, and “general comment”, these refer to a qualitative 
comment with no specific reference to any performance indicators when commenting on the 
respective disclosure item. If the scale specifically mentions the name of the performance 
indicator (such as profit before tax), this means that only quantitative disclosure was made 
available. However, quantitative and qualitative comments can be found for the scale that 
mentions “the performance indicator together with explanation” or “projection with specific 
comment”.  
Further, the scoring sheet was sent for review to En Azhan Abu Bakar, Senior Auditor at 
Jamal, Amin and Partners, to ensure the validity of the scoring sheet. The wording was 
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refined to reduce the ambiguity of the scoring sheet, as suggested by En Azhan Abu Bakar. 
The final scoring sheet, as in Appendix 4, was used to capture the extent of disclosure. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter started with the discussion of the sample selection, providing justification on 
how the sample was selected. It was then followed by the discussion on how data were 
collected, namely, “measuring timeliness”, “measuring compliance” and “measuring the 
extant of disclosure”. A clear definition of the initial report date and the amendment 
announcement date was provided under Section 5.3.1. Under data collection for measuring 
compliance (Section 5.3.2), a detailed explanation was provided on how the self-constructed 
checklist was developed. It further explained the way the disclosure index model was 
employed to calculate a disclosure index. Issues such as validity and reliability were also 
discussed and tested in this section. Section 5.3.3 discussed the choices for the explanatory 
notes used in this section. It also highlighted the differences in items used to measure the 
extent of disclosure employed in this study, compared with previous studies.  
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     Chapter 6 
Analysis of Findings and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of various data analyses carried out in this 
study.  Normality test results are reported first for the individual variables to guide the choice 
of appropriate statistical techniques for analysing the data, followed by descriptive and 
inferential statistics for all stages illustrated in Chapter 5. The statistical package used is SPSS 
version 15. 
6.2 Normality test 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) procedure was performed to test the null hypothesis that the 
sample data is drawn from a normal distribution, and the results are presented in Appendix 1.  
The dependent variable is the disclosure index (DI), and consists of company size, leverage, 
industry, quick ratio and profitability. All normality tests were performed on these variables 
except for industry, which was not transformed because it was coded to enable SPSS to read 
the data.  
According to Pallant (2007), K-S with a significant value of more than 0.05 indicates that the 
distribution is normal at 5% significance level. With reference to the normality value (as in 
Appendix 5), only DI and some of the leverage values (Q1-Q4 2005) are normally distributed. 
Therefore, transformation of data was performed as follows: transformation using the log of 
assets for company size is necessary to reduce the skewness of the distributions, and the 
potential effects for the size of the variables on the regression equation (see, for example, 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) for log transformation of total 
assets). Further, leverage, quick ratio and profitability were transformed using the Van Der 
Waerden
17
 approach. No transformation was used for disclosure indices because it is normally 
distributed. This was suggested by Cooke (1998), who proposed the normal scores method as 
the most appropriate in transforming datasets that reveal non-linear monotonic relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables. 
 
                                                 
17
 The Van Der Waerden test is one of a number of normal scores tests which have been developed for 
evaluating data. Normal scores tests transform a set of rank orders into a set of standard deviation scores based 
on standard normal distribution. 
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6.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are divided into two sections: timeliness and disclosure index. 
Descriptive statistics for timeliness are presented in two forms: (a) “reporting within 
allowable period” which refers to compliance as to whether or not the company produced the 
quarterly reporting within 60 days as required by the regulation; and (b) “reporting lag (days)” 
which refers to the length of time the company took to produce the quarterly report. It is then 
followed by the discussion on the nature of disclosure compliance and cross-tabulation results 
between non-compliant companies and groups. The descriptive statistics for the disclosure 
index and statistics for independent variables used in this study are also discussed in this 
section. 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics for timeliness 
Descriptive statistics relating to the timeliness of quarterly reporting from 2005 to 2007 are 
presented in Tables 6.1 to 6.3. As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two aspects of timeliness 
where quarterly reporting is concerned for this study. The first aspect is to establish whether 
the interim reports are produced within the allowable period, as required by the regulations, 
and the second aspect of timeliness is reporting lag. 
6.3.1.1 Reporting within the allowable period 
Table 6.1 Reporting within the allowable period (%) 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2005 100 100 93 93 
2006 97 100 100 98 
2007 98 100 98 98 
 
Table 6.1 presents the percentage of Malaysian companies that published their interim reports 
within the allowable period of two months, as specified by the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements. It indicates that most Malaysian companies within quarters and across years 
complied with this requirement. Only 7% of the companies failed to comply with the 
requirement for Q3 and Q4 in 2005.  However, the compliance rate improved for the same 
quarters in 2006. A closer inspection of this table shows that there is a slight decrease in the 
compliance rate from 100% in 2005 to 97% in 2006. For 2007, the compliance rate is 98% for 
Q1, Q3 and Q4 and 100% for Q2. From the results, it can be concluded that the compliance 
rate is very high and (essentially) constant over the years. This finding is consistent with 
statistics gathered by KLSE on the submission of quarterly reporting that  shows a compliance 
rate of 98% for reports due on 30 September 1999 (KLSE, 1999). It should be noted that some 
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companies do not comply with the regulations, and submit their reports after the due 
date/allowable period. Although the non-compliance rate is low, the reasons for non-
compliance may be of interest to the regulatory bodies, who may need to consider whether 
some form of action might ensure greater compliance. For example, requiring companies to 
disclose the reason or reasons for this non-compliance with reporting deadlines might 
incentivise companies to avoid such exposure, thereby achieving greater compliance with the 
regulators. In addition, the reasons for non-compliance need to be made known so that 
investors are able to understand the real reason for the non-compliance. This situation will 
help investors to evaluate the real performance of a company for their decision-making 
process. 
6.3.1.2 Reporting lag (days) 
Table 6.2 Reporting lag (days) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Year Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
2005 52 76 26 51 61 13 50 61 19 55 73 36 
2006 52 76 26 51 61 13 50 61 19 55 73 23 
2007 52 73 23 51 61 19 50 86 19 56 85 36 
 
Table 6.2 indicates the mean time taken by companies to publish their quarterly reports. It 
reveals that the mean time is 52 days for Q1 for 2005 to 2007, 51 days for Q2 and Q3 for the 
three years, while the mean for Q4 is 55 days for 2005 and 2006 and 56 days for 2007. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. Firstly, Malaysian companies submit 
their reports between five and 10 days before the due date. Secondly, the average number of 
days taken to produce quarterly reports gradually decreases from Q1 to Q3, but then increases 
for the last quarter of the year. Thirdly, it takes longer to produce the quarterly report in Q4. 
These findings are similar to those reported by Ku Ismail (2003), where the mean for Q4 was 
55.7 days. However, a longer time for Q4 is intuitively reasonable, since companies are 
required to prepare the report for the fourth quarter as well as the full annual report, while in 
the first three quarters, only additional information is added to the previous report. 
6.3.1.3 The nature of disclosure compliance 
Further analysis was carried out to investigate the nature of disclosure compliance. Samples 
were divided into four subgroups based on their compliance with the reporting requirements 
(Reporting) and with the listing requirements (Listing), as follows: Group 1 – Companies that 
comply with both Reporting and Listing; Group 2 – Companies that comply with Reporting 
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but not Listing; Group 3 – Companies that comply with Listing but not Reporting; and Group 
4 – Companies that do not comply with Reporting or Listing. The sample companies fall only 
into Groups 2 and 4. This was carried out by scrutinizing the disclosure checklists gathered 
during the phase 2 data collection and a remark was given to the company in the group in 
which they belong on those checklists. 
Table 6.3 Nature of disclosure compliance (%) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Year Group 2 Group 4 Group 2 Group 4 Group 2 Group 4 Group 2 Group 4 
2005 11.7 88.3 13.3 86.7 10.0 90.0 10.0 90.0 
2006 10.0 90.0 10.0 90.0 10.0 90.0 10.0 90.0 
2007 11.7 88.3 11.7 88.3 11.7 88.3 11.7 88.3 
Table 6.3 reports on the nature of disclosure compliance and the percentage rates based on the 
subgroups. The result reveals that there are quite a number of companies that do not comply 
with both listing and reporting requirements. This is surprising given that (a) the Reporting 
requirement is subject to legal backing, as follows: 
“Where financial statements are required to be prepared or lodged 
under any law administrated by the Securities Comission, Bank 
Negara Malaysia or the Companies Commission Malaysia and 
approved accounting standards have been issued or adopted by the 
Board, such financial statement shall be deemed not to have complied 
with the requirement of such laws unless they have been prepared and 
are kept in accordance with the approved accounting standard.” 
(S26D, FRA (Amendment) 2004) 
and (b) the Listing requirement is subject to enforcement by the Securities Commission via a 
structured approach, namely, the financial reporting surveillance and compliance programme. 
The surveillance and compliance function is intended to ensure that listed companies comply 
with approved accounting standards regarding the preparation and presentation of their 
financial statements. Compliance with accounting standards is required by law, and there are 
severe penalties for non-compliance. The Securities Commission has broad powers to direct 
the company, its director(s), or chief executive officer to take the necessary rectifying actions, 
or make the necessary announcements with respect to the non-compliance or rectification 
required. Such offences also carry a fine not exceeding RM1 million, or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding five years, or both.  
The results in Table 6.3 also reveal that Malaysian companies fail to observe the requirements 
of the Act and other enforcement bodies. Another surprising finding from Table 6.3 is that 
only 10-12% of the companies fall into Group 2 (Compliance with Reporting but not Listing 
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requirements) for each quarter across the years. This shows that very few companies comply 
with the requirement of FRS 134. In other words, most of the companies belong to Group 4 
(Non-compliance with both requirements). 
Further analysis was carried out on an item-by-item basis to determine if there are any 
specific items that are not disclosed. The analysis shows that there are two items that the 
sample companies do not commonly disclose in their quarterly reports that result in non-
compliance with the listing requirements, namely, the “Opinion from the Board of Directors” 
and the “Review of the performance of the company and its principal subsidiaries for the 
current quarter and financial year to date”. With respect to non-compliance with the reporting 
requirements, the common non-disclosure items are “Additional lines and items for the 
financial statement” and “Additional disclosure as required by FRS 3 Business Combination 
Para 66-73”.  
6.3.1.4 Cross-tabulation results between the non-compliant companies and 
the group 
This section shows the cross-tabulation of compliant and non-compliant (quarterly reporting 
produced after due date) companies and the group that they fall into (either Group 2 or 
Group 4). The results are shown in Panel 1 to Panel 7. It is noted that the total numbers of 
non-compliant companies vary from one quarter to another. Panels are prepared for the 
quarters when non-compliant companies exist, namely, Q3 and Q4 (2005), Q1 and Q4 (2006), 
and Q1, Q2 and Q3 (2007).  
 
Panel 1: Quarter 3, 2005  
    Gp_Q3_05 Total 
    Group 2  Group 4  
Re_Q3_05 compliant Count 49 7 56 
    Expected Count 46.7 9.3 56.0 
    % within Re_Q3_05 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
    % within Gp_Q3_05 98.0% 70.0% 93.3% 
    % of Total 81.7% 11.7% 93.3% 
  non-compliant Count 1 3 4 
    Expected Count 3.3 .7 4.0 
    % within Re_Q3_05 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
    % within Gp_Q3_05 2.0% 30.0% 6.7% 
    % of Total 1.7% 5.0% 6.7% 
Total Count 50 10 60 
  Expected Count 50.0 10.0 60.0 
  % within Re_Q3_05 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q3_05 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
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Panel 1 for Q3, 2005 indicates that out of 56 companies that produce quarterly reporting 
within the allowable period, 49 companies fall into Group 2 and seven companies fall into 
Group 4. Then, out of four non-compliant companies, three fall into Group 2 and one into 
Group 4. 
Panel 2: Quarter 4, 2005  
    Gp_Q4_05 Total 
    Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q4_05 compliant Count 49 5 54 
    Expected Count 45.0 9.0 54.0 
    % within Re_Q4_05 90.7% 9.3% 100.0% 
    % within Gp_Q4_05 98.0% 50.0% 90.0% 
    % of Total 81.7% 8.3% 90.0% 
  non- compliant Count 1 5 6 
    Expected Count 5.0 1.0 6.0 
    % within Re_Q4_05 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
    % within Gp_Q4_05 2.0% 50.0% 10.0% 
    % of Total 1.7% 8.3% 10.0% 
Total Count 50 10 60 
  Expected Count 50.0 10.0 60.0 
  % within Re_Q4_05 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q4_05 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
 
Panel 2 for Q4, 2005 reveals that one and five non-compliant companies fall into Group 2 and 
Group 4, respectively. The table also shows that there are 54 compliant companies, of which, 
49 fall into Group 2 and five into Group 4. 
Panel 3: Quarter 1, 2006  
  Gp_Q1_06 Total 
  Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q1_06 compliant Count 53 6 59 
  Expected Count 52.1 6.9 59.0 
  % within Re_Q1_06 89.8% 10.2% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q1_06 100.0% 85.7% 98.3% 
  % of Total 88.3% 10.0% 98.3% 
 non-compliant Count 0 1 1 
  Expected Count .9 .1 1.0 
  % within Re_Q1_06 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q1_06 .0% 14.3% 1.7% 
  % of Total .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 53 7 60 
 Expected Count 53.0 7.0 60.0 
 % within Re_Q1_06 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
 % within Gp_Q1_06 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
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Panel 3 for Q1, 2006 shows that only one company is non-compliant, and it falls into Group 
4. For compliant companies, 53 are in Group 2 and six are in Group 4. 
 
Panel 4: Quarter 4, 2006 
  Gp_Q4_06 Total 
  Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q4_06 compliant Count 53 6 59 
  Expected Count 52.1 6.9 59.0 
  % within Re_Q4_06 89.8% 10.2% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q4_06 100.0% 85.7% 98.3% 
  % of Total 88.3% 10.0% 98.3% 
 non-compliant Count 0 1 1 
  Expected Count .9 .1 1.0 
  % within Re_Q4_06 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q4_06 .0% 14.3% 1.7% 
  % of Total .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 53 7 60 
 Expected Count 53.0 7.0 60.0 
 % within Re_Q4_06 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
 % within Gp_Q4_06 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
 
Panel 4 for Q4, 2006 indicates that out of 59 companies that produce quarterly reporting 
within the allowable period, 53 fall into Group 2 and six fall into Group 4. Only one company 
is non-compliant and falls into Group 4. 
 
Panel 5: Quarter 1, 2007  
  Gp_Q1_07 Total 
  Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q1_07 Compliant Count 53 6 60 
  Expected Count 52.1 6.9 59.0 
  % within Re_Q1_07 89.8% 10.2% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q1_07 100.0% 85.7% 98.3% 
  % of Total 88.3% 10.0% 98.3% 
 non-compliant Count 0 1 1 
  Expected Count .9 .1 1.0 
  % within Re_Q1_07 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q1_07 .0% 14.3% 1.7% 
  % of Total .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 54 7 60 
 Expected Count 53.0 7.0 60.0 
 % within Re_Q1_07 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
 % within Gp_Q1_07 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 88.3% 11.7% 100.0% 
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Panel 5 for Q1, 2007 reveals that only one non-compliant company falls into Group 4. The 
table also shows that there are 59 compliant companies, of which, 53 are in Group 2 and six in 
Group 4. 
Panel 6: Quarter 2, 2007  
  Gp_Q2_07 Total 
  Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q2_07 compliant Count 52 7 59 
  Expected Count 51.1 7.9 59.0 
  % within Re_Q2_07 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q2_07 100.0% 87.5% 98.3% 
  % of Total 86.7% 11.7% 98.3% 
 non-compliant Count 0 1 1 
  Expected Count .9 .1 1.0 
  % within Re_Q2_07 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q2_07 .0% 12.5% 1.7% 
  % of Total .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 52 8 60 
 Expected Count 52.0 8.0 60.0 
 % within Re_Q2_07 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within Gp_Q2_07 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 
Panel 6 for Q2, 2007 indicates that out of 59 companies that produce quarterly reporting 
within the allowable period, 52 companies fall into Group 2 and seven companies fall into 
Group 4. Only one company is non-compliant and falls into Group 4. 
 
Panel 7: Quarter 4, 2007 
  Gp_Q4_07 Total 
  Group 2 Group 4  
Re_Q4_07 compliant Count 52 7 59 
  Expected Count 51.1 7.9 59.0 
  % within Re_Q4_07 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q4_07 100.0% 87.5% 98.3% 
  % of Total 86.7% 11.7% 98.3% 
 non-compliant Count 0 1 1 
  Expected Count .9 .1 1.0 
  % within Re_Q4_07 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within Gp_Q4_07 .0% 12.5% 1.7% 
  % of Total .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 52 8 60 
 Expected Count 52.0 8.0 60.0 
 % within Re_Q4_07 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within Gp_Q4_07 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
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Panel 7 for Q4, 2007 reveals that only one company is non-compliant and falls into Group 4. 
The table also shows that there are 59 compliant companies, of which, 52 are in Group 2 and 
seven are in Group 7. 
Findings in Panels 1 to 7 lead to two important conclusions. Firstly, most of the non-
compliant companies belong to Group 4, which is non-compliant with both Reporting and 
Listing. It means that these companies not only produced their quarterly reports after the 
allowable period, but that they also did not comply with the reporting and listing 
requirements. Nevertheless, there are non-compliant companies that belong to Group 2, but 
still produced their quarterly reports after the allowable period. This group of companies 
failed to observe the listing requirement but did comply with the reporting requirement. 
Secondly, the majority of the compliant companies belong to Group 2. This means that the 
companies failed to observe the listing requirement, although they managed to produce their 
quarterly reports within the allowable period. This finding reveals the serious offence against 
the disclosure requirement, and the two problems that will result from this offence: (a) for 
companies that do not produce the quarterly reports within the allowable period it could lead 
to doubt about “timeliness” characteristics‟; and (b) not complying with either the listing 
requirement or both requirements will lead to insufficient disclosure which will later affect 
investors in their decision making.  
6.3.2 Descriptive statistics for the disclosure index 
Table 6.4 Disclosure index (mean) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Year Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
2005 0.89 0.97 0.82 0.87 0.97 0.79 0.89 0.97 0.80 0.89 0.97 0.79 
2006 0.90 0.97 0.83 0.89 0.97 0.82 0.89 0.97 0.82 0.90 0.96 0.81 
2007 0.90 0.97 0.82 0.90 0.97 0.79 0.90 0.97 0.79 0.90 0.97 0.79 
 
Table 6.4 reports the means of the disclosure indices for all companies, as calculated 
according to the formula in Section 5.3.2. The range of the mean disclosure indices is between 
0.87 and 0.90 for all quarters across the three years of the study. A closer inspection of this 
table reveals that the lowest mean of 0.87 occurs in Q2 of 2005, and all the other means are 
relatively stable at 0.89 and 0.90. The lowest minimum disclosure index is 0.79, which 
occurred in Q2 and Q3 in 2005 and Q2, Q3 and Q4 in 2007, while the highest disclosure 
index is 0.97 reported in Q3 and Q4 of 2007. Thus, it can be seen that full compliance with 
the reporting and listing requirements is not achieved in any of the periods studied. These 
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findings pose the question as to why the disclosure compliance index is moderately low under 
a regulated reporting environment. Several explanations are possible. It could be that 
companies have different interpretations as to what is required. It could also be that some 
companies may have disclosed items using other means of communication, such as 
management commentary and/or press releases rather than their quarterly reports. However, 
using media other than the formal quarterly reports does not form part of this study. These 
reasons might explain why the item was regarded as not being disclosed, which, in turn, will 
affect the disclosure compliance index. Further, other factors affecting compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements may be due to an inadequate regulatory framework and 
enforcement mechanisms (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). 
Table 6.5 Comparison of average mean disclosure indices 
Country Average mean disclosure index 
Malaysia (this study) 0.89 
United Kingdom (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007) 0.75 
Australia (Samantha & Greg, 1997) 0.84 
New Zealand and neighbouring countries  
(Owusu-Ansah, 2005)  
0.93 
Singapore (Samantha & Gregg 1997) 0.95 
 
From the comparison shown in Table 6.5 between this study and other previous studies, it can 
be concluded that the disclosure means for Malaysian companies are comparatively good. 
However, under the legal backing environment, this is not supposed to be the case for reasons 
highlighted earlier. 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables examined in this study are 
presented in Table 6.6 (descriptive statistics for company size, liquidity, profitability and 
leverage) and Table 6.7 (descriptive statistics for industries). 
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Table 6.6 Summary of statistics for total asset, liquidity, profitability and leverage 
 Year 2005 2006 2007 
Variables 
Quarter 
Statistic 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Company size 
(total assets) 
(RM’000 000) 
Mean 62.62 63.03 63.41 64.99 68.61 69.32 70.54 72.87 74.79 79.69 81.17 84.63 
Min 2.68 2.91 2.91 2.83 2.81 2.92 2.81 2.69 2.92 3.06 3.32 3.07 
Max 630.63 642.98 640.11 650.92 666.18 669.80 675.07 677.24 681.31 685.00 688.54 699.84 
Liquidity 
Mean 2.43 2.44 2.35 2.39 2.52 2.41 2.27 2.36 2.41 2.67 2.08 2.19 
Min 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.37 -3.67 -2.37 -2.71 -1.14 
Max 13.73 20.72 14.14 11.79 14.39 14.84 13.69 9.05 16.65 18.95 15.96 21.17 
Profitability 
Mean 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.10 
Min -0.46 -0.45 -0.39 -3.48 -0.49 -0.45 -0.51 -1.37 -0.50 -0.43 -0.51 -2.21 
Max 3.52 1.85 1.12 0.88 4.98 1.22 1.44 9.11 2.58 1.89 1.70 1.99 
Leverage 
Mean 0.55 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.56 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.62 
Min -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 3.67 5.88 5.87 6.18 2.63 2.50 6.01 5.79 5.12 4.91 4.97 4.71 
 
As shown in Table 6.6, the mean size for the sample companies  is measured by their total asset value, which is from RM62.62 to RM64.99 
million for year 2005, from RM68.61 to RM72.87 million for year 2006, and from RM74.79 to RM84.63 million for year 2007. For year 2005, 
the minimum total asset is from RM2.68 to RM2.91 million, and the maximum is from RM630.6 to RM650.92 million. For year 2006, the 
minimum total asset is from RM2.81 to RM2.92 million, and the maximum is from RM666.18 to RM677.24 million. For year 2007, the 
minimum total asset is from RM2.92 to RM3.32 million, and the maximum is from RM681.31 to RM699.84 million.  
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Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio. The mean liquidity ratio is from 2.68 to 2.91 for year 
2005, from 2.69 to 2.92 for year 2006, and from 2.92 to 3.32 for year 2007. The minimum 
liquidity ratio lies between 0.07 and 0.12 for year 2005, between 0.07 and 0.13 for year 2006, 
and between 2.08 and 2.67 for year 2007. As for the maximum liquidity ratio, the value is 
from 11.79 to 20.72 for year 2005, from 9.05 to 14.84 in year 2006, and from 15.96 to 21.17 
for year 2007. 
The profitability ratio is measured by net profit sales or revenue. The mean size for the 
profitability ratio is between 0.05 and 0.23 for year 2005, between 0.16 and 0.31 for year 
2006, and between 0.10 and 0.20 in year 2007. For year 2005, the minimum profitability ratio 
is between -0.39 and -3.48, and the maximum is between 0.88 and 3.52. For year 2006, the 
minimum is between -0.45 and -1.37, and the maximum is between 1.22 and 9.11. For year 
2007, the minimum is between -0.51 and -2.21, and the maximum is between 1.70 and 2.58. 
As for the debt ratio, which is measured by debt to equity, the mean size ranges from 0.55 to 
0.73 in year 2005, from 0.56 to 0.64 in year 2006, and from 0.60 to 0.62 in year 2007. The 
minimum debt ratio lies between -0.40 and zero for year 2005. For years 2006 and 2007, the 
minimum debt ratio is zero. As for the maximum debt ratio, the value is 3.67 to 6.18 for year 
2005, 2.63 to 6.01 for year 2006, and 4.71 to 5.12 for year 2007. 
Table 6.7 Number of companies by industry 
Industries Frequency Percentage (%) 
Trading/services 21 35.0 
Customer 10 16.7 
Industrial 9 15.0 
Construction 5 8.3 
Infrastructure 5 8.3 
Property 4 6.7 
Plantation 4 6.7 
Technology 2 3.3 
Total 60 100 
 
Table 6.7 reports on the number of companies in the sample for each industry. Trading/ 
services represent 35% of the total sample, followed by Consumer (16.7%) and Industrial 
(15%). About 8.3% and 6.7% of the sample are represented by Infrastructure and Property, 
respectively. The balance of the sample consists of companies from Technology.  
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Tables 6.6 and 6.7 represent the descriptive statistics for the independent variables, which are 
measured by the following methods:  
 Company size: Natural log of total assets  
 Liquidity: Quick ratio 
 Profitability: Net profit 
 Leverage: Debt to equity ratio 
 Industry: Coded according to the industry groups listed in Bursa Malaysia.  
The results presented the mean, minimum and maximum for total asset, liquidity, profitability 
and leverage. As for industries, frequency was calculated to determine the number of 
companies for each industry, and the result reveals that Trading/services contributes the most 
sample companies for this study. 
6.4  Inferential statistics 
This section presents inferential statistics covering the “timeliness” and “level of disclosure”, 
followed by hypothesis testing using univariate and multivariate analysis. Timeliness will 
employ non-parametric tests, since the reporting lag shows a non-normal distribution (see 
Davies & Whittred, 1980; Dyer & McHugh, 1975), namely Spearman‟s correlation, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, the Mann-Whitney U test, and the Friedman test. For the level of 
disclosure, data are normally distributed; therefore parametric tests will be employed such as 
one sample t-test, independent t-test, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). All results are 
presented according to the hypotheses in Chapter 4. 
6.4.1 Timeliness 
This section discusses all the test and hypotheses tested, in relation to timeliness as 
hypothesised in Section 4.3.1, summarised as follows: 
a
H1 : There is no difference in the means of timeliness across years 
b
H1 : There is no difference in the means of timeliness between quarters 
c
H1 : There is no difference in the means of timeliness between industries 
d
H1 : There is no difference in the means of timeliness between groups 
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6.4.1.1 Means for timeliness across years (H a1 ) 
Table 6.8 Comparison of the means for timeliness (number of days) across years 
 2005 2006 2007 
Mean rank 
Q1 2.63 2.71 2.78 
Q2 2.28 2.46 2.35 
Q3 2.23 2.04 1.92 
Q4 2.85 2.79 2.95 
Friedman test 
N 60 60 60 
Chi-square 9.876 13.102 25.307 
Df 3 3 3 
p-value 0.020* 0.004* 0.000* 
*significant at 0.05 
 
Table 6.8 shows the mean rank for timeliness for each quarter from 2005 to 2007, and 
indicates no systematic pattern in the mean rank across the year. The mean rank increases 
from 2005 to 2006 for Q1 and Q2. However, it decreases for Q3 and Q4 from 2005 to 2006. 
The decreasing trend can also be observed for Q2 and Q3 from 2006 to 2007. As for Q1 and 
Q4, the mean rank increases from 2006 to 2007.  
The results of the Friedman test in Table 6.8 indicate that the p value is less than 0.05 for all 
three years. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it is concluded that there are 
significant differences in the means for timeliness across years. The result is expected because 
there is a variation in the number of days taken for each company for each quarter for all three 
years, which can be clearly seen for Q1 and Q4 of each year. It is suggested that the reason for 
the variation is because Q1 and Q4 reporting overlap the preparation of the annual financial 
statements and the annual report. This means that companies have more workload towards the 
end of the year and early in the following year, because they have to prepare three reports that 
require the same degree of attention. This leads to a conflict of interest in the company when 
preparing such reports. 
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6.4.1.2 Means for timeliness between quarters (H b1 ) 
Table 6.9 Comparison of means for timeliness (number of days) between quarters 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Mean rank 
2005 2.02 1.96 2.23 2.01 
2006 2.10 2.22 2.00 1.93 
2007 1.88 1.83 1.93 2.06 
Friedman test 
N 60 60 60 60 
Chi-square 1.550 5.191 6.877 0.514 
Df 2 2 2 2 
p-value 0.461 0.075 0.032* 0.774 
*significant at 0.05 
 
The results in Table 6.9 report whether or not there is any significant difference in the means 
for timeliness between quarters. Again, the result for the mean rank does not show a 
systematic pattern. A closer inspection of Table 6.10, however, reveals that the mean rank for 
timeliness decreases from Q1 to Q2 for years 2005 and 2007. Yet, year 2006 reported an 
increase in the mean rank for similar periods. Further, the mean rank increases in Q3 for 2005, 
and decreases in Q3 for year 2006 and 2007. The decreasing trend continues for Q3 and Q4 in 
years 2005 and 2006, and the trend increases for Q3 and Q4 in year 2007.  
The result for the Friedman test shows a mixed result between quarters. For Q1, Q2 and Q4, 
the p-value is greater than 0.05, which concludes that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the means of timeliness for Q1, Q2 and Q4. In contrast, there is a 
statistically significant difference in mean rank for timeliness for Q3, since the p-value is at 
the 5% significance level. The conclusion reached for Q2 is expected due to the reporting lag 
being more or less similar for this quarter for these three years. Q3 yields a similar result. As 
for Q1 and Q4, a significant difference should be observed/expected because the reporting lag 
for each quarter for all three years is more variable and companies take longer to produce 
their quarterly reports since they are busy with their annual report.  
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6.4.1.3 Means for timeliness between industries (H c1 ) 
Table 6.10 Comparison of the means for timeliness across industries 
 2005 2006 2007 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Trading/ 
Service 
34.52 31.81 26.86 28.81 32.64 31.40 29.67 27.95 28.00 29.12 27.98 29.79 
Industrial 32.56 34.44 33.61 27.56 30.78 32.44 26.72 32.72 30.33 29.17 32.83 28.94 
Consumer 27.50 25.95 29.95 34.00 25.10 27.85 27.75 37.60 31.25 25.35 24.45 37.95 
construction 29.50 32.10 44.30 41.70 34.80 27.20 43.00 34.50 36.70 45.70 45.10 32.80 
property 31.75 39.38 43.00 43.13 49.13 45.75 53.63 32.38 50.63 51.25 52.88 44.13 
infrastructure 25.60 20.60 23.50 27.80 27.30 20.40 25.30 21.20 28.80 22.20 28.10 23.10 
plantation 25.63 34.25 34.13 18.00 24.00 32.13 24.38 25.00 19.13 27.63 23.00 21.13 
technology 16.00 17.25 8.25 22.50 6.75 25.25 17.75 32.35 25.00 23.75 16.50 12.00 
Chi-Square 3.680 5.307 10.648 7.672 10.613 5.562 12.362 4.449 8.384 12.076 14.058 8.906 
df 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
p-value .816 .623 .155 .362 .156 .592 .089 .727 .300 .098 .060 .260 
*significant at 0.05 
 
The Kruskal Wallis (K-W) test was used to compare the means for timeliness for three or 
more industries, and the results are reported in Table 6.10. The p-value for Q1 to Q4 is more 
than 0.05 for years 2005 to 2007. This result reveals that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and it can be concluded that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
means of timeliness between industries from Q1 to Q4 for the three years. It suggests that 
there is no “industry effect” on the number of days taken by a company to produce quarterly 
reporting. A good explanation for such a result is that the regulation states only the allowable 
period for all listed companies (that is, 60 days), and there is no mention of industry type. 
Therefore, this result is consistent with the reporting regulation.  
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6.4.1.4 Means for timeliness between groups (H d1 ) 
Table 6.11 Means for timeliness between groups 
Year Qtr Group Mean z-value p-value 
2005 
Q1 
2 43.00 
4.023 0.159 
4 50.91 
Q2 
2 45.00 
3.246 0.595 
4 50.49 
Q3 
2 36.00 
3.133 0.008* 
4 52.74 
Q4 
2 58.86 
3.122 0.652 
4 56.00 
2006 
Q1 
2 48.86 
3.775 0.380 
4 51.92 
Q2 
2 43.29 
3.706 0.148 
4 51.98 
Q3 
2 43.57 
3.516 0.041* 
4 50.89 
Q4 
2 47.14 
2.876 0.002* 
4 56.02 
2007 
Q1 
2 51.43 
3.781 0.817 
4 51.81 
Q2 
2 44.57 
3.231 0.356 
4 51.32 
Q3 
2 43.00 
3.105 0.087 
4 51.04 
Q4 
2 55.00 
1.833 0.218 
4 56.32 
  *significant at 0.05 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test is used to test for differences in the means for timeliness between 
Group 2 and Group 4. The tests reveal that the p-values for years 2005 to 2007 are greater 
than 0.05 for all quarters at the 5% level of significance, except for Q3 in 2005 and 2006 and 
Q4 in 2006. Therefore, the null hypotheses for Q1, Q2 and Q4 for year 2005, Q1 and Q2 for 
year 2006, and Q1 to Q4 for year 2007 cannot be rejected, which concludes that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the means for timeliness between Group 2 and Group 4 
for the respective periods. As for Q3 in 2005 and Q3 and Q4 in 2006, the results indicate that 
there is a statistical difference in the means for timeliness between Group 2 and Group 4 at the 
5% significance level. The first part of the results are as expected since the difference between 
these two groups is mainly due to the disclosure item and not the reporting lag. As such, a 
statistical difference due to the reporting lag should not exist. However, the result for the 
second part is in the opposite direction. Upon reviewing the reporting lag for the respective 
periods, one obvious conclusion is that most of the companies during these periods (Q3 of 
2005, Q3 and Q4 of 2006) are taking longer than the allowable period of 60 days.  Hence, this 
situation is being reflected in the results. 
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6.4.2 Disclosure index 
This section discusses all the test of hypotheses related to the disclosure index as hypothesised 
in subsections b and d of Section 4.3.1: 
a
H 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index across years 
b
H 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index between quarters 
cH 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index between industries 
dH 2 : There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index for each group 
eH 2 :  There is no difference in the means of the disclosure index between groups 
6.4.2.1 Means for the disclosure index across years (H a2 ) 
Table 6.12 Comparison of means for the disclosure index between quarters for 2005 
to 2007 
Year Quarter Mean p-value 
2005 
Q1 0.8909 
0.139 
Q2 0.8864 
Q3 0.8882 
Q4 0.8899 
2006 
Q1 0.8961 
0.016* 
Q2 0.8917 
Q3 0.8921 
Q4 0.8962 
2007 
Q1 0.8977 
0.904 
Q2 0.8960 
Q3 0.8960 
Q4 0.8962 
*significant at 0.05 
 
A one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the 
means of the disclosure index by years, and the results are presented in Table 6.12. P-values 
of 0.139 in year 2005, 0.016 in year 2006, and 0.904 in year 2007 are greater than the 
criterion value of 0.05 (except for year 2006). Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, and it can be concluded that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
means for the disclosure index for years 2005 and 2007. This result indicates that the content 
of disclosure between quarters for years 2005 and 2007 is the same. In similar words, 
companies are practising cut and paste activities between quarters for these two years.  In 
contrast, the result for 2006 indicates that there is a significant difference in means for the 
disclosure index for Q1 to Q4. This suggests that there is a difference in disclosure content for 
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each company from one quarter to another quarter for this year. A possible explanation for 
this finding may be due to the high level of compliance with the disclosure requirement 
between quarters for year 2006. 
6.4.2.2 Means for the disclosure index between quarters (H b2 ) 
Table 6.13 Comparison of means for the disclosure index across years for Q1 to Q4 
Quarter Year Mean p-value 
 
Q1 
2005 0.8909 
 
0.306 
2006 0.8962 
2007 0.8977 
 
Q2 
2005 0.8864 
 
0.123 
2006 0.8917 
2007 0.8960 
 
Q3 
2005 0.8882 
 
0.295 
2006 0.8921 
2007 0.8953 
 
Q4 
2005 0.8899 
 
0.257 
2006 0.8962 
2007 0.8962 
 
The same conclusions from Table 6.12 can also be made for Table 6.13 for the means for the 
disclosure index since the p-value is more than 0.05 across years for Q1 to Q4. This result 
implies that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; it can therefore be concluded that there is 
no significant difference in means for the disclosure index between quarters. This result is 
expected, since, by observation, companies are practising „cut and paste‟ activities throughout 
this period. It can be suggested that the purpose of producing the quarterly report is just to 
comply with the requirement. 
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6.4.2.3 Means for the disclosure index across industries (H c2 ) 
Table 6.14 Comparison of means for the disclosure index across industries 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Year Industries Mean F p-value Mean F p-value Mean F p-value Mean F p-value 
2005 
Trading/Services 0.8934 
.493 .836 
0.8872 
.961 .469 
0.8909 
.921 .498 
0.8901 
.828 .569 
Industrial 0.8951 0.8875 0.8865 0.8945 
Consumer 0.8996 0.8881 0.8886 0.8867 
Construction 0.8834 0.8967 0.9047 0.9055 
Property 0.8669 0.8475 0.8475 0.8525 
Infrastructure 0.8804 0.8719 0.8751 0.8776 
Plantation 0.8902 0.9083 0.9029 0.9105 
Technology 0.8975 0.9094 0.9088 0.9088 
2006 
Trading/Services 0.9013 
.516 .818 
0.8951 
1.230 .304 
0.8943 
0.962 0.468 
0.9019 
1.041 .415 
Industrial 0.8961 0.8858 0.8928 0.8938 
Consumer 0.9010 0.9061 0.9002 0.9017 
Construction 0.8991 0.8986 0.8992 0.8992 
Property 0.8727 0.8441 0.8444 0.8458 
Infrastructure 0.8877 0.8886 0.8936 0.9022 
Plantation 0.8898 0.8877 0.8886 0.8886 
Technology 0.8920 0.9044 0.9060 0.9111 
2007 
Trading/Services 0.9043 
.675 .692 
0.9037 
1.661 .139 
0.9008 
1.526 .179 
0.9016 
1.237 .300 
Industrial 0.8959 0.8910 0.8945 0.8931 
Consumer 0.9020 0.9036 0.9043 0.9037 
Construction 0.8968 0.9073 0.9090 0.9027 
Property 0.8615 0.8319 0.8303 0.8398 
Infrastructure 0.8933 0.8964 0.8993 0.9040 
Plantation 0.8952 0.9094 0.8959 0.8952 
Technology 0.9038 0.8960 0.8819 0.8947 
 
Table 6.14 indicates the means of the disclosure index across industries. ANOVA repeated measures were conducted to explore the relationship. Since 
the p-value is greater than 0.05, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is no significant difference in the means for 
the disclosure index across industries. This is not unexpected since the disclosure requirement is the same for all industries. The finding is consistent 
with studies by Tan and Tower (1999) and Tai et al. (1990), who found no evidence of any association between industry type and the degree of 
compliance.  
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6.4.2.4 Means for the disclosure index for Group 2 ( dH 2 )  
Table 6.15 Comparison of means for the disclosure index for Group 2 
Year Quarter Mean t-statistic p-value 
 
2005 
Q1 0.9344 10.652 0.000* 
Q2 0.9390 18.287 0.000* 
Q3 0.9494 14.337 0.000* 
Q4 0.9546 23.829 0.000* 
 
2006 
Q1 0.9345 13.148 0.000* 
Q2 0.9390 14.730 0.000* 
Q3 0.9429 12.602 0.000* 
Q4 0.9409 10.072 0.000* 
 
2007 
Q1 0.9461 13.951 0.000* 
Q2 0.9507 16.247 0.000* 
Q3 0.9506 15.948 0.000* 
Q4 0.9414 11.196 0.000* 
           *significant at 0.05 
 
One sample t-test was employed to derive the findings in Table 6.15. Since the p-value is less 
than 0.05, there is strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses. Hence, it is concluded that 
there is a significant difference in the means for the disclosure index for Group 2 between 
each quarter for all the three years.  Group 2 here refers to companies that comply with 
Reporting but not Listing. In similar words, this group of company has the entire disclosure 
item for Reporting but there is a missing disclosure item in respect of Listing. This result 
indicates that the missing disclosure item could not be the same between companies for Group 
2. 
6.4.2.5 Means for the disclosure index for Group 4 ( dH 2 ) 
Table 6.16 Comparison of means for the disclosure index for Group 4 
Year Quarter Mean t-statistic p-value 
2005 
Q1 0.8852 20.652 0.000* 
Q2 0.8783 15.915 0.000* 
Q3 0.8814 16.553 0.000* 
Q4 0.8827 16.339 0.000* 
2006 
Q1 0.8919 23.900 0.000* 
Q2 0.8864 17.561 0.000* 
Q3 0.8864 17.354 0.000* 
Q4 0.8912 17.326 0.000* 
2007 
Q1 0.8913 20.255 0.000* 
Q2 0.8888 16.511 0.000* 
Q3 0.8880 15.611 0.000* 
Q4 0.8902 16.897 0.000* 
                      *significant at 0.05 
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One sample t-test was employed to derive the findings in Table 6.16. Since the p-value is less 
than 0.05, there is a strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses. It is therefore concluded 
that there is a significant difference in the means for the disclosure index for Group 4 for all 
three years. Group 4 here refers to companies that do not comply with Reporting or Listing. In 
similar words, this group of company has missing disclosure items in respect to the disclosure 
requirement. Therefore, a possible explanation for such a result is that the missing disclosure 
item could not be the same between companies for Group 4. 
6.4.2.6 Means for the disclosure index between groups ( eH 2 ) 
Table 6.17 Comparison of means for the disclosure index between groups 
Year Qtr Group Mean t-statistic p-value 
 
2005 
Q1 
2 0.9344 
4.023 0.000* 
4 0.8852 
Q2 
2 0.9288 
3.246 0.002* 
4 0.8808 
Q3 
2 0.9304 
3.133 0.003* 
4 0.8826 
Q4 
2 0.9330 
3.122 0.003* 
4 0.8842 
2006 
Q1 
2 0.9332 
3.775 0.000* 
4 0.8913 
Q2 
2 0.9375 
3.706 0.000* 
4 0.8857 
Q3 
2 0.9372 
3.516 0.001* 
4 0.8861 
Q4 
2 0.9356 
2.876 0.006* 
4 0.8909 
2007 
Q1 
2 0.9421 
3.781 0.000* 
4 0.8918 
Q2 
2 0.9414 
3.231 0.002* 
4 0.8900 
Q3 
2 0.9409 
3.105 0.003* 
4 0.8893 
Q4 
2 0.9226 
3.833 0.002* 
4 0.8927 
  *significant at 0.05 
 
An independent sample t-test was used to determine whether there is any statistical difference 
in the means for the disclosure index between Group 2 and Group 4. Table 6.17 reports that 
the p-values for all quarters for the three years are less than 0.05.  Therefore, the null 
hypotheses are rejected, which concludes there is a statistically significant difference between 
the means for the disclosure index between these two groups for all quarters in year 2005 to 
2007. These results are consistent with the results found in Table 6.15 and Table 6.16.  
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6.4.3 Hypotheses testing for dependent and independent variables  
The most extensive data analysis in this study will involve the testing of the hypotheses that 
have been generated. The section will start with univariate and multivariate analyses for levels 
of disclosure. The univariate analysis was first carried out to examine the separate association 
between the dependent and the independent variables. It describes the relationship between 
two continuous variables in terms of the strength and the direction of the relationship. The 
multivariate analysis was then performed to answer how the hypotheses relate to the 
association between level of disclosures and timeliness with company attributes, respectively 
as laid out in section 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2. 
6.4.3.1 Univariate test for mandatory disclosure 
Table 6.18 Pearson’s correlation between level of and each of the five independent 
variables for Q1 to Q4 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Level of 
disclosure and 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
Company size 0.143** 0.055 0.135* 0.070 0.197*** 0.008 0.190*** 0.010 
Liquidity -0.086 0.250 -0.128* 0.086 -0.182*** 0.015 -0.189*** 0.011 
Profitability 0.034 0.654 0.079 0.292 0.162** 0.030 0.143** 0.056 
Leverage -0.020 0.786 0.033 0.661 0.061 0.417 0.092 0.220 
I industrial 0.010 0.892 -0.035 0.642 -0.006 0.932 -0.003 0.970 
I consumer 0.079 0.291 0.088 0.238 0.063 0.400 0.036 0.634 
I construction -0.016 0.828 0.071 0.343 0.091 0.225 0.062 0.412 
I property -0.221*** 0.003 -0.334*** 0.000 -0.331*** 0.000 -0.312*** 0.000 
I infrastructure -0.070 0.351 -0.043 0.569 -0.019 0.804 0.004 0.959 
I plantation -0.025 0.737 0.029 0.704 0.026 0.734 0.026 0.728 
I technology 0.016 0.833 0.076 0.312 0.032 0.674 0.049 0.516 
Correlation is        *for 0.10 significance level 
   **for 0.05 significance level 
                 ***for 0.01 significance level 
 
Table 6.18 presents the results of the Pearson correlation analysis for the level of disclosure 
and each of the five independent variables for Q1 to Q4. The following conclusions are 
essentially based on a bi variate analysis that does not control for the effects of other 
variables. For company size, the findings reveal that the p-value is significant at the 5% level 
for Q1, at the 10% level for Q2 and at the1% level for Q3 and Q4. Thus, the hypothesis ( 3H ) 
is rejected, which concludes that there is an association between company size and level of 
disclosure. This is consistent with the Tan and Tower‟s (1999) study.  
For leverage, measured by the debt ratio, the p-value is greater than 0.05 for all quarters. 
There is no evidence to reject the hypothesis ( 4H ), thus concluding that there is no 
association between level of disclosure and leverage. 
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As for liquidity, the Pearson correlation indicates p-values of 0.086(Q2), 0.015(Q3) and 
0.011(Q4). Therefore, for Q2, Q3 and Q4, the hypothesis ( 5H ) is to be rejected at 10%, 1% 
and 5% levels of significance, respectively. This shows that there is a negative association 
between liquidity and the level of disclosure for Q2, Q3 and Q4. However, not for Q1, since 
the p-value is greater than 0.05. These findings are supported by literature such as Owusu-
Ansah (2005), who found a relationship between disclosure and liquidity, but rejected by 
Wallace and Naser (1995). 
For profitability, the p-value is less than at the 5% significance level for Q3 and the 10% level 
of significance for Q4. Therefore, the hypothesis ( 6H ) is rejected, which concludes that there 
is an association between the level of disclosure and companies‟ profitability for Q3 and Q4. 
However, hypothesis 6 is not rejected for Q1 and Q2, meaning that no association was found 
between profitability and level of disclosure. This result is consistent with the literature 
discussed in Section 4.3.2.1.4. 
For industry-type ( 7H ), only property has a p-value at the 1% significance level, indicating 
that property has an association with the level of disclosure for all quarters. 
6.4.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
6.4.3.2.1 Choice of multivariate model 
Multiple regression analysis is a technique to explore the direction and extent of the 
relationship between one continuous dependent variable and a number of independent 
variables or predictors.  It will explain the determination of each independent variable that is 
relatively important for the explanation of the dependent variable. The data used in this study 
was extracted from 60 companies for four quarters across three years, resulting in 180 
observations for each quarter. The ordinary least-squares regression technique was used to 
estimate the coefficients for the level of disclosure in the equation, and the Mann-Whitney U 
test for timeliness for each quarter. 
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6.4.4 Regression analysis 
For this study, the observed variables are the extent of disclosure and timeliness.  In order to 
answer the third research question (What company characteristics are associated with the 
level of disclosure and timeliness?), the regression equation is specified in the following 
model for the level of disclosure for each quarter:   
Level of disclosure vs Independent variables: 
itJJ
JJJJ
eLEVCOPFRT
LIQDTYPEISIZECODI

 
_
__
1,51,4
1,31,21,11,0


 
Where: 
DI       = the quotient of relative score as measured by the disclosure index for 
each quarter; 
  = the intercept 
CO_SIZE = Natural log of total assets at the end of the reporting period 
I_TYPE  = Industry code according to Bursa Malaysia  
LIQD = Quick ratio at the end of the reporting period 
PRFT  = Ratio of net profit to sales at the end of the reporting period 
CO_LEV = Debt to equity ratio at the end of the reporting period 
e = the unexplained variable error term 
i = quarter 
t = year 
For timeliness, no model will be specified since the nature of the data of the reporting lag 
violates the assumption of parametric tests. Therefore, following previous literature, the 
Spearman correlation will be used to investigate the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. The Mann-Whitney U test will also be employed to complement the 
Spearman correlation (see Davies & Whittred, 1980; Dyer & McHugh, 1975; Ku Ismail, 
2003).  
6.4.5 Examination of the assumption underlying the regression analysis for 
individual variables  
In order for the multiple regression analysis to be valid, the assumptions underlying the OLS 
regression must apply to both the individual dependent and independent variables, as well as 
to the relationship as a whole. This is important to ensure that the best possible results are 
obtained and are truly representative of the sample. The basic assumptions of OLS regression, 
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namely normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers, are examined in the following 
sections. 
The most fundamental assumption of OLS regression analysis is normality of the data. The 
normality test, as reported in Section 6.2, uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, since it is a 
more specific statistical test suggested by Hair et al. (1998). A normal score transformation 
was applied to the independent variables with non-normal distributions. The linearity of the 
relationship was then examined using scatter plots for all variables. The results did not reveal 
any apparent nonlinear relationship. Further, identification of outliers was carried out by 
examining the data. This step is important since an outlier may have an influential impact on a 
regression analysis. It is important to identify data that may be influential, and to determine 
whether they should be excluded from the analysis
18
. Following Hair et al. (1998), outliers 
were identified using the following tests: Mahalanobis distance, Cook‟s statistics, leverage 
values, and identifying observations outside 2.5-3 standard deviations from the mean. A small 
selection of cases with extreme values was detected. Further examination revealed that they 
could not be considered unrepresentative of the population, and therefore were not excluded 
from the datasets. Another important assumption of OLS regression is homoscedasticity
19
, 
that all variances are equal. Examination of the studentised residual plots showed no sign of 
heteroscedasticity. 
6.4.6 Multicollinearity tests 
Another standard procedure that needs to be applied before undertaking multiple regression 
analysis is to test for multicollinearity. The results will enable the identification of variables 
that are highly correlated with one another, allowing appropriate action to be taken to avoid 
distorting the results (Rawlings, 1998). Table 6.19 contains the correlation matrix of 
independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
  Outliers should only be removed from the model if they are inappropriate representations of the population 
from which the sample is drawn (Hair et al., 1998, p145). 
19
  Homoscedasticity is an assumption that the dependent variables exhibit equal levels of variance across the 
range values of the independent variables (Hair et al., 1998). In contrast, if the level of variance of the dependent 
variables varies with the values of the independent variables, it is known as heteroscedasticity. 
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6.4.6.1 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.19 Correlation matrix of independent variables  
  CS IND QR S L 
CS  
Pearson Correlation 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.418(***)     
N 720        
IND  
Pearson Correlation -.095(**) 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .011         
N 720 720       
QR 
  
Pearson Correlation -.308(***) .168(***) 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000       
N 720 720 720     
S  
Pearson Correlation .082(**) .044 -.018 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .240 .626     
N 720 720 720 720   
L  
Pearson Correlation .338(***) .031 -.071 .017 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .405 .058 .648   
N 720 720 720 720 720 
Correlation is          **for 0.05 significance level 
*** for  0.01 significance level 
    
An examination of Table 6.19 reveals that the range of bi-variate correlations is between 0.10 
and 0.30, which indicates that the relationship between the independent variables is weak 
(Cohen, 1988, pp79-81). Therefore, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is not a problem 
since the bi-variate correlations are less than 0.7. 
6.4.6.2 Collinearity test  
Subsequently, collinearity test are performed to confirm the existence of multicollinearity, 
which may not be evident in the correlation matrix. Two statistics, namely tolerance and 
variance inflation (VIF), are given in Table 6.20. Tolerance is calculated using the formula 1-
R. A small value (normally less than 0.10) will indicate that multiple correlations between the 
other variables are high, thus suggesting the possibility of multicollinearity  (Pallant, 2007, 
p156).  The VIF is the inverse of the Tolerance values (1 divided by Tolerance). VIF values 
(normally above 10) suggest the presence of multicollinearity. Therefore, the results of the 
Tolerance and VIF values in Table 6.20 confirm that multicollinearity is not an issue among 
the independent variables for Q1 to Q4. 
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Table 6.20 Tolerance and VIF for Q1 to Q4 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
 Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Company size 0.638 1.566 0.667 1.500 0.686 1.457 0.675 1.482 
Leverage 0.637 1.571 0.619 1.616 0.649 1.541 0.621 1.611 
Liquidity 0.817 1.225 0.855 1.170 0.853 1.172 0.861 1.161 
Profitability 0.799 1.252 0.795 1.257 0.803 1.246 0.828 1.207 
I_industrial 0.701 1.427 0.731 1.367 0.737 1.357 0.755 1.324 
I_consumer 0.712 1.404 0.700 1.429 0.716 1.397 0.727 1.376 
I_construction 0.802 1.247 0.781 1.281 0.754 1.327 0.761 1.314 
I_property 0.865 1.157 0.867 1.153 0.865 1.156 0.857 1.167 
I_infrastructure 0.825 1.213 0.838 1.193 0.834 1.200 0.820 1.219 
I_plantation 0.815 1.226 0.788 1.269 0.792 1.263 0.797 1.255 
I_technology 0.851 1.175 0.865 1.156 0.858 1.165 0.855 1.131 
 
6.4.7 Results from multivariate analyses 
Having confirmed the appropriateness of the results by the diagnostic tests, this section 
presents the regression analyses for the effects of company attributes, namely company size, 
leverage, liquidity, profitability and industries, on the levels of disclosure for Q1 to Q4.   
Table 6.21 The effect of company attributes on mandatory disclosure for Q1 to Q4 
 The effects of company attributes on level of disclosure for : 
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Intercept 0.814 0.836 0.806 0.827 
Company size 0.013** 0.009 0.013* 0.010 
Leverage -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Liquidity -0.002 -0.006* -0.006 -0.006** 
Profitability 0.002 0.004 0.008** 0.004 
I_industrial -0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.005 
I_consumer 0.006 0.013 0.015 0.010 
I_construction -0.009 0.004 0.009 0.000 
I_property -0.029*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.046*** 
I_infrastructure -0.011 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 
I_plantation -0.008 0.001 -0.003 0.002 
I_technology 0.008 0.024 0.022 0.018 
R 0.0308 0.410 0.044 0.409 
R-squared 0.095 0.168 0.197 0.167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 0.114 0.144 0.113 
Standard error 0.0332 0.0379 0.0382 0.0388 
F-statistic 1.605 3.090 3.740 3.069 
p-value 0.101 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Degrees of freedom 179 179 179 179 
Number of observation 180 180 180 180 
Correlation is      *for 0.10 significance level 
   **for 0.05 significance level 
               ***for 0.01 significance level 
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Table 6.21 presents the multiple regression analysis between level of disclosure and corporate 
attributes. Looking at the p-values, the results indicate that the model for all quarters is 
significant at the 1% level, except for Q1. The R
2 
statistics of 9.5% (Q1), 16.8% (Q2), 19.7% 
(Q3) and 16.7% (Q4) indicate a weak relationship between the dependent variables and the 
independent variables for the entire model.  Further, the adjusted  R
2 
statistics are only 0.036 
for Q1, 0.114 for Q2, 0.144 for Q3, and 0.113 for Q4, indicating that the equation explains 
about 4%(Q1), 11.4%(Q2), 14.4%(Q3) and 11.3%(Q4) of the variance in level of disclosure 
for each quarter. The  results for Q2, Q3 and Q4 are close to  the adjusted R
2
 of 12.5% 
reported by Bradbury (1991) and 10.08% for Australian companies reported by Tan and 
Tower (1999) for interim disclosure studies. At the same time, the adjusted R
2 
for Q1 is close 
to the 0.05 reported by Ku Ismail (2003). The low R
2
 simply suggest that the explanatory 
variables do not comprehensively explain the variation in the dependent variables. From this 
result, questions arise as to why the overall model is not significant for Q1, since the 
preparation of quarterly reporting for this quarter is usually in conjunction with the 
preparation of the annual financial statements. This result suggests that companies focus more 
on the preparation of the yearly financial statement  than on quarterly reporting. This tension 
should not exist since both statements are required by law and both should be treated with 
equal importance. Such situations should not happen if companies have in place proper 
systems and procedures for financial reporting. In other words, proper financial reporting 
systems will enable companies to deal with the current preparation of quarterly and annual 
financial statements. If this is related to Q4 of the model, this tension does not exist since the 
overall model is significant. This indicates that companies consider Q4 as an important 
statement in helping them prepare the annual financial statements.  
For company size (H3), the p-value for Q2 and Q4 are above 0.05, and this result implies that 
there is no association between company size and level of disclosure for these two quarters. 
However, the p-values for Q1 and Q3 indicate that the levels of disclosure for these two 
quarters are significant at the 5% level, and have a positive coefficient of 0.01. The mixed 
result for company size provides a confusing situation, and it is not consistent with the 
Pearson‟s correlation result in the previous section. As for the former result, it is expected 
since companies have to fully comply with the disclosure requirement, irrespective of their 
size. However, the findings for Q1 and Q3 suggest otherwise, although a possible explanation 
could be that bigger companies tend to disclose more than smaller companies. However, the 
strength and coefficient for Q1 and Q3 are weak and small, implying that there could be a 
slight difference in level of disclosure due to size. That means that the companies involved 
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tend to disclose more than what is required by the regulations. Hence, providing more 
information to investors could reduce uncertainties in decision making (Ku Ismail, 2003).  
As for leverage (H4), the p-value is above 0.05 for all quarters. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the four models, and it is concluded that there is no association between 
leverage and level of disclosure. This result contrasts with studies by Schdewitz and Blevins 
(1998), Tan and Tower (1999), and Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005).  
Next, the association between liquidity ratio and the level of disclosure (H5) shows mixed 
results. For Q1 and Q3, the null hypotheses are not rejected at the 5% significance level, 
implying that there is no association between these two variables. This is consistent with 
Wallace and Naser (1995) for annual report studies. In contrast, the null hypotheses for Q2 
and Q4 for liquidity are rejected at the 10% and 5% significance levels. Therefore, it is 
concluded that there is an association between liquidity and level of disclosure for Q2 and Q4, 
even though it is weak. Also, there is an inverse or negative relationship between these two 
variables, suggesting that a company that has liquidity as an ongoing concern will disclose 
more information in their interim reports. This action contradicts signalling theory, which 
suggests that companies that suffer losses will not disclose additional information. However, 
this result does seem to show that companies are willing to become more transparent in the 
eyes of investors. 
Table 6.21 also reports that only profitability for Q3 is significant, with a p-value below 0.05.  
This implies that there is strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses (H6), enabling the study 
to conclude that there is an association between profitability and level of disclosure. The 
direction and coefficient indicate a weak and positive association for this quarter. This means 
that companies with higher profitability will have higher levels of disclosure. This is 
consistent with arguments made by Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Cooke (1989) and Wallace 
and Naser (1995) that a highly profitable company is more likely to signal to the market its 
superior performance by disclosing more information. Further, Lang and Lundholm (1993, 
p250)  noted that the “influence of a company‟s profitability level on disclosure can be 
positive or negative depending on its performance”. However, the null hypotheses for Q1, Q2 
and Q4 cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level, and it is concluded that there is no 
association between profitability and level of disclosure in these quarters. This finding is 
consistent with McNally et al. (1982) and Ahmed and Courtis (1999).  
Industries are coded as “one” according to the industry group, and “zero” otherwise. Only 
seven industries are included in the regression analysis in order to avoid the “dummy variable 
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trap” (see Gujarati, 1995) and a singular matrix since industry is a dummy variable. The 
results in Table 6.21 indicate that only the null hypotheses (H7) for the property industry are 
rejected at the 1% significance level for Q1. As a result, it can be concluded that there is a 
significant difference between the property industry and the industry base (trading/services) 
that was used. As for the other industries, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance levels, and it is concluded that there is no significant difference between the other 
industries with the industry base for Q1 to Q4. This latter result is expected because, as 
highlighted earlier, the disclosure requirements do not differ from one industry to another. 
However, the association found between these two industries  could be consistent with the  
suggestion made by Sprouse (1967) that accounting policies and techniques may vary by 
industry. Further, Owusu-Ansah (1998) outlined several reasons for these differences. First, 
certain industries are highly regulated due to their overall contribution towards a country‟s 
export earnings or national income. Second, companies in certain industries may have 
difficulties in reporting adequately due to the nature of the work involved. Finally, disclosure 
differences may also be associated with the type of product line and the diversity of products 
of companies. 
6.4.8 Diagnosis of the regression model 
This section examines the model for robustness by addressing the issues of specification 
errors. Specification errors occur when a relevant variable is omitted from the model, or when 
an irrelevant variable is included in the model. It is first considered whether there are any 
variables omitted from the model by examining the residuals against predicted values. No 
noticeable patterns can be observed, so it is concluded that they are the residuals, thus, there 
are no signs of specification errors. With respect to the inclusion of an irrelevant variable in 
the model, the F-test
20
 and t-test
21
 values were examined. The regression models are re-run by 
dropping one non-significant independent variable each time. The values of the F-test are than 
examined for each model. The results indicate that dropping one of the non-significant 
independent variables does not increase the power of the model in terms of the adjusted R
2
, 
standard error of the estimate, the F-test and t-test. It is thus concluded that the models are 
adequate, without any indications of the presence of unnecessary variables. Based on these 
two diagnostics tests, all the models are robust and free from specification errors. 
 
                                                 
20
  F-test is a measure of the overall significance of the regression model. It examines the joint significance of 
the estimated regression model. 
21
  T-test is for individual independent variables and examines the estimated regression model. 
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6.4.9 Association between timeliness and company characteristics 
As mentioned earlier, due to the non-normal distribution of the reporting lags, the 
nonparametric tests, namely Spearman‟s correlation and the Mann-Whitney U test, will be 
employed in this study to determine the association between timeliness and company 
characteristics. Following Ku Ismail (2003), data for each of the four attributes (namely 
company size, leverage, liquidity and profitability) are divided into four quartiles in order to 
apply the Mann-Whitney U test. Data in the first and fourth quartiles are labelled for each 
attribute and tested to determine the association between attributes and timeliness. For 
industry, the Kruskal-Wallis test is employed, since it involves more than two groups. The 
industry will not be divided into quartiles due to different sample numbers for each industry. 
This section will report the univariate and Man-Whitney U tests carried out to determine the 
relationship between dependent variable and independent variable for timeliness.   
6.4.9.1 Univariate test for timeliness 
Table 6.22 Nonparametric Spearman’s correlation between reporting lag and each of 
the five independent variables 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Reporting lag  
and 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Company size 0.258 0.000*** 0.219 0.003*** 0.296 0.000*** 0.077 0.302 
Profitability -0.166 0.026** -0.100 0.183 -0.120 0.110 -0.196 0.008*** 
Leverage 0.017 0.824 -0.080 0.287 -0.011 0.883 -0.028 0.704 
Liquidity -0.99 0.188 -0.106 0.156 -0.107 0.151 -0.027 0.716 
I_trading/service -0.072 0.340 -0.064 0.396 0.033 0.656 -0.065 0.390 
I_industrial 0.042 0.572 0.078 0.299 0.051 0.497 0.056 0.453 
I_consumer -0.006 0.933 0.046 0.536 -0.056 0.457 -0.085 0.256 
I_construction 0.102 0.174 0.060 0.423 -0.064 0.393 -0.083 0.268 
I_property 0.045 0.546 0.09 0.904 0.130 0.082 0.035 0.638 
I_infrastructure -0.096 0.200 -0.098 0.190 -0.054 0.474 0.036 0.636 
I_plantation 0.121 0.106 0.038 0.611 0.046 0.542 0.184** 0.013 
I_technology -0.121 0.105 -0.089 0.235 -0.137 0.066 0.005 0.949 
Correlation is            **0.05 significance level 
***0.01 significance level 
             
Table 6.22 reveals for company size that the reporting lag as measured by the number of days 
has a p-value of 0.000 for Q1 to Q3.  Thus, the null hypothesis (H8) is rejected, and it is 
concluded that there is an association between company size and reporting lag for these three 
quarters. This result contrasts with the studies by Tan and Tower (1999) and Al Bogami 
(1996), who found no relationship between reporting lag and company size. In contrast, the p-
value for Q4 is greater than 0.05, thus the null hypotheses cannot be rejected, and it is 
concluded that there is no association between reporting lag and company size in Q4.  
 93 
Table 6.22 also presents the correlation between reporting lag and profitability (H9). The p-
value is significant for Q1 and Q4 at the 0.01% level. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between the reporting lag and profitability is rejected.  In contrast, there is no 
association between profitability and reporting lag for Q2 and Q3, since the p-value is greater 
than 0.05.  
For leverage (H10), the p-value is greater than 0.05 for Q1 to Q4, which supports the null 
hypotheses that there is no relationship between reporting lag and leverage. As for liquidity 
(H11), the p-value for all quarters is more than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis should not be 
rejected, and it is concluded that there is no association between reporting lag and liquidity. 
This finding is consistent with Boritz and Liu (2006).  
From the correlation for industries in Table 6.21, the result indicates that the p-value is more 
than 0.05 for all industries in Q1 to Q4, except for plantation industries for Q4. This result 
indicates that there is no association between industries and reporting lag (H12). This finding 
is in contrast to the studies of Robb (1980) , Lunt (1982) and Al Bogami (1996). 
6.4.9.2 Result of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test between reporting 
lags and company attributes 
Following the tests performed by Dyer and McHugh (1975) and Ku Ismail (2003), each of the 
dependent (reporting lag) and independent variables (company size, profitability, leverage, 
liquidity and industries) are divided into quartiles. The following table presents the results of 
the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal Wallis test. 
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Table 6.23 Results of nonparametric tests between reporting lag and corporate 
attributes  
 The effects of company attributes on reporting lag for : 
Independent  
variables 
Mean 
Rank Q1 
p-value 
Mean 
Rank Q2 
p-value 
Mean 
Rank Q3 
p-value 
Mean 
Rank Q4 
p-value 
Company size: 
      Small 
      Large 
1800.00 
2295.00 
0.038** 
1754.50 
2340.50 
0.014*** 
1675.50 
2419.50 
0.002*** 
1998.00 
2097.00 
0.678 
Profitability: 
 Low profitable 
High profitable 
2367.00 
1728.00 
0.007*** 
2239.00 
1856.00 
0.107 
2308.50 
1786.50 
0.028** 
2295.00 
1800.00 
0.038** 
Leverage: 
Lowly leveraged 
Highly leveraged 
2082.50 
2012.50 
0.770 
2125.50 
1969.50 
0.513 
2195.00 
1900.00 
0.219 
2097.50 
1997.50 
0.675 
Liquidity: 
     Low liquid 
     High liquid 
2259.00 
1836.00 
0.077* 
2247.50 
1847.50 
0.093* 
2169.00 
1926.00 
0.310 
2065.00 
2030.00 
0.882 
Trading/service 91.97 
0.008*** 
89.41 
0.018** 
83.03 
0.000*** 
86.37 
0.023** 
Industrial 96.30 94.33 93.74 89.17 
Consumer 86.18 82.27 83.77 106.97 
Construction 101.30 102.67 125.63 109.57 
Property 131.17 137.96 147.00 114.67 
Infrastructure 83.40 66.70 77.97 72.80 
Plantation 56.17 84.92 76.50 59.46 
Technology 48.67 71.17 46.50 67.83 
Correlation is         *0.10 significance level 
   **0.05 significance level 
           ***0.01 significance level 
 
Data in Table 6.23 are derived from the Mann-Whitney U test for company size, profitability, 
leverage and liquidity, and the Kruskal Wallis test for industry. It shows that some of the 
mean ranks are confirmed with the direction of the correlation produced by Spearman‟s 
correlation, but some are not. For company size (H8), the results are significant at the 1% level 
for Q1 and at the 5% level for Q2 and Q3. Thus, there is an association between reporting lag 
and company size for Q1, Q2 and Q3. Looking at the direction, the results indicate a positive 
relationship for these three quarters. However, for Q4, since the p-value is greater than 0.05, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. Thus, it is concluded that 
there is no association between these two variables. The results for Q1, Q2 and Q3 show that 
larger companies report earlier than smaller companies, which is consistent with most of the 
previous literature concerning this determinant. This result is not unexpected because large 
companies usually possess sophisticated information systems that enable them to process 
information more efficiently than smaller companies. However, the result for Q4 is 
unexpected, although processing data for both a quarterly report and the annual report 
concurrently would be a major task for any size of company. Still, this result could be 
meaningful because the maximum allowable period granted to a company does not depend on 
its size. 
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As for profitability (H9), the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level for Q1 and 
at 5% for Q3 and Q4. Thus, there is an association between reporting lag and profitability and 
it is a positive relationship for these three quarters. However, there is no association between 
these two variables for Q2. For Q1, Q3 and Q4, the result shows that highly profitable 
companies are taking a shorter time to produce interim reports than low profit companies. As 
suggested by signalling theory, highly profitable companies will tend to report without undue 
delay (i.e. a shorter reporting period as compared to poorly performing companies). This is in 
line with the suggestion made by Givoly and Palmon (1981) that earnings announcements 
containing good news might be made in advance, and bad news tends to be delayed. In 
addition, the result for Q2 is also expected since the reporting lag is a mandatory requirement 
that does not distinguish between high and low profit companies. It applies equally to all 
Malaysian companies.  
The Mann-Whitney U test result also shows that there is no association between leverage and 
reporting lags (H10) for all quarters because the criterion value is greater than 0.05. This is 
contrary to studies by  Owusu-Ansah (2000) and Owusu-Ansah and Leventis (2006). It is 
contrary to the competing view in the literature concerning the association between leverage 
and timeliness, and the agency theory argument that posits that highly leveraged companies 
will have prompt disclosure on a more frequent basis to give opportunities to the debt holders 
to reassess the long term financial performance or position of companies (Owusu-Ansah, 
2000).  
For liquidity (H11), the p-value is significant for Q1 and Q2 at the 10% significance level. 
Thus the null hypothesis is rejected for both quarters, and it is concluded that there is an 
association between liquidity and reporting lag and it is positively associated. However, the p-
value is more than 0.10 for Q3 and Q4, and it is therefore concluded that the null hypotheses 
cannot be rejected (i.e. there is no association between liquidity and timeliness for Q2 and 
Q4). These mixed results suggest that companies with high liquidity are taking a shorter time 
to produce quarterly reports, as compared to companies with low liquidity. 
For industry (H12), the p-value is less than 0.05 for all quarters. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is rejected, and it is concluded that there is an association between industry type and reporting 
lag. These results suggest the presence of an „industry effect‟ on the number of days taken by 
companies to produce quarterly reports. 
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6.5 Extent of disclosure 
This section will report the variation in the extent of disclosure for eight “notes” associated 
with quarterly reports. The justification for selecting these notes only has been discussed in 
Section 5.3.3. 
6.5.1 Comment on seasonality and cyclicality 
Table 6.24 Comment on seasonality and cyclicality (%) 
 2005 2006 2007 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Due to festive season 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Due to festive season 
with few comments 
11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Not applicable 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The analysis in Table 6.24 shows that the majority of companies, 75% in 2005 and 2006 and 
76.7% in 2007, do not comment on seasonality and cyclicality. This means that their activities 
are not significantly affected by the festive seasons. Of the 25% of the companies that made 
comments on seasonality and cyclicality for 2005 and 2006, approximately 11.7% stated that 
their principal activities are influenced by festive seasons and they made extensive comments 
on how these festive seasons affect their business. Examples of extensive comments are when 
the company highlights the festive seasons that affect their business operations and describes 
the effect on their turnover. The remaining companies only stated that their businesses are 
affected by festive seasons, which can be considered as a common wording among these 
companies. For 2006, an equal proportion of companies stated that their businesses are 
affected “due to festive season” or “due to festive season with few comments”. 
6.5.2 Review of performance 
Bursa Malaysia requires companies to disclose a review of performance as follows: 
“A review of the performance of the company and its principal subsidiaries, 
setting out material factors affecting earnings and/or revenue of the company and 
the group for the current quarter and financial year to date.” 
(KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06) 
From the requirement, it is clear that a company must disclose their review of performance 
quarterly and yearly. The review of performance involves the holding company and all its 
subsidiaries, and they must disclose the significant factors that affect earnings. However, the 
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Listing Requirement does not specify the particular earnings indicator that should be reviewed 
(Ku Ismail, 2003). Therefore, a variety of earning indicators can be observed throughout the 
quarters for the three years as presented in Table 6.25 and Table 6.26. 
Table 6.25 Review of the quarterly performance  (%) 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No Information 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 0.0 8.3 10.0 8.3 1.7 0.0 6.7 8.3 
General 
explanation 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 3.3 1.7 0.0 
Either profit 
before tax only 
or turnover only 
3.3 13.3 13.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 
Both PBTT 15.0 15.0 10.0 11.7 11.7 13.3 13.3 10.0 15.0 21.7 13.3 11.7 
PBTT and 
explanation  
75.0 63.3 68.3 66.7 78.3 66.7 66.7 71.7 70.0 66.7 68.3 66.7 
PBTT and other 
performance 
measurement 
with explanation  
6.7 8.3 8.3 8.3 6.7 8.3 8.3 8.3 11.7 6.7 8.3 13.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*PBTT= Profit before tax and turnover  
 
Table 6.25 shows that between 63.3 and 78.3 percent of companies disclose the minimum 
requirement of “profit before tax, turnover and explanation about material factors” for all four 
quarters. A few companies (6.7 to 13.3 percent) go beyond the minimum disclosure 
requirement by including other performance measurements, such as economic profit 
statement, in their review of quarterly performance. However, the proportion of non-
compliant companies is quite substantial for all four quarters. They either provide general 
explanations or state the earnings indicators in qualitative and quantitative form. Surprisingly, 
there are companies that do not make any quarterly disclosures that review performance. This 
is unacceptable since the requirement has been mandatory since 2002. Further, the sample 
companies are selected based on their market capitalisation, which means these companies are 
followed closely by financial analysts and investors. Failure to comply with the disclosure 
requirements will deprive investors of important information. Further investigation into the 
companies that do not comply with this requirement revealed that no enforcement actions or 
penalties were imposed on these companies. This reduces the credibility of the enforcement 
bodies. As found by Ku Ismail (2003), the review of performance is an important piece of 
information for investors, so the enforcement bodies should ensure compliance with this 
requirement. 
 
 98 
Table 6.26 Review of the yearly performance (%) 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No Information N/A 33.3 33.3 35.0 N/A 35.0 0.0 33.3 N/A 31.7 31.7 33.3 
General 
explanation 
N/A 1.7 1.7 1.7 N/A 1.7 5.0 0.0 N/A 3.3 1.7 0.0 
Either profit 
before tax only 
or turnover only 
N/A 1.7 0.0 0.0 N/A 0.0 1.7 1.7 N/A 1.7 0.0 0.0 
Both PBTT N/A 1.7 5.0 5.0 N/A 5.0 23.3 6.7 N/A 23.3 8.3 41.7 
PBTT  and 
explanation  
N/A 50.0 51.7 50.0 N/A 46.7 65.0 46.7 N/A 65.0 43.3 45.0 
PBTT and other 
performance 
measurement 
with explanation  
N/A 11.6 8.3 8.3 N/A 11.6 5.0 11.6 N/A 5.0 15.0 13.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*PBTT= Profit before tax and turnover  
**N/A- not applicable 
 
Table 6.26 shows the result for the yearly performance review which refers to the cumulative 
quarterly performance review. Therefore, the quarterly performance review for Q1 will be 
similar to the yearly performance review for Q1. Therefore, the disclosure requirement for the 
yearly performance review does not apply to Q1 in each year because the content for this 
requirement in Q1 for the yearly performance review will be the same as Q1 for the quarterly 
performance review. Accordingly, the results for the following subsequent quarter are 
cumulative figures from the quarterly performance review to the present yearly performance 
review. The result in Table 6.25 indicates that 46.7 to 65 percent of companies within Q1 to 
Q4 for the three years disclose the minimum requirement for the yearly performance review. 
In addition, there is a small percentage (between 5.0 to 13.3 percent) of companies that 
disclose more than the minimum requirement. The balance are non-compliant companies, 
ranging from companies that did not make any disclosures at all, gave a general explanation 
only, or stated the earnings indicators in the form of qualitative and/or quantitative 
disclosures. These findings suggest two important conclusions. First, companies might not 
exactly understand the Listing requirements. They could, for example, believe that a quarterly 
review is sufficient to comply with the Listing requirement. Second, these companies might 
understand but chose not to comply. Upon investigation, no enforcement action was taken 
against these companies or penalties imposed. In contrast, there are companies that gave 
considerable attention to carefully interpreting the disclosure requirements by extensively 
disclosing other performance measurements, together with explanations about material 
factors.  
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6.5.3 Material changes in the profit before taxation 
Table 6.27 Material changes in the PBT 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No information 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 
General 
explanation 
3.3 3.3 1.7 3.3 1.7 3.3 5.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.7 
Either profit 
before tax only 
or turnover only 
5.0 1.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 
Both PBTT 21.7 21.7 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 23.3 25.0 21.7 23.3 25.0 25.0 
PBTT  and 
explanation  
66.7 70.0 70.0 68.3 70.0 68.3 65.0 68.3 66.7 65.0 65.0 68.3 
PBTT and other 
performance 
measurement 
with explanation  
3.3 3.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*PBTT= Profit before tax and turnover  
**PBT= Profit before tax 
 
Bursa Malaysia requires companies to make “an explanatory comment on any material 
change in the profit before taxation for the quarter reported on as compared with the 
immediate preceding quarter” (KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06). In a similar way, companies 
are required to explain the reason for material changes in profit before taxation between 
quarters. From the result in Table 6.27, it appears that most of the companies (65 to 70 
percent for all three years) complied with the minimum requirement that is “profit before tax, 
turnover and explanation about material factors”. Further, between 3.3 to 5.0 percent made a 
disclosure beyond the minimum requirement by including other performance measurements, 
together with an explanation about material factors. The explanation involved explaining the 
changes against the preceding quarter, and whether the changes give a positive or negative 
impact on the overall company‟s performance. Table 6.27 also indicates that a small 
percentage of companies make extensive disclosures, namely, “profit before tax, turnover and 
other performance measurement together with explanation about material factors”. An 
example of another performance measurement disclosure is an economic profit statement and 
an explanation of this indicator. Further, the rest of the companies can be found to make a 
general explanation or state the earning indicators in the form of profit before tax or turnover, 
and the table suggests that only one company did not make any disclosures (in Q2 2007). All 
of these can be grouped as non-compliant companies. Attention should be given to the reasons 
those companies failed to make any disclosures, or failed to comply with the minimum 
 100 
requirement as stated by regulation. Otherwise, the enforcement bodies will be questioned on 
their efficiency to enforce regulations for which they are responsible. 
6.5.4 Report on future prospects 
Table 6.28 Company prospects (future) 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No projection 0.0 5.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
General 
projection  
83.3 80.0 81.7 85.0 80.0 80.0 73.3 73.3 75.0 70.0 68.3 63.3 
Projection 
with specific 
comment  
16.7 15.0 15.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 25.0 26.7 25.0 30.0 31.7 36.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
With regard to future prospects, companies are expected to disclose the following in the 
interim report:  
“Commentary on the prospects, including the factors that are likely to 
influence the company’s prospect for the remaining period to the end 
of the financial year of the next financial year if the reporting period 
is the last quarter.”  
(KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06)  
This means that companies need to comment on the factors that might affect their future 
performance for the rest of the quarter. Upon reviewing the quarterly reports, the majority of 
companies (between 63.3 and 85 percent for Q1 to Q4 for all three years) meet this minimum 
requirement. Companies are stating future prospects in general without reference to specific 
indicators. Likewise, the balance of the companies (between 15 and 36.7 percent) chose to 
make extensive disclosures by specifying the type of factors (such as a joint venture business 
with other companies) or economic factors (such as a new government policy for trading). 
6.5.5 Report on current progress  
Table 6.29 Company progress 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No comment  53.3 53.3 56.7 56.7 55.0 55.0 56.7 55.0 55.0 53.3 53.3 55.0 
General 
comment  
28.3 28.3 26.7 26.7 26.7 23.3 18.3 16.7 16.7 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Specific 
comment  
18.3 18.3 16.7 16.7 18.3 21.7 25.0 28.3 26.7 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Where a statement of the company‟s progress is concerned, a listed company is required to 
disclose a “commentary on the company’s progress to achieve the revenue or profit estimate, 
forecast, projection or internal target in the remaining period to the end of the financial year 
and the forecast period which was previously announced or disclosed in a public document 
and steps taken or proposed to be taken to achieve revenue or profit estimate, forecast, 
projection or internal targets” (KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06). In other words, the company 
not only has to project its future performance, but it must also provide an insight into the 
company‟s current performance. The company needs to comment on the steps taken to 
achieve its target revenues, as compared to the announcements it made earlier in the media or 
newspapers. The result in Table 6.29 shows that more than 50% of the companies do not 
make any comments on company progress for Q1 to Q4. This result is extremely poor 
because companies are expected to give extensive comment about the companies‟ progress 
against their forecast throughout the year by relating this to other factors, and not solely 
focusing on the earnings indicators being disclosed in the performance review.  Nevertheless, 
between 15 and 27 percent of the companies make general comments that are hardly helpful 
for investors to evaluate the direction of the companies‟ prospects. The general comment 
basically reviews the current quarter‟s performance by comparing that result with those of the 
last quarter, or expressing a general optimism or pessimism for the current year. Another 
verbatim comment made is “Barring any unforeseen circumstances, the Directors expect the 
Group to continue to achieve satisfactory performance in the current financial year.” As stated 
by Ku Ismail (2003), this sweeping statement is common among the quarterly reports. This is 
rather surprising given the fact that this mandatory requirement has been in place since 2002. 
Again, the issues on whether preparers understand or chose to ignore the requirement arose. 
6.6 Board of Directors’ opinion  
Table 6.30 Board of Directors’ opinion 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No information 96.7 95.0 98.3 98.3 96.7 96.7 96.6 95.0 95.0 90.0 5.0 91.7 
State not 
applicable 
1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 3.4 3.3 10.0 95.0 8.3 
State that no 
forecast or 
projection has 
been made 
1.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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For the Board of Directors‟ opinion, companies are required to disclose “a statement of the 
board of directors’ opinion as to whether the revenue or profit estimates, forecast, projection 
or internal targets in the remaining period to the end of financial year and the forecast period 
which was previously announced or disclosed in a public-document are likely to be achieved” 
(KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06). Quarterly reporting does not provide “Chairman Statements” 
like the annual report. Therefore, this disclosure item is substantial because it provides a 
Board of Directors‟ opinion on every aspect of the company‟s current performance. Since 
quarterly reports are regarded as a short-term communication to investors, while waiting for 
the annual report, this disclosure will give the investors a better understanding of the 
company‟s performance. However, the result in Table 6.30 is unfavourable because more than 
90% of the companies did not make any comment at all. Their silence may be for two reasons. 
First, companies are using other means, such as public release, to comment on this issue. 
Second, companies do not consider this disclosure as important to investors, and therefore 
choose not to make any comment. Further investigation of the non-compliant companies 
reveals that the majority of the companies (70%) fall into the second reason, and the rest of 
the non-compliant companies make these disclosures by press releases. Even then, some do 
not make the required disclosure in any of the quarters in the year. For some of the companies 
that do comply, no extensive comment could be found. They commonly made a sweeping 
statements such as “not applicable” or “no forecast or projection has been made”.  
6.7 Profit forecast 
Table 6.31 Profit forecast 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
No information 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 1.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Only QF 
without 
variance and 
shortfall 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Only QF for 
the variance 
and shortfall 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
QF with 
explanation  
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
QF with 
explanation  
and steps taken 
0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Not applicable 100 96.7 98.3 100 100 98.3 98.3 96.7 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*QF – quantitative figure 
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The Listing requirements state that companies have to provide the following disclosure: 
“Explanatory note applicable to the final quarter for companies 
which have previously announced or disclosed a profit forecast or 
profit guarantee in a public document by stating the variance of 
actual profit after tax and minority interest and the forecast profit 
after tax and minority interest (where the variance exceeds 10%) and 
shortfall in the profit guaranteed received by the company (if any) 
steps taken to recover the shortfall.” 
(KLSE, 2001, Appendix 9B-06)  
The result reveals that the majority of the requirement is not applicable to the companies, 
which means that the compliance rate for this disclosure is between 95 and 100 percent for Q1 
to Q4 for all three years. A small percentage of non-compliance can also be found in Table 
6.31. However, there are a few companies that do provide extensive disclosures on this item 
by stating the quantitative figure with explanation about the variance and shortfall, and the 
steps taken to recover the shortfall. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis for this study. It provides evidence on the 
level of disclosure for interim reporting in Malaysia with respect to timeliness, compliance 
and extent of disclosure. Descriptive statistics, univariate tests and multivariate tests were 
performed to provide answers to the research questions of this study (as stated in Section 1.3). 
The data was examined before being analysed, and all underlying assumptions were tested. 
Preliminary analysis using univariate tests provides initial insight into the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables.  
With respect to timeliness, this study provides evidence from two perspectives. Firstly, to 
establish whether the interim reports are produced within the allowable period as required by 
regulation and secondly, to determine the number of days taken by Malaysian companies to 
produce their quarterly reporting. Further analysis was also performed to investigate the 
nature of disclosure compliance. The result of the Friedman test implies that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the mean rank of timeliness for years 2005 to 2007. In 
addition, mixed results were found in the mean rank of timeliness between Q1 to Q4 and the 
mean for timeliness between groups.  However, using the Kruskal-Wallis test, no significant 
result was found for the mean of timeliness across industries. For the determinants of 
timeliness, the study reveals that there is a relationship between reporting lag and Q1, Q2 and 
Q4 for company size, Q1, Q3 and Q4 for profitability, and Q1 and Q2 for liquidity. Besides, 
all industries are significantly associated with the reporting lag. 
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Next, the disclosure index model was employed to determine the level of disclosure among 
Malaysian companies. Major findings on the levels of disclosure reveal that companies do not 
fully comply with the disclosure requirement. Further investigation on enforcement issues 
found no penalties or action taken against non-compliant companies. The one-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance revealed a mixed result for the mean of disclosure index across 
years. No significant difference in the mean disclosure index can be observed for years 2005 
and 2007, but the difference is significant for 2006. Nevertheless, there is no significant 
difference in the means of the disclosure index between quarters and across industries. In 
addition, there is a significant difference for the means of the disclosure index for Group 2 
(companies that comply with Reporting but not Listing), Group 4 (companies that do not 
comply with Listing or Reporting) and between these two groups. As for corporate attributes, 
company size for Q1 and Q3, profitability for Q3, and liquidity for Q2 and Q4 show a weak 
relationship with the level of disclosure. For industries, only properties have a significant 
difference with the industry base. 
With respect to the extent of disclosure on quarterly notes, all notes that are subject to the 
users‟ interpretations are reviewed. However, only descriptive results are discussed in this 
study. The types of notes are as follows: 
 Comment on seasonality and cyclicality 
 Review the performance (quarterly and yearly) 
 Material changes in the profit before taxation 
 Company‟s prospects (future and current) 
 Board of Directors‟ opinion 
 Profit forecast 
For the extent of disclosure on quarterly notes, most of the companies are poor in disclosing 
discretionary information as laid out by the disclosure requirement. They chose to disclose 
merely to satisfy the minimum requirement. In addition, compliance with disclosure 
concerning the Board of Directors‟ comments and profit forecast was not made available. 
Further investigation on the action taken against these non-complaint companies on these 
quarterly notes showed that no enforcement actions or penalties were imposed.  A question as 
to whether the preparers really understand the disclosure requirement arose, after the regular 
sweeping statement was seen over and over again in the quarterly reporting. Having presented 
the results, the last chapter (Chapter 7) will summarise the findings, interpret the implications 
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from the results, identify the limitations of the study, and highlight possible areas for 
improvement. 
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     Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This study has examined the mandatory disclosure of interim financial reporting by Malaysian 
companies. The mandatory disclosures were measured from two aspects: timeliness and 
compliance with the disclosure requirement. The disclosure requirement comprises FRS 134 
Interim Financial Reporting and Bursa Listing Requirement. In addition, several variables 
pertaining to firm characteristics that may be associated with the level of disclosure and 
timeliness were identified. Both univariate and multivariate analyses were conducted to 
explore the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The data were 
examined before running the analyses. Basic assumptions underlying the multiple regressions 
were also examined to see if any violations existed. The estimated regression models were all 
diagnosed for their robustness. The major findings of the study will be summarised in the next 
section. Implications from the results will be discussed in the subsequent sections, followed 
by the limitations of the study. The final section will identify possible areas for future 
research.  
7.2 Major findings of the study 
This section summarises the major findings of the study. The findings will be discussed under 
the following headings: 
 Timeliness of quarterly reporting 
 Disclosure of quarterly reporting 
 Determinants of disclosure and timeliness of quarterly reporting 
 Extent of disclosure of quarterly reporting 
7.2.1 Timeliness of quarterly reporting 
This study provides evidence for timeliness from two perspectives. The first is to establish 
whether the interim reports are produced within the allowable period as required by 
regulation. Analysis of 60 Malaysian companies, based on market capitalisation as at 31 
December 2004, found that compliance with respect to the mandatory reporting requirement 
outlined by MASB and Bursa Malaysia was high, with 93% to 100% between quarters and 
across years. Secondly, the study found that the mean times vary for each quarter for all three 
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years (2005 to 2007), and a longer time is needed to produce Q4. On average, Malaysian 
listed companies submit their reports between five and ten days before the due date. This 
result indicates that companies are taking as long as they can to submit their quarterly 
reporting. However, the time taken does not exceed the maximum allowable period. This 
finding reveals that companies are aware of the submission dateline. Compliance also 
indicates a company‟s seriousness in providing quarterly reporting to ensure investors have 
access to interim reporting that provides current information besides the annual report. 
However, companies tend to delay submission until the deadline is nearly reached, especially 
for Q4.  Although most companies are submitting their interim reports within the allowable 
period, the average time taken to produce quarterly reports is longer, especially for Q4. The 
possible reason is because preparation of Q4 coincides with the preparation of the annual 
report. This situation should not happen because the fact that reporting is mandatory need not 
have any association with the time taken to prepare and publish these reports. Companies 
should have efficient reporting systems to ensure that the preparation of financial statements, 
especially annual reports, does not affect the preparation of interim reports.  
Further analysis was carried out to investigate the nature of disclosure compliance. The 
findings revealed that the non-compliant companies belong to either Group 2 or Group 4. 
Group 2 refers to “Companies that comply with the Reporting but not the Listing” and Group 
4 refers to “Companies that do not comply with both disclosure requirements”.  However, 
both groups are non-compliant companies. The result of cross-tabulation indicated that the 
majority of these non-compliant companies belong to Group 4. These companies were further 
scrutinised for items that are commonly not disclosed. For the listing requirement, the items 
are “Opinion from the Board of Directors” and “Review of the performance of the company 
and its principal subsidiaries for the current quarter and financial year to date”. With respect 
to non-compliance with the reporting requirement, the common non-disclosure items are 
“Additional lines and items for the financial statements” and “Additional disclosure as 
required by FRS 3 Business Combination Para 66-73”.  These findings pose the question as to 
why these two items are commonly missing. Understanding what is required to be disclosed 
revealed that although explanatory notes are compulsory, the amount of disclosure provided is 
at the discretion of the preparer. This indicates that each preparer might have different 
opinions as to what items should be disclosed. Another possible reason for this missing 
disclosure could be because companies chose to disclose in other types of communication, 
such as press releases. Even if the item is being disclosed, the amount of disclosure is 
questionable, because the discretion of the preparer is very subjective. The most important 
thing is whether the disclosure meets the minimum requirement, as stipulated by the 
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regulation. The extent of disclosure carried out to determine the quality of disclosure can be 
found in Section 7.2.4.  
This study also found that there is a statistical difference in the means of timeliness across 
years (2005 to 2007). However, there is no statistical difference in the means of timeliness 
between quarters for Q1, Q2 and Q4 for all three years. In contrast, there is a difference in 
means of timeliness between quarters for Q3 for years 2005 to year 2007, and in means for 
timeliness between groups. In addition, no significant result was found in the means of 
timeliness across industries. From this result, a conclusion can be drawn that the time taken to 
produce quarterly reports for Q1 varied between 2005 and 2006, and between 2006 and 2007 
for the same quarter. This variation in the means of timeliness can be observed clearly, 
especially for Q1 and Q4, because the company is facing two major tasks during this period, 
namely, preparing the annual financial statement and the quarterly reporting. 
7.2.2  Disclosure of quarterly reporting 
Descriptive statistics revealed that full compliance was not achieved in any of the studied 
periods. Moreover, standard phrases for disclosure practices are repeated year by year. With 
respect to the means for disclosure, the study found that there was no significant difference in 
the means of the disclosure index for years 2005 and 2007, but not for year 2006. As for the 
means of the disclosure index across years for Q1 to Q4, the result implies no significant 
difference in the means of the disclosure index between quarters. A similar finding was also 
found for the means of the disclosure index across industry types. Further, the study also 
found there is significant difference in the means of the disclosure index of Group 2, Group 4 
and between groups for the three years. This result implies that the level of disclosure does 
not vary from Q1 to Q4 (between quarters). This should not have happened because each of 
the reports should be treated differently. In fact, each quarterly report should be reporting on 
events that occurred during that period. 
7.2.3 Determinants of the disclosure and timeliness of quarterly reporting 
In order to investigate the relationship between the corporate attributes and the level of 
disclosure for each quarter, the least-squares technique was employed. Having confirmed all 
the underlying assumptions for regression analysis, the results revealed that the models for all 
quarters were significant, except for Q1. These findings highlight the conflict that the 
companies are facing when the preparation of interim report coincides with the preparation of 
the annual report. It indicates that companies might not have an efficient reporting system to 
help them deal with this major task. In addition, the study found that the corporate attributes 
 109 
(company size for Q1 and Q3, profitability for Q3, and liquidity for Q2 and Q4) showed a 
weak relationship with the level of disclosure. As for industry type, only the property type had 
a significant difference with the industry-based (trading/services) type. 
For the determinants of timeliness, due to the non-normal distribution of the reporting lag, the 
Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal Wallis test were employed in this study. The study 
found that company size for Q1, Q2 and Q4, profitability for Q3 and Q4, and liquidity for Q1 
and Q2 had an association with reporting lag. Besides, all industries were found to have a 
relationship with the reporting lag. Therefore, this study concludes that the company 
attributes, company size, leverage, profitability, liquidity and industry that influence the 
mandatory disclosure are mixed. 
7.2.4 Extent of disclosure for notes of quarterly reporting 
With respect to the extent of disclosure, all notes in quarterly reports which are subject to 
interpretation of the users were reviewed. However, only descriptive results are discussed in 
this study. The types of notes are as follows: 
 Comment on seasonality and cyclicality 
 Review the performance (quarterly and yearly) 
 Material changes in the profit before taxation 
 Company‟s prospects (future and current) 
 Board of Directors‟ opinion 
 Profit forecast 
The overall findings conclude that most companies are poor in disclosing discretionary 
information, as laid out by the disclosure requirement. They chose to disclose merely to 
satisfy the minimum requirement. However, there are those who indicated “not applicable” if 
the compulsory notes to the account were not applicable for the respective period. In 
summary, the study found that, for “Comment on seasonality and cyclicality”, the majority of 
the companies made a disclosure that this item was not applicable to the company for Q1 to 
Q4. The remaining chose to include a sweeping statement that “their business is subject to 
festive season”. However, a small number of companies that disclosed this sweeping 
statement did make an extensive comment in the notes for Q1 to Q4. 
For “Review the performance”, the findings are summarised into two sections: quarterly and 
yearly performance. Findings for this item show that the majority of the companies have a 
minimum disclosure requirement, as stated by the regulation for either quarterly or yearly 
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reports. In addition, there are a small number of companies who showed a good effort by 
disclosing beyond what is required.  
Similar findings were also found for “Material changes in the profit before taxation”. The 
result implies that 65 to 85 percent of the companies for Q1 to Q4 make a general comment 
by disclosing profit before tax, turnover and explanation about material factors, which is the 
minimum disclosure for this note.  
As for “Company‟s prospects”, more than half of the companies chose not to disclose on this 
note for Q1 to Q4. The remaining provided only general comment on the company‟s progress, 
with no specific indicator of performance used as a reference. In addition, findings for “Board 
of Directors‟ opinion” and “Profit forecast” reveal that almost 100% of the Malaysian 
companies chose not to disclose these items. Even if they did, again, it was with a sweeping 
statement to indicate that these items are non-disclosable and not applicable. 
7.3 Implications of the research findings 
This study has examined the adequacy of mandatory disclosure for Interim Reporting among 
Malaysian listed companies for the period of 2005-2007. The findings reveal that compliance 
with the disclosure requirement is attainable despite a small percentage of non-compliant 
companies. As discussed previously, the Reporting requirements have legal backing, as stated 
in S26D Financial Reporting Act (Amendment) 2004. Therefore, non-compliant issues should 
not exist if all Malaysian listed companies observed and followed what is stated in the 
regulation. This is important since interim reporting has been recognised as one of the 
important mechanisms for the management to communicate with their investors. 
As for timeliness aspects, the number of days taken to produce quarterly reporting is between 
five and ten days before the due date. Even though some Malaysian listed companies 
managed to produce interim reports within the allowable period, the time taken is too long 
when compared to the quality of interim reporting. When the first quarter report was 
compared with the other quarters, it revealed that the contents of the report are merely 
standard phrases from year to year. In fact, it is clear that companies are practising „cut and 
paste‟ activities throughout the quarters. So it would be reasonable to expect that the number 
of days taken to issue the interim reports should reduce. However, this does not seem to be 
happening, since Malaysian listed companies are still taking a long time to produce the 
quarterly reports. In other words, the companies do not consider that early production of 
quarterly reporting will benefit their organisation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
purpose of producing the quarterly reports is mainly for the company to comply with the 
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regulation and to avoid a bad to reputation in the eyes of the enforcement bodies. The 
companies also fail to implement an efficient reporting system to help them deal with the 
preparation of quarterly reports. 
Findings for the extent of disclosure on notes for quarterly reporting reveal that there are 
items that have not been properly disclosed. For example, the listing requirement required that 
the Board of Directors provide its opinion/comment on the progress of the company.  The 
majority of the companies failed to comply. Upon investigation, the companies chose to make 
separate comments in either a press release or the company newsletter. This action is not 
consistent with what is required by the disclosure requirement. Another example is the profit 
forecast. The findings imply that most of the companies chose to state “Not applicable”.  This, 
again, poses a question as to why such an important disclosure is not being given attention. 
Profit forecast is one of the important items that investors will read in order to have an idea 
about the company‟s future performances. Such findings pose a question as to why these 
items are missing or not applicable. One possible reason could be that these items were 
disclosed in another medium of communication. 
The regression result reveals that there is a mixed association between the level of disclosure 
and the variables. For example, an association can be found between the level of disclosure 
and the company size for Q1 and Q3, profitability for Q4, and liquidity for Q2 and Q4. 
However, the association is very weak. The finding provides an avenue for future research to 
investigate what will happen to this association when other variables, such as dividends and 
the number of shares, are added to the model. Similar research can also be conducted for the 
association between timeliness and company characteristics.  
Overall, this study has identified areas of weaknesses relating to the enforcement of 
compliance regulations that should be addressed in the future. In addition, other variables can 
be added to the existing model, because the R-squared value is still low even though the 
overall model is significant. It suggests that the regulators or enforcement bodies should hold 
seminars and training for preparers in order to highlight issues regarding interim reporting. 
The seminars and training would also be a place for the preparers to discuss any issues 
pertaining to interim reporting. Hence, this action by the regulators or enforcement bodies not 
only would benefit the Malaysian listed companies, but it would add to the companies‟ 
credibility in the eye of investors. It will also protect the investors‟ interests because quarterly 
reporting provides the most current information on the company‟s financial performance. 
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7.4 Limitations of this study 
There are several limitations which should be considered when evaluating this study. Firstly, a 
content analysis was adopted and a disclosure index model was employed to measure the 
quality of disclosure. A review of the literature shows that the content analysis approach and 
the disclosure index model are commonly used in disclosure studies but the method of 
analysis and the model have their strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the use of content 
analysis in this study has been justified and is empirically valid.  
Secondly, the sample and industry groupings used in this study could diminish the accuracy of 
the result. This is because the sample consists of the top 100 companies, but after excluding  
companies that have incomplete data, the final sample size drops to 60 companies. In 
addition, some of the industry groupings have very small sizes, for example technology with 
only two companies, plantations and property with four companies 
Thirdly, one of the issues that always arises during disclosure studies is how to distinguish 
between a „non-disclosure‟ and a „not applicable‟ item, because these two will affect the 
calculation of the level of disclosure. Hence, in order to have a clear picture of how to 
distinguish between these two items, the entire interim report was read. 
Fourthly, this study only considered the quarterly report in order to determine whether the 
company has complied with the mandatory disclosure requirement. No other medium was 
used to capture the mandatory disclosure. 
Fifthly, no inferential statistics concerning the extent of disclosure were run on the data. This 
study does not investigate the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms for interim reporting. 
In addition, the time series could only be carried out for three years (2005 to 2007), 
considering the availability of the interim reporting and the date when the enforcement of 
FRS took place. 
Sixthly, in attempting to ascertain which corporate attributes explain the variation in levels of 
disclosure and timeliness for Malaysian companies, some attributes such as corporate 
governance, audit committee and interim dividend which may be influential were not 
considered in this study. Thus, future research may investigate the effects of these corporate 
attributes on mandatory disclosures. 
Finally, the meaning of „adequacy‟ used in this study should be interpreted with extra caution. 
The word used in this study does not reflect the situation where information disclosed in the 
interim reporting is considered adequate, if it is capable of fulfilling users‟ needs. It only 
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considers „adequacy‟ from compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirement of interim 
reporting. This concept is adopted from the Owusu-Ansah study.  
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
This is the first comprehensive study for disclosure studies involving quarterly reporting in 
Malaysia. It generates many possibilities for future research. Findings from this study suggest 
that a comparative study on compliance with quarterly reporting can be carried out with other 
countries (such as New Zealand and Australia) that have similar legal environments. In 
addition, this research has examined the   relationship between the comprehensiveness of 
mandatory disclosure and firm characteristics, which are mostly a firm‟s attributes. It would 
be interesting to know how the disclosure quality of interim reporting reacts to industry and 
market-specific variables (such as market share).  
Further, the result of the regression equation shows a low level of R-squared for the level of 
disclosure and timeliness. Therefore, it is important to indicate the amount of dependent 
variable variation that was not explained. Exploring other variables that were excluded from 
the analysis which may affect the dependent variables (namely, level of disclosure and 
timeliness) may shed more light on the disclosure of quarterly reporting.  Further study can 
also include the relationship of mandatory disclosure with audit and corporate governance 
characteristics. 
In future, this study can also be repeated to observe any improvement on compliance issues 
and the level of disclosure. A longitudinal study and adjustment period have been considered 
for this study to ensure that the companies are practising what they are required to do, and not 
just sitting in their comfort zone while complying with the reporting regulation. Moreover,  
research can also be carried out on voluntary disclosure for quarterly reporting which includes 
other disclosures made for quarterly reporting in other communication media.  
In addition, a study can be carried out on the awareness and understanding of interim 
reporting among the accounting practitioners. It is important to investigate their level of 
awareness and understanding of disclosure requirements for quarterly reporting. Further,  
research into the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism will help towards studying the 
reasons for non-compliance among companies. 
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     Appendix 1 
Kilmogorov Value (Before and After Transformation) 
Before transformation After transformation (Using Van daer Waerden‟s approach) 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk  Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
DI_Q1_2005 .091 60 .200(*) .977 60 .316 DI_Q1_2005 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q2_2005 .073 60 .200(*) .985 60 .676 DI_Q2_2005 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q3_2005 .078 60 .200(*) .982 60 .532 DI_Q3_2005 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q4_2005 .073 60 .200(*) .984 60 .609 DI_Q4_2005 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q1_2006 .068 60 .200(*) .984 60 .620 DI_Q1_2006 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q2_2006 .101 60 .200(*) .969 60 .126 DI_Q2_2006 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q3_2006 .096 60 .200(*) .968 60 .116 DI_Q3_2006 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q4_2006 .062 60 .200(*) .978 60 .354 DI_Q4_2006 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q1_2007 .090 60 .200(*) .977 60 .323 DI_Q1_2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q2_2007 .061 60 .200(*) .980 60 .415 DI_Q2_2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q3_2007 .066 60 .200(*) .977 60 .309 DI_Q3_2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DI_Q4_2007 .080 60 .200(*) .969 60 .131 DI_Q4_2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CS_Q1_2005 .275 60 .000 .528 60 .000 CS_Q1_2005 .074 60 .200(*) .986 60 .729 
CS_Q2_2005 .276 60 .000 .523 60 .000 CS_Q2_2005 .073 60 .200(*) .985 60 .648 
CS_Q3_2005 .275 60 .000 .524 60 .000 CS_Q3_2005 .067 60 .200(*) .984 60 .619 
CS_Q4_2005 .276 60 .000 .521 60 .000 CS_Q4_2005 .086 60 .200(*) .983 60 .566 
CS_Q1_2006 .269 60 .000 .538 60 .000 CS_Q1_2006 .084 60 .200(*) .986 60 .737 
CS_Q2_2006 .269 60 .000 .545 60 .000 CS_Q2_2006 .085 60 .200(*) .987 60 .776 
CS_Q3_2006 .268 60 .000 .548 60 .000 CS_Q3_2006 .084 60 .200(*) .987 60 .786 
CS_Q4_2006 .271 60 .000 .558 60 .000 CS_Q4_2006 .066 60 .200(*) .989 60 .870 
CS_Q1_2007 .264 60 .000 .569 60 .000 CS_Q1_2007 .071 60 .200(*) .986 60 .739 
CS_Q2_2007 .262 60 .000 .601 60 .000 CS_Q2_2007 .078 60 .200(*) .985 60 .661 
CS_Q3_2007 .259 60 .000 .605 60 .000 CS_Q3_2007 .103 60 .200(*) .982 60 .540 
CS_Q4_2007 .255 60 .000 .618 60 .000 CS_Q4_2007 .079 60 .200(*) .986 60 .732 
QR_Q1_2005 .200 60 .000 .718 60 .000 QR_Q1_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q2_2005 .245 60 .000 .508 60 .000 QR_Q2_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q3_2005 .183 60 .000 .686 60 .000 QR_Q3_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q4_2005 .244 60 .000 .719 60 .000 QR_Q4_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q1_2006 .258 60 .000 .663 60 .000 QR_Q1_2006 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q2_2006 .282 60 .000 .622 60 .000 QR_Q2_2006 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q3_2006 .248 60 .000 .636 60 .000 QR_Q3_2006 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
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Before transformation After transformation (Using Van daer Waerden‟s approach) 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk  Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
QR_Q4_2006 .212 60 .000 .774 60 .000 QR_Q4_2006 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q1_2007 .264 60 .000 .682 60 .000 QR_Q1_2007 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q2_2007 .304 60 .000 .610 60 .000 QR_Q2_2007 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q3_2007 .228 60 .000 .638 60 .000 QR_Q3_2007 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
QR_Q4_2007 .280 60 .000 .537 60 .000 QR_Q4_2007 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q1_2005 .238 60 .000 .742 60 .000 P_ Q1_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q2_2005 .213 60 .000 .819 60 .000 P_ Q2_2005 .032 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q3_2005 .228 60 .000 .665 60 .000 P_ Q3_2005 .018 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q4_2005 .257 60 .000 .748 60 .000 P_ Q4_2005 .021 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q1_2006 .191 60 .000 .722 60 .000 P_ Q1_2006 .024 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q2_2006 .229 60 .000 .656 60 .000 P_ Q2_2006 .024 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q3_2006 .292 60 .000 .533 60 .000 P_ Q3_2006 .023 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q4_2006 .205 60 .000 .702 60 .000 P_ Q4_2006 .023 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q1_2007 .201 60 .000 .735 60 .000 P_ Q1_2007 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q2_2007 .265 60 .000 .698 60 .000 P_ Q2_2007 .024 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q3_2007 .285 60 .000 .599 60 .000 P_ Q3_2007 .022 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
P_ Q4_2007 .254 60 .000 .685 60 .000 P_ Q4_2007 .023 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
L_Q1_2005 .201 60 .000 .575 60 .000 L_Q1_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
L_Q2_2005 .201 60 .000 .594 60 .000 L_Q2_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
L_Q3_2005 .220 60 .000 .511 60 .000 L_Q3_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
L_Q4_2005 .220 60 .000 .521 60 .000 L_Q4_2005 .016 60 .200(*) .997 60 1.000 
L_Q1_2006 .075 60 .200(*) .975 60 .263 L_Q1_2006 .053 60 .200(*) .995 60 .998 
L_Q2_2006 .068 60 .200(*) .980 60 .442 L_Q2_2006 .050 60 .200(*) .995 60 .997 
L_Q3_2006 .057 60 .200(*) .981 60 .477 L_Q3_2006 .043 60 .200(*) .993 60 .977 
L_Q4_2006 .068 60 .200(*) .979 60 .404 L_Q4_2006 .034 60 .200(*) .996 60 .999 
L_Q1_2007 .050 60 .200(*) .981 60 .469 L_Q1_2007 .045 60 .200(*) .995 60 .998 
L_Q2_2007 .064 60 .200(*) .984 60 .598 L_Q2_2007 .035 60 .200(*) .993 60 .986 
L_Q3_2007 .072 60 .200(*) .975 60 .243 L_Q3_2007 .040 60 .200(*) .995 60 .999 
L_Q4_2007 .065 60 .200(*) .982 60 .530 L_Q4_2007 .043 60 .200(*) .993 60 .979 
 
N/A  No transformation was done against the disclosure indices because it is normal distributed 
*  This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a  Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 122 
     Appendix 2 
Items in the Disclosure Requirement 
FRS 134 INTERIM REPORTING 
1. Condensed statements are clearly labelled 
2. Prominently display an explicit statement that the interim financial report is to be read 
in conjunction with the most recent annual financial report 
3. Include comparative condensed balance sheet  
4. Include current, cumulative and comparative condensed income statement 
5. Include cumulative and comparative condensed statement of changes in equity 
6. Condensed cash flow statement 
7. Additional line items and notes should be included if their omission would make the 
condensed interim financial statements misleading. 
8. Basic EPS (on the face of income statement) 
9. Diluted EPS (on the face of income statement) 
10. Same accounting policies are followed 
11. Changes in accounting policies 
12. Auditor‟s opinion on previous annual report 
13. Comment on seasonality or cyclicality factors 
14. Unusual item that affects assets, liability, equity, net income and cash flows 
15. Changes in estimates (if  these changes have material effects) 
16. Issuance, cancellation, repurchases and repayment of debt and equity securities 
17. Dividends paid 
18. Segmental reporting in primary segment format 
19. Valuations of property, plant and equipment 
20. Events after balance sheet date 
21. Disclose that preparation of interim report complies with FRS 134 
22.  Effect of changes in the composition of the entity during the interim period (e.g. 
business combination, disposals, restructurings and discontinued operations) 
23.  Addition note (FRS 3 para 66-73) 
24.  Any other disclosure of events or transactions that are material to an understanding of 
the current interim period. 
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LISTING REQUIREMENTS Para 2.22 
25. Review of the performance of the company and its principal subsidiaries setting out 
material factors affecting the earnings and/or revenue of the company and the group for 
the current quarter. 
26. Review of the performance of the company and its principal subsidiaries setting out 
material factors affecting the earnings and/or revenue of the company and the group for 
the financial year-to-date. 
27. Comment on material change in the profit before taxation for the quarterly result as 
compared with the preceding quarter 
28.  Comment on the current year prospect –factors that influence the prospects 
29.  Comment on the company progress and steps taken to achieve target which was 
previously announced or publicly documented 
30.  Opinion from the board of directors about the forecast and actual company performance 
which was previously announced or publicly documented 
31. Explanatory note – variance of actual profit after tax, minority interest (variance 
exceeds 10%) – Only applicable in final quarter 
32. Shortfall in the profit guarantee received by the company and steps taken to recover the 
shortfall – Only applicable in final quarter 
33. Taxation (breakdown of tax charged) 
34. Taxation (explanation of variance) 
35. Profit on sale of unquoted investment and/or property respectively for the current and 
financial year to date. 
36. Purchase and sale of quoted securities OTHER than securities in existing subsidiaries 
and associate companies. 
37. Investment in quoted securities (showing cost, carrying value/book value and market 
value) 
38. Status of corporate proposal 
39 Brief explanation about procedures which arise due to corporate proposal (in table form) 
40. Group borrowing and debt securities   (between secured and unsecured, short term and 
long term borrowings and foreign currency-breakdown in each currency) 
41. Financial instrument with off balance sheet risk 
42. Changes in material litigation 
43. Final dividend (if decision has been made) - state mention, the amount per share, 
previous corresponding period, date payable and the deposited securities 
44. Earnings per share (what are the numerator and denominator in calculating basic 
earning per share) 
45. Earnings per share (what are the numerator and denominator in calculating diluted 
earning per share) 
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     Appendix 3 
Scoring Sheet for Level of Disclosure 
COMPANY NAME: 
YEAR:  2005 / 2006 / 2007 
TYPE: Condensed / Complete 
FINANCIAL YEAR: 31 JAN/ 31 MAR/ 30 APR/ 30 JUN/  31 JUL/ 31 AUG/ 30 SEP/ 31 
DEC  
No ITEM Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remarks 
1 Condensed statement are 
clearly labelled 
     
2 Prominently displayed an 
explicit statement 
     
3 Include comparative 
condensed balance sheet  
     
4 Include current , cumulative 
and comparative condensed 
income statement* 
     
5 Include cumulative and 
comparative condensed 
statement of changes in 
equity*  
     
6 Condensed cash flow 
statement* 
     
7  Additional item      
8 Basic EPs ( on the face of 
income statement) 
     
9 Diluted earning per share (on 
the face of income statement) 
     
10 Same accounting policies are 
followed 
     
11 Changes in accounting 
policies (FRS 108) 
     
12 Auditor‟s opinion  on previous 
annual report 
     
13 COMMENT on seasonality 
or cyclicality factors** 
     
14 Unusual item that affects 
assets, liability, equity, net 
income and cash flows. 
     
15 Changes in estimates (if these 
changes have material effect) 
     
16 Issuance, cancellation, 
repurchases  and repayment of 
debt and equity securities 
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No ITEM Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remarks 
17 Dividends paid      
18 Segmental reporting in 
primary segment format 
     
19 Valuations of property, plant 
and equipment 
     
20 Events after balance sheet date      
21 Disclose that preparation of 
interim report complies with 
FRS 134 
     
22 Effect of changes in the 
composition of the entity (e.g 
business combinations(BC), 
disposals, restructuring and 
discontinued operation) 
     
23 Additional note -BC- FRS 3 
para 66-73 
     
24 Any other disclosure of event 
or transaction besides 
disclosure 9-21. 
     
25 REVIEW the performance of 
the company and its principal 
subsidiaries (pre-tax profit) for 
the current quarter. 
-setting out material factors 
     
26 REVIEW the performance of 
the company and its principal 
subsidiaries (pre-tax profit) for 
the financial year to date.-
setting out material factors 
     
27 COMMENT on material 
change in the profit before 
taxation for the  quarterly 
result as compared with the 
preceding quarter 
     
28 COMMENT on the current 
year‟s prospects –factors that 
influence the prospects 
     
29 COMMENT on the company 
progress and steps taken  to 
achieve target which was 
previously announced or 
publicly documented 
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No ITEM Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remarks 
30 OPINION from the board of 
directors about the forecast 
and actual company 
performance which was 
previously announced or 
publicly documented 
     
31 Explanatory note – variance of 
actual profit after tax, minority 
interest (variance exceeds 
10%) – Only applicable in 
final quarter 
     
32 Shortfall in the profit 
guarantee received by the 
company and steps taken to 
recover the shortfall – Only 
applicable in final quarter 
     
33 Taxation ( breakdown of tax 
charged) 
     
34 Taxation ( explanation of 
variance) 
     
35 Profit on sale of unquoted 
investment and/or property 
respectively for the current 
and financial year to date. 
     
36 Purchase and sale of quoted 
securities OTHER than 
securities in existing 
subsidiaries and associate 
companies. 
     
37 Investment in quoted 
securities (showing cost, 
carrying value/book value and 
market value) 
     
38 Status of corporate proposal      
39 Brief explanation about 
procedures arising due to 
corporate proposal (in table 
form) 
     
40 Group borrowing and debt 
securities       (between 
secured and unsecured, short 
term and long term 
borrowings and foreign 
currency-breakdown in each 
currency) 
     
41 Financial instrument with off 
balance sheet risk 
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No ITEM Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remarks 
42 Changes in material litigation      
43 Final dividend (if decision has 
been made) - state the amount 
per share, previous 
corresponding period, date 
payable and the deposited 
securities. 
     
44 Earnings per share ( what are 
the numerator and 
denominator  in calculating 
basic  earning per share) 
     
45 Earnings per share ( what are 
the numerator and 
denominator  in calculating 
diluted  earning per share) 
     
46 Total assets      
47 Sales/turnover      
48 Total liabilities      
59 Shareholder equity      
50 Net profit after tax and interest      
51 Inventory      
52 Current asset      
53 Current liabilities      
54 EPS      
55 Prepayment      
56 Industry group      
Item 1- 24 – required by standard 
24 - 45   required by listing requirement 
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     Appendix 4 
Scoring Sheet for Extent of Disclosure 
COMPANY: 
YEAR: 2005/2006/2007 
NO ITEM Theme Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remark 
1. 
(12) 
Comment on 
seasonality and 
cyclicality 
1. Due to festive season      
2. Due to festive season with few 
comments 
3. Due to festive season with 
analytical discussion 
2. 
(23) 
Review the 
performance 
(quarter) 
0. No information      
1. General explanation 
2. Either profit before tax only or 
turnover only 
3. Both profit before tax  and 
turnover 
4. Profit before tax, turnover  and 
explanation about material 
factors 
5. Profit before tax, turnover and 
other performance measurement 
together with explanation about 
material factors 
3. 
(24) 
Review the 
performance 
(year to date) 
0. No information      
1. General explanation 
2. Either profit before tax only or 
turnover only 
3. Both profit before tax  and 
turnover 
4. Profit before tax, turnover  and 
explanation about material 
factors 
5. Profit before tax, turnover and 
other performance measurement 
together with explanation about 
material factors 
4. 
(25) 
Material 
changes in the 
profit before 
taxation 
0. No information      
1. General explanation 
2. Either profit before tax only or 
turnover only 
3. Both profit before tax  and 
turnover 
4. Profit before tax, turnover  and 
explanation about material 
factors 
5. Profit before tax, turnover and 
other performance measurement 
together with explanation about 
material factors 
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NO ITEM Theme Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Remark 
5. 
(26) 
Company‟s 
prospects 
(future) 
0. No  projection on prospects      
1. General projection about 
company‟s prospects 
2. Projection with specific 
comment that company‟s   
prospects would depend on either 
factors specific to the company 
or economic factors. 
6. 
(27) 
Company‟s 
progress 
(current) 
0. No comment on company‟s 
progress  
     
1. General comment about 
company‟s progress 
2. Specific comment that 
company‟s   prospects would 
depend on either factors specific 
to the company or economic 
factors 
7. 
(28) 
BOD opinion 0. No information      
1. State not applicable 
2. State that no forecast or 
projection has been made 
8. 
(29) 
Profit forecast 0. No information      
1.Only quantitative figure 
without  variance and shortfall. 
2. .Only quantitative figure for 
the variance and shortfall. 
3. Quantitative figure with 
explanation about  the variance 
and shortfall  
4. Quantitative figure with 
explanation about  the variance 
and shortfall  and steps taken to 
recover the shortfall. 
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     Appendix 5 
Regression Analysis for Each Quarter 
MODEL 1: THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES ON LEVEL OF 
DISCLOSURE FOR QUARTER 1 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.814 0.044 18.609 0.000   
Company size 0.013 0.007 1.952 0.053* 0.638 1.566 
Leverage -0.002 0.003 -0.730 0.466 0.637 1.571 
Liquidity -0.002 0.003 -0.608 0.544 0.817 1.225 
Profitability 0.002 0.003 0.514 0.608 0.799 1.252 
I_industrial -0.001 0.008 -0.136 0.892 0.701 1.427 
I_consumer 0.006 0.008 0.804 0.423 0.712 1.404 
I_construction -0.009 0.010 -0.871 0.385 0.802 1.247 
I_property -0.029 0.011 -2.712 0.007** 0.865 1.157 
I_infrastructure -0.011 0.010 -1.107 0.270 0.825 1.213 
I_plantation -0.008 0.011 -0.757 0.450 0.815 1.226 
I_technology 0.008 0.015 0.521 0.603 0.851 1.175 
 
Model summary: 
R=0.308     R-squared =0.095  Adjusted R-squared=0.036     Standard error =0.0332 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Model             Sum of Squares         df         Mean Square      F-value      Significance 
Regression               .019                 11               0.002            1.605           0.101 
Residual                   .185                168              0.001 
Total                       0.204                179 
 
* Significant at 0.05  
** Significant at 0.01 
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MODEL 2:  THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES ON LEVEL OF 
DISCLOSURE FOR QUARTER 2 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.836 0.048 17.342 0.000   
Company size 0.009 0.007 1.195 0.234 0.667 1.500 
Leverage 0.000 0.004 0.052 0.958 0.619 1.616 
Liquidity -0.006 0.003 -1.843 0.067* 0.855 1.170 
Profitability 0.004 0.003 1.101 0.272 0.795 1.257 
I_industrial -0.006 0.009 -0.619 0.536 0.731 1.367 
I_consumer 0.013 0.009 1.411 0.160 0.700 1.429 
I_construction 0.004 0.012 0.328 0.744 0.781 1.281 
I_property -0.050 0.012 -4.131 0.000** 0.867 1.153 
I_infrastructure -0.008 0.011 -0.746 0.457 0.838 1.193 
I_plantation 0.001 0.013 0.056 0.955 0.788 1.269 
I_technology 0.024 0.017 1.444 0.151 0.865 1.156 
Model summary: 
R=0.410       R-squared =0.168  Adjusted R-squared=0.114     Standard error =0.0379 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Model             Sum of Squares         df         Mean Square      F-value      Significance 
Regression               .049                 11               0.004            3.090           0.001 
Residual                   .241                168              0.001 
Total                       0.290                179 
 
*Significant at 0.10 
**Significant at 0.01 
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MODEL 3:  THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES ON LEVEL OF 
DISCLOSURE FOR QUARTER 3 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.806 0.048 16.685 0.000   
Company size 0.013 0.007 1.793 0.075* 0.686 1.457 
Leverage 0.001 0.004 0.156 0.876 0.649 1.541 
Liquidity -0.006 0.003 -1.828 0.069 0.853 1.172 
Profitability 0.008 0.003 2.334 0.021** 0.803 1.246 
I_industrial 0.000 0.009 0.029 0.977 0.737 1.357 
I_consumer 0.015 0.009 0.134 1.646 0.716 1.397 
I_construction 0.009 0.012 0.745 0.457 0.754 1.327 
I_property -0.048 0.012 -3.885 0.000*** 0.865 1.156 
I_infrastructure -0.004 0.011 -0.335 0.738 0.834 1.200 
I_plantation -0.003 0.013 -0.246 0.806 0.792 1.263 
I_technology 0.022 0.017 1.257 0.210 0.858 1.165 
Model summary: 
R=0.444       R-squared =0.197  Adjusted R-squared=0.144     Standard error =0.0382 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Model             Sum of Squares         df         Mean Square      F-value      Significance 
Regression               .060                11               0.005            3.740           0.000 
Residual                   .246                168              0.001 
Total                       0.307                179 
 
* Significant at 0.10 
**Significant at 0.05 
***Significant at 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 133 
MODEL 4:  THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES ON LEVEL OF 
DISCLOSURE FOR QUARTER 4 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.827 0.049 16.942 0.000   
Company size 0.010 0.007 1.441 0.152 0.675 1.482 
Leverage 0.003 0.004 0.079 0.885 0.621 1.611 
Liquidity -0.006 0.003 -1.952 0.053* 0.861 1.161 
Profitability 0.004 0.003 0.100 1.287 0.828 1.207 
I_industrial -0.005 0.009 -0.512 0.609 0.755 1.324 
I_consumer 0.010 0.009 1.047 0.297 0.727 1.376 
I_construction 0.000 0.012 -0.025 0.980 0.761 1.314 
I_property -0.046 0.013 -3.671 0.000** 0.857 1.167 
I_infrastructure -0.006 0.012 -0.477 0.634 0.820 1.219 
I_plantation 0.002 0.013 0.163 0.871 0.797 1.255 
I_technology 0.018 0.017 1.073 0.285 0.855 1.131 
Model summary: 
R=0.409       R-squared =0.167  Adjusted R-squared=0.113     Standard error =0.0388 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Model             Sum of Squares         df         Mean Square      F-value      Significance 
Regression               .051                 11               0.005            3.069           0.001 
Residual                   .253                168              0.002 
Total                       0.304                179 
 
*Significant at 0.05 
**Significant at 0.01 
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Result of nonparametric Mann-Whitney test between reporting lag and company 
attributes for Quarter 1 
Independent 
variables 
 
n 
Mean reporting 
lag 
Mann-Whitney test 
Mean rank Sig. (2 tailed) 
Company size: 
      Small 
      Large 
 
45 
45 
 
40.00 
51.00 
 
1800.00 
2295.00 
 
0.038 
Profitability: 
      Low profitable 
      High profitable 
 
45 
45 
 
52.60 
38.40 
 
2367.00 
1728.00 
 
0.007 
Leverage: 
      Lowly leveraged 
      Highly leveraged 
 
45 
45 
 
46.28 
44.72 
 
2082.50 
2012.50 
 
0.770 
Liquidity: 
     Low liquid 
     High liquid 
 
45 
45 
 
50.20 
40.80 
 
2259.00 
1836.00 
 
0.077 
 
 
 
 
Result of nonparametric Mann-Whitney test between reporting lag and company 
attributes for Quarter 2 
Independent 
variables 
 
n 
Mean reporting 
lag 
Mann-Whitney test 
Mean rank Sig. (2 tailed) 
Company size: 
      Small 
      Large 
 
45 
45 
 
38.99 
52.01 
 
1754.50 
2340.50 
 
0.014 
Profitability: 
      Low profitable 
      High profitable 
 
45 
45 
 
49.76 
41.24 
 
2239.00 
1856.00 
 
0.107 
Leverage: 
      Lowly leveraged 
      Highly leveraged 
 
45 
45 
 
47.23 
43.77 
 
2125.50 
1969.50 
 
0.513 
Liquidity: 
     Low liquid 
     High liquid 
 
45 
45 
 
49.94 
41.06 
 
2247.50 
1847.50 
 
0.093 
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Result of nonparametric Mann-Whitney test between reporting lag and company 
attributes for Quarter 3 
Independent 
variables 
 
n 
Mean reporting 
lag 
Mann-Whitney test 
Mean rank Sig. (2 tailed) 
Company size: 
      Small 
      Large 
 
45 
45 
 
37.23 
53.77 
 
1675.50 
2419.50 
 
0.002 
Profitability: 
      Low profitable 
      High profitable 
 
45 
45 
 
51.30 
39.70 
 
2308.50 
1786.50 
 
0.028 
Leverage: 
      Lowly leveraged 
      Highly leveraged 
 
45 
45 
 
48.78 
42.22 
 
2195.00 
1900.00 
 
0.219 
Liquidity: 
     Low liquid 
     High liquid 
 
45 
45 
 
48.20 
42.80 
 
2169.00 
1926.00 
 
0.310 
 
 
 
 
Result of nonparametric Mann-Whitney test between reporting lag and company 
attributes for Quarter 4 
Independent 
variables 
 
n 
Mean reporting 
lag 
Mann-Whitney test 
Mean rank Sig. (2 tailed) 
Company size: 
      Small 
      Large 
 
45 
45 
 
44.40 
46.60 
 
1998.00 
2097.00 
 
0.678 
Profitability: 
      Low profitable 
      High profitable 
 
45 
45 
 
51.00 
40.00 
 
2295.00 
1800.00 
 
0.038 
Leverage: 
      Lowly leveraged 
      Highly leveraged 
 
45 
45 
 
46.61 
44.39 
 
2097.50 
1997.50 
 
0.675 
Liquidity: 
     Low liquid 
     High liquid 
 
45 
45 
 
45.89 
45.11 
 
2065.00 
2030.00 
 
0.882 
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Result of nonparametric Kruskal Wallis test between reporting lag and industries for 
Quarter 1 to Quarter 4 
 
Quarter 
 
Industry 
 
n 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
Mean rank Sig. (2 tailed) 
 
 
 
 
Q1 
Trading/service 63 91.97  
 
 
 
0.008 
Industrial 27 96.30 
consumer 30 86.18 
construction 15 101.30 
property 12 131.17 
Infrastructure 15 83.40 
plantation 12 56.17 
technology 6 48.67 
 
 
 
Q2 
Trading/service 63 89.41  
 
 
 
 
0.018 
Industrial 27 94.33 
consumer 30 82.27 
construction 15 102.67 
property 12 137.96 
Infrastructure 15 66.70 
plantation 12 84.92 
technology 6 71.17 
 
 
 
Q3 
Trading/service 63 83.03  
 
 
 
 
0.000 
Industrial 27 93.74 
consumer 30 83.77 
construction 15 125.63 
property 12 147.00 
Infrastructure 15 77.97 
plantation 12 76.50 
technology 6 46.50 
 
 
 
Q4 
Trading/service 63 86.37  
 
 
 
0.023 
Industrial 27 89.17 
consumer 30 106.97 
construction 15 109.57 
property 12 114.67 
Infrastructure 15 72.80 
plantation 12 59.46 
technology 6 67.83 
 
